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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
THE WORLD OF THE UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY ELITE:  
A CASE STUDY OF THE U.S. FOREIGN POLICY THINK TANKS’ DEBATES IN 
THE GENERAL ELECTIONS OF 2004, 2008, AND 2012 
by 
Seyed Hamidreza Serri 
Florida International University, 2015 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Mohiaddin Mesbahi, Major Professor 
American foreign policy think tanks are an important part of the American foreign policy 
elite. By gathering data, publishing research, and reaching out to the public and 
government, think tanks help set the public debate agenda. The question I asked was 
whether these American foreign policy think tanks exhibited a shared worldview during 
the past three election cycles. I analyzed 7,000 documents (half a million verbs) 
published by the seven American foreign policy think tanks active in the three general 
elections of 2004, 2008, and 2012: the American Enterprise Institute, the Brookings 
Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Cato Institute, the 
Council on Foreign Relations, the Heritage Foundation, and the RAND Corporation. To 
measure the collective and individual worldviews of these seven think tanks, I used the 
Profiler Plus software, which answered Alexander George’s operational code questions 
based on the transitive verbs for the Self and the Other. My research showed that the 
collectivity of the seven think tanks had three separate worlds of action with three 
different worldviews. It also showed that the worldview of the American collective Self 
 viii 
 
was very stable across time. Another empirical finding was that from the perspective of 
the seven think tanks, the United States’ actions were the most similar to the actions of 
other great powers: Europe, China, and Russia. It was also shown that from the 
perspective of the seven think tanks, China was the most cooperative nation and 
Terrorists were the most conflictual actors in the world.  
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CHAPTER 1 : RESEARCH QUESTION 
1- General Statement  
 The importance of the United States in world affairs makes explaining U.S. 
foreign policy crucial for understanding world politics. Therefore, numerous theories 
about foreign policy and international relations have addressed U.S. foreign policy, 
employing different levels of analysis.1  
 Some scholars, such as Kenneth Waltz2 and John Mearsheimer,3 choose the level 
of international system. Others, like William Appleman Williams and the scholars of the 
Wisconsin School, argue that American foreign policy should be interpreted according to 
the imperial intentions of the United States.4 However, in place of these systemic studies, 
researchers can use lower levels of analysis, such as sub-state, organizational, and 
individual levels. Graham Allison, for instance, examines bureaucratic politics;5 David 
Barber focuses on presidential character;6 and Peter Trubowitz addresses the role of the 
economic regions in the United States to explain American foreign policy.7 Stephen Walt 
                                                 
1 J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations,” World Politics 14, no. 1 
(1961): 77-92. 
2 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill, 1979). 
3 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politic (New York: Norton, 2001). 
4 William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1988). 
5 Graham Allison and Zelikow Philip, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New 
York: Longman, 1999). 
6 James David Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992). 
7 Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998). 
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and others emphasize the role of domestic pressure groups in shaping U.S. foreign 
policy.1 
 Some proponents of a lower/domestic level of analysis choose elites as their 
explanatory level of analysis. They argue that U.S. foreign policy is shaped and 
conducted by a group of individuals whose influence is significantly greater than the 
general public’s.2 Elites influence American foreign policy disproportionately through 
their exercise of the power of ideas, the power of instructions/rules, and the power of 
purse.3 Using any combination of these powers, elites set the foreign policy agenda and 
define the possible and acceptable solutions for issues they are concerned with. Elite 
Theory peaked during the 1960s and 1970s. In 1967, G. William Domhoff published Who 
Rules America?, the seminal book in this category. Domhoff argues that although 
Americans despise the terms class and power elite, there is, in fact, an economic      
upper-class that rules the nation.4 
 Some scholars study the elites by extracting their worldviews through surveys.5 In 
the 1970s Ole R. Holsti and James Rosenau started the most famous survey studies of the 
U.S. foreign policy elite. In a series of surveys taken between 1976 to 1996 that 
                                                 
1 Stephen M. Walt and John J. Mearsheimer, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Girous, 2007). 
2 See G. William Domhoff, The Higher Circles; The Governing Class in America (New York: Vintage, 
1971); 
G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America?: The Triumph of the Corporate Rich (New York: McGraw-Hill, 
2014). 
3 James McGann, The Competition for Dollars, Scholars and Influence in the Public Policy Research 
Industry (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1995). 
4 Domhoff, The Triumph of the Corporate Rich. 
5 Ole R. Holsti, Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2004). 
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categorized the elites’ beliefs regarding militant internationalism and cooperative 
internationalism, the authors demonstrated that significant divisions exist among the 
elites.1 Holsti and Rosenau divided the elites into four categories. They classified those 
who opposed both kinds of internationalism as Isolationists, those who supported both 
types of internationalism as Internationalists, those who supported cooperative 
internationalism and opposed militant internationalism as Accomodationists, and finally 
those who opposed cooperative internationalism and supported militant internationalism 
as Hardliners.2 
 In 2002, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs conducted another study of the 
U.S. elite centered around an issue-oriented perspective on the elites’ worldviews.3 For 
instance, on the issue of the U.S. unilateralism, non-governmental members of the elite 
argued that the United States needs the support of allies in order to act successfully in the 
world. On the other hand, a majority of elite members from the U.S. House of 
Representatives, the Senate, and the administration said that the United States had the 
right to act alone. Or, in the case of Israel and Palestine, most of the U.S. elite supported 
neutrality, whereas the elite in the Senate expressed pro-Israeli sentiments.4 
                                                 
1 Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, “Foreign Policy Leadership Project, 1976-1996 (ICPSR 2614),” 
ICPSR, accessed March 12, 2015, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/2614/version/1/. 
2 Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, “The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes among American 
Leaders,” The Journal of Politics 52, no. 1 (1990): 94-125. 
3 Marshall M. Bouton, Worldviews 2002: American Public Opinion & Foreign Policy (Chicago: Chicago 
Council on Foreign Relations, 2002). 
4 James McCormick, American Foreign Policy and Process (Boston, MA: Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 
2010), 603. 
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 A recent study of the U.S. foreign policy elite is the 2005 Pew survey,1 to which 
more than 520 individuals in key leadership positions, including members of think tanks, 
responded.2 The Pew survey showed that there are some issues about which a majority of 
elite members share the same view. For instance, a majority of the participants identified 
China not as an adversary but as a serious problem. On the other hand, one of the main 
lines of disagreement was about whether the United States should be the only military 
superpower. A majority of the military officers, local officials and foreign affairs 
specialists were in favor of the United States being the only military superpower, whereas 
a majority of the religious leaders, think tank scholars, and academic individuals were 
opposed.3 
 Extracting worldviews via surveys has several problems, especially with foreign 
policy experts and leaders. Surveys are very expensive and time consuming. In addition, 
many policy makers decline to participate. As a result of these problems, there have been 
very few attempts in the literature to extract the worldview of the elites by using surveys. 
 My research uses texts instead of surveys to extract the worldviews of the 
American foreign policy elite. Using texts as the source of raw data offers many 
advantages. It is less expensive, more accessible, and more reliable. Also, all aspects of 
human life are now being recorded in digital format on the Internet. By tapping into this 
online resource to answer a question that has not been answered before, my research 
                                                 
1 In association with the Council on Foreign Relations.  
2 “America’s Place in the World 2005,” PEW, November 2005, http://www.people-press.org/files/legacy-
pdf/263.pdf. 
3 McCormick, American Foreign Policy and Process. 
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makes a substantive and original contribution to the literature about American foreign 
policy and to methodology in political science.  
2- Research Question 
 This research is exploratory rather than explanatory.1 The purpose of exploratory 
research is to “investigate little-understood phenomena” and “to identify or discover 
important categories of meaning.” However, the purpose of explanatory research is to 
“explain the pattern related to the phenomena in question” and “to identify plausible 
relationships shaping the phenomena.”2 The exploratory questions can best be answered 
by using the strategy of data immersion. In this strategy, the research does not start with a 
priori hypothesis; instead it allows data to “speak for themselves.”3 
 The following are the main questions of the research: On the basis of the texts 
published by the American foreign policy elite, what are the worldviews of the elite? 
Does analysis of these texts show any shared patterns of belief across time, topic, and 
target? If so, were these patterns shared across the political spectrum?  
 Each of the analytic chapters (Chapters Three, Four, and Five) approaches the 
main questions differently. Chapter Three considers all the verbs of all the actors and 
asks whether the worldview of the collectivity of the think tanks changes across time 
(2004, 2008, and 2012) and topic (all the topics, military topics, political topics, and 
social topics).  
                                                 
1 John W. Creswell, Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2003). 
2 Catherine Marshall and Gretchen B. Rossman, Designing Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage publications, 2010), 33. 
3 Richards J. Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Pittsburgh, PA: Government Printing Office, 
1999), 32. 
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 Chapter Four answers the main questions by considering only the verbs used in 
conjunction with the United States. Considering the verbs used for the American 
collective Self, does the worldview of the American foreign policy elite show stability 
over time? Does the American collective Self have distinct worldviews in relation to the 
issue areas?  
 Chapter Five answers the main questions by considering only the verbs used for 
the twenty-two most frequent actors in the texts of the American foreign policy elite. For 
instance, considering the verbs used in conjunction with Afghanistan, Chapter Five asks 
the following questions: How does the American foreign policy elite perceive 
Afghanistan’s operational code? What is Afghanistan’s relative position in the world of 
the American foreign policy elite? Which actors are most similar to Afghanistan?  
3- Definition of Concepts 
The following three sections explain the main concepts of this research. The first 
section explains the concept of worldview, its origins, and its relation to operational code 
analysis. The second section defines the American foreign policy elite and why think 
tanks are considered part of the elite. The third section briefly reviews operational code 
analysis, its history and the Verbs In Context System (VICS).  
3-1 Worldview 
 The term worldview was first used in English in 1858.1 It is the translation of the 
German word Weltanschauung, which comes from the words welt, which means world, 
                                                 
1 David K. Naugle, Worldview: The History of a Concept (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing, 2002), 69. 
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and anschauung, which means perception.1 Weltanschauung was first used by Immanuel 
Kant in 1790 in the Critique of Judgment:2  
If the human mind is nonetheless to be able to even to think the given 
infinite without contradiction, it must have within itself a power that is 
supersensible, whose idea of the noumenon cannot be intuited but can yet 
be regarded as the substrate underlying what is mere appearance, namely, 
our intuition of the world [Weltanschauung]. For only by means of this 
power and its idea do we, in a pure intellectual estimation of magnitude, 
comprehend the infinite in the world of sense entirely under a concept, 
even though in a mathematical estimation of magnitude by means of 
numerical concepts we can never think it in its entirety. 
 The Oxford English Dictionary defines worldview as, “fundamental beliefs, 
values, etc., determining or constituting a comprehensive outlook on the world; a 
perspective on life.”3 The concept of worldview has been studied from the linguistic, 
ideological, philosophical and cognitive perspectives.4 This research applies the concept 
of worldview as a cognitive tool and to operationalize this cognitive tool, it uses the 
operational code method developed by Nathan Leites in the 1950s.5 
 In the mid-twentieth century, three groups of scholars became interested in 
researching the views of the collectivity of individuals. Some anthropologists began 
                                                 
1 “Weltanschauung, n.,” OED Online, accessed March 16, 2015, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/227763/. 
2 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment: Including the First Introduction, translated and Introduction by 
Werner S. Pluhar, with a forward by Mary J. Gregor (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), 111-112, quoted in 
David K. Naugle, Worldview: The History of a Concept, 58-59. 
3 “World, n.,” OED Online, accessed March 16, 2015, 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/230262?redirectedFrom=Worldview. 
4 Naugle, Worldview: The History of A concept. 
5 The operational code method is not the only attempt to extract worldview of political actors. Beside 
operational code, there are three other main approaches: Robert Axelrod’s Cognitive Mapping method; 
Rochard Cottam’s Image Theory; and Conceptual Complexity by Peter Suedfeld and Margaret Hermann. 
Michael D. Young and Mark Schafer, “Is There Method in our Madness? Ways of Assessing Cognition in 
International Relations,” Mershon International Studies Review 42, no. 1 (1998): 63-96. 
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applying the methods and theories of cultural anthropology to complex groups, like 
literate and technologically advanced societies, rather than just focusing on non-literate 
primitive societies. On the other hand, psychologists and psychiatrists studied patterns in 
large groups. Political scientists also became interested in studying large groups and 
complex societies, and they began asking how elites view different problems of 
international relations.1 In this context, Nathan Leites’ psycho-cultural work on Study of 
Bolshevism became a breakthrough for the scholars who wanted to conduct 
psychoanalysis of large groups and those who were interested in studying the elites.2  
 Leites did not use the term worldview in his work. Instead, he used operational 
code, rules of conduct, and rules of strategy. Leites defined the operational code as the 
rules of strategy or the rules of conduct of Bolshevism that were developed as the result 
of the in-group struggles of Russian Socialists in the past:3 “Ideology, socialization, and 
leadership pressures result in a consistent, identifiable set of behavioral patterns in Soviet 
foreign policy.”4 According to Leites, operational code describes the implicit and explicit 
necessary rules for “effective political conduct.”5  
                                                 
1 Nathan Leites, “Psycho-Cultural Hypotheses about Political Acts,” World Politics 1, no. 1 (1948): 102-
119. 
2 Alexander L. George, “The “Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders 
and Decision-Making,” International Studies Quarterly 13, no. 2 (1969): 192. 
3 Nathan Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1951), xiv. 
4 Young and Schafer, “Method in our Madness,” 69. 
5 Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo, xi. 
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 Ole R. Holsti was perhaps the first scholar in the operational code research 
program to use the term world view for the operational code method.1 Today, the 
operational code literature uses the terms belief system,2 worldview,3 and operational 
code4 interchangeably. The later and widespread use of the term worldview in the 
operational code research might result from the general trend in English literature to use 
the term worldview and its derivatives. Figure 1-1 shows the usage of the five words of 
worldview, world-view, world view, belief system, and operational code in English 
literature from 1800 to 2008. This chart was built using the Google Books Ngram 
viewer.5 The Google Ngram Project has indexed the frequency of the use of one-word, 
two-word, three-word, and n-word terms in the printed materials from 1800 to 2008.6 The 
x-axis in Figure 1-1 shows the years of publication. The y-axis shows the percentage of 
all the two-word phrases contained in the Google books written in English and published 
in the United States that are world-view, world view, belief system, or operational code.7 
It also shows the percentage of all the one-word phrases that the term worldview accounts 
                                                 
1 Ole R. Holsti, “The “Operational Code” Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: John Foster Dulles' 
Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 3, no. 1 (1970): 131.  
2 Stephen G. Walker, “The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems: A Re-Analysis of the 
Operational Code Construct,” International Studies Quarterly 27, no. 2 (1983): 179-202. 
3 Bertjan Verbeek, “The Worldview of Sir Anthony Eden,” in Decision Making in Great Britain during the 
Suez Crisis, ed. Verbeek Bertjan (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2003), 61–80.  
4 Stephen G. Walker, “The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis,” Political Psychology 11, no. 2 
(1990): 403-418. 
5 “Google Books Ngram Viewer,” Google, 2013, https://books.google.com/ngrams. 
6 Jean-Baptiste Michel et al., “Quantitative Analysis of Culture Using Millions of Digitized Books,” 
Science 331, no. 6014 (2011): 176-182. 
7 Also called bigram. 
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for.1 Figure 1-1 shows that since 1900, the term worldview has been used exponentially in 
English literature. From the different terms that the operational code literature has used to 
refer to the concept of worldview, this research uses Leites’ original term, rules of 
conduct, along with the terms worldview and operational code. 
 
 
3-2 The American Foreign Policy Elite 
 G. William Domhoff argues in his seminal work, Who Rules America?, that a 
power elite created from the collaboration of a social upper class, a corporate 
community, and a policy-planning network rules the United States.2 By social upper class 
Domhoff means “intermarrying and interacting families who see each other as equals, 
share a common style of life, and have a common viewpoint on the world.” They 
constitute between 0.5% and 1% of the American population. This social upper class is 
                                                 
1 Also called unigram. 
2 G. William Domhoff, “The Class-Domination Theory of Power,” Who Rules America?, 2012, 
http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/power/class_domination.html.   
Figure 1-1 Frequency of “worldview” in the English Literature between 1800-2008 
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“nationwide in its scope” and because its members attend the same schools and belong to 
the same clubs and other social institutions, the upper class maintains its social cohesion.1  
 The corporate community refers to ongoing concentration, since the nineteenth 
century, of power among a few financial, consulting, legal and accounting firms in the 
United States. The members of the corporate community create boards of directors that 
are dominated by just a few families. The inner circle of the corporate directorate owns 
eighty to ninety percent of the corporations in the United States.2 
 The policy-planning network consists of cultural and civic nonpartisan 
organizations, foundations and think tanks. Its main task is to define the standards of 
what is important, beautiful or classy for the society. They communicate their ideas to the 
public through their publications, conferences and roundtables. The members of policy-
planning network are typically tax-exempt organizations that receive most of their 
funding from the corporate community. By supporting certain priorities and ideas, the 
policy-planning network sets the tone and agenda for the public debates in the United 
States. According to Domhoff, think tanks are one of the main components of the policy-
planning network:3 
Think tanks are nonprofit organizations that provide settings for experts in 
various academic disciplines to devote their time to the study of policy 
alternatives, free from the teaching, committee meetings, and departmental 
duties that are part of the daily routine for most members of the academic 
community. Supported by foundation grants, corporate donations, and 
government contracts, think tanks are a major source of the new ideas 
discussed in the policy-planning network. 
                                                 
1 Ibid.  
2 Ibid. 
3 Domhoff, The Triumph of the Corporate Rich, 71.  
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 Think tanks perform several functions within the power elite. They educate the 
leaders of the corporate community about different policy options, and the corporate 
leaders use this knowledge to convince and influence the public. Think tanks “serve as 
sorting and screening mechanisms for the emergence of new leadership for the corporate 
rich in general” by providing a venue for the corporate executives to show their wit and 
debating strength. Also, think tanks act like a venue for corporate executives to show to 
the public that the members of the corporate community care about nonpartisan issues. 
By doing so, think tanks present corporate executives as “national leaders” and 
“statesmen.” Finally, think tanks provide a venue for the corporate community to know 
and employ experts.1   
 Figure 1-2 shows how Domhoff envisions the relations among the three segments 
of the power elite. It shows the flow of financial resources, ideas and policy among the 
social upper class, the corporate community, and the policy-planning network. The 
corporate community controls the think tanks indirectly through universities and 
foundations, universities provide think tanks with experts, and the foundations provide 
them with funding. The corporate community also controls the think tanks by 
participating on the think tanks’ boards of trustees. Think tanks, on the other hand, 
produce ideas and influence government by presenting papers, publishing reports, and 
giving testimonies. Following Domhoff’s theory of power elite in the United States, this 
research regards think tanks part of the American foreign policy elite.  
                                                 
1 Domhoff, “The Class-Domination Theory of Power.”  
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 After much discussion with foreign policy specialists and considering the 
availability of data, I concluded that the following seven think tanks constitute a 
representative sample of the United States foreign policy think tanks. On the basis of 
extensive reading and discussion, I located each think tank on an ideological continuum, 
from the Left to Right. The three think tanks on the Right (conservative) are the 
American Enterprise Institute (hereafter cited in text as AEI), the Heritage Foundation 
(hereafter cited in text as Heritage), and the Cato Institute (hereafter cited in text as Cato). 
The Council on Foreign Relations (hereafter cited in text as CFR) and the RAND 
Corporation (hereafter cited in text as RAND) stand in the Center, and the Brookings 
Institution (hereafter cited in text as Brookings) and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace (hereafter cited in text as Carnegie) are on the Left (liberal). 
Figure 1-2 Corporate Community, Upper Class, and the Policy-Planning Network  
Source: Figure adopted from G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? The Triumph of the 
Corporate Rich (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2014), 78. 
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 Domhoff argues that think tanks influence the government by presenting papers, 
publishing reports and presenting testimonies. Following Domhoff, I used think tanks’ 
articles, op-eds, reports and testimonies as the sources of data. I located 7,000 foreign 
policy reports, articles, op-eds, and testimonies that were digitally available and 
published in the periods of six months before and after the three general elections of 
2004, 2008, and 2012.  
 There were two reasons for choosing the months close to general elections. Close 
to general elections, think tanks do their best to sell their ideas to the public and the 
upcoming executive branch. They enter to a virtual debate with each other about the key 
issues and publish competing fact-sheets and background briefs. Therefore, in the period 
close to elections, the difference between the think tanks becomes more visible in their 
texts. Another reason for choosing the time periods bracketing the general elections was 
the availability of a greater number of publications.  
4- Measuring Worldview 
 At the beginning of the Cold War, as the rivalry between the United States and the 
Soviet Union intensified, understanding the Soviet leadership’s worldview, goals and 
aspirations became paramount for the United States. The main tools for extracting the 
worldview of world leaders were traditionally interviews and surveys. However, these 
methods could not be used to assess the Soviet leadership, which was unavailable to 
Western scholars. Therefore, scholars and politicians developed at-a-distance methods to 
study the beliefs of the Soviet leaders.  
 The first scholarly works to study the Soviet Union leadership at a distance 
emanated from a project by RAND. In 1951 and 1953, Nathan Leites published two 
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works describing the worldview of the Soviet Union. In Operational Code of Politburo1 
and Study of Bolshevism2 Leites studied all the publications that Lenin and Stalin issued 
before 1930. Leites’ main goal was “to discover the rules which Bolsheviks believe to be 
necessary for effective political conduct.”3 He wanted to extract the “spirit of the 
Bolshevik elite” from their texts and was particularly interested in their strategy of action, 
or what he called the “operational code” of the Soviet Union.4  
 In the Study of Bolshevism Leites applied psychoanalytical theories for studying 
the human mind. Using LeDoux's trilogy of cognition, emotion, and motivation,5 Leites 
concluded that the cognitive dimensions of the Soviet leaders revealed their operational 
codes, or political strategies. The affective dimensions revealed the fears of the Bolshevik 
elite and the motivational dimensions showed how and why the Bolsheviks pursued 
power.6  
 In 1967, RAND commissioned Alexander George to conduct another study on the 
operational code method. In “The “Operational Code”: A Neglected Approach to the 
Study of Political Leaders and Decision Making,” George criticized Leites’ study of 
Bolshevism for not making the structure of the belief system explicit. He also criticized 
                                                 
1 Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo.  
2 Leites, A Study of Bolshevism (Illinois: Free Press, 1953). 
3 Leites, The Operational Code of the Politburo, xi. 
4 Leites, A Study of Bolshevism, 15. 
5 Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, “Operational Code Theory: Beliefs and Foreign Policy Decisions,” 
The International Studies Encyclopedia, 2010, 
http://www.isacompendium.com/subscriber/tocnode?id=g9781444336597_chunk_g978144433659715_ss1
-1. 
6 Ibid. 
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Leites for not putting the elements of the operational code in a hierarchy. According to 
George, the operational code acts as a set of cognitive limits/boundaries on the rational 
decision making of the actors. To give structure to the operational code method, George 
proposed that an actor’s cognitive boundaries can be grouped into two categories. The 
Philosophical category is comprised of the cognitive boundaries that constrained how 
actors made sense of the context of the situations they faced. The Instrumental category is 
comprised of the cognitive boundaries that constrained the means the actors preferred to 
use to achieve their goals. George proposed ten questions to map these two sets of 
boundaries: five Philosophical questions to discern the cognitive boundaries of the 
context of action and five Instrumental questions to draw the cognitive boundaries of 
available means. Below are George’s Instrumental and Philosophical questions: 
Alexander George’s Philosophical Questions: 
P1: What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the political universe 
essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's 
political opponents?1 
P2: What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental 
political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic 
on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?2 
P3: Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?3 
P4: How much “control” or “mastery” can one have over historical development? 
What is one's role in “moving” and “shaping” history in the desired direction?4 
P5: What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in historical development?5 
 
                                                 
1 George, “Operational Code: A Neglected approach,” 201. 
2 Ibid., 203. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., 204. 
5 Ibid. 
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Alexander George’s Instrumental Questions: 
I1: What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political 
action?1 
I2: How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?2 
I3: How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?3 
I4: What is the best “timing” of action to advance one's interest?4 
I5: What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interest?5 
 
 George also placed the elements of the operational code into a hierarchy. 
Following the cognitive consistency theory, he argued that the first philosophical 
question is the master belief.6 According to the cognitive consistency theory, master/key 
beliefs direct other beliefs of an actor.7  
4-1 Types of Operational Code Analysis by Their Targets 
 From the early stages of the evolution of the operational code research, it was 
accepted that both the individual and the collectivity of individuals can have operational 
codes. For instance, the target of the first study of the operational code was a collective 
entity called Bolshevik elite. In other words, it was tacitly accepted in the operational 
code research that a collectivity of individuals has attributes that are not reducible to the 
attributes of its members. Most operational code research, however, have focused on 
                                                 
1 Ibid., 205. 
2 Ibid., 211. 
3 Ibid., 212. 
4 Ibid., 215. 
5 Ibid., 216. 
6 Walker and Schafer, “Operational Code Theory.” 
7 Jerel A. Rosati, “A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy,” in Foreign Policy Analysis: 
Continuity and Change in its Second Generation, ed. Neack Jeanne et al. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice 
Hall, 1995), 49-70. 
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individual political leaders. Some of these leaders are American, some are foreign, and 
some belong to other political entities. Despite the proliferation of targets of operational 
code studies, no work until now has studied American foreign policy think tanks.  
 Many of the studies in the operational code literature have focused on American 
presidents, including Theodore Roosevelt,1 Woodrow Wilson,2 John F. Kennedy,3 
Lyndon Johnson,4 Jimmy Carter,5 Ronald Reagan,6 George H. W. Bush,7 Bill Clinton,8 
George W. Bush,9 and Barak Obama.10  
                                                 
1 Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, “Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as Cultural Icons of 
US Foreign Policy,” Political Psychology 28, no. 6 (2007): 747-776. 
2 Stephen G. Walker, “Psychodynamic Processes and Framing Effects in Foreign Policy Decision-Making: 
Woodrow Wilson's Operational Code,” Political Psychology 16, no. 4 (1995): 697-717. 
3 Gregory Marfleet, “The Operational Code of John F. Kennedy During the Cuban Missile Crisis: A 
Comparison of Public and Private Rhetoric,” Political Psychology 21, no. 3 (2000): 545-558. 
4 Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer, “The Political Universe of Lyndon B. Johnson and His Advisors: 
Diagnostic and Strategic Propensities in Their Operational Codes,” Political Psychology 21, no. 3 (2000): 
529-543. 
5 Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael D. Young, “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code 
Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter's Operational Code,” International Studies Quarterly 42, 
no. 1 (1998): 175-189. 
6 Brian Dille, “The Prepared and Spontaneous Remarks of Presidents Reagan and Bush: A Validity 
Comparison for At‐a‐Distance Measurements,” Political Psychology 21, no. 3 (2000): 573-585. 
7 David G. Winter et al., “The Personalities of Bush and Gorbachev at a Distance: Follow-up on 
Predictions,” Political Psychology 12, no. 3 (1991): 457-464. 
8 Mark Schafer and Scott Crichlow, “Bill Clinton's Operational Code: Assessing Source Material Bias,” 
Political Psychology 21, no. 3 (2000): 559-571. 
9 Jonathan Renshon, “Stability and Change in Belief Systems: The Operational Code of George W. Bush,” 
The Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 6 (2008): 820-849. 
10 See Stephen G. Walker, “Quantum Politics and Operational Code Analysis,” in Rethinking Foreign 
Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral International Relations, ed. 
Stephen G. Walker et al. (New York: Routledge, 2011): 62-80; David G. Winter, “Philosopher‐King or 
Polarizing Politician? A Personality Profile of Barack Obama,” Political Psychology 32, no. 6 (2011): 
1059-1081. 
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 Some studies examined the operational codes of American senators. However, no 
recent study of operational code has focused on an American senator. This might be an 
indication of possible weakening of the Senate as an institution,1 empowerment of the 
institution of presidency at the expense of Congress,2 or lack of strong and influential 
personalities in the Senate. Nonetheless, Senators Frank Church,3 James William 
Fulbright,4 and Arthur Vandenberg5 have been the subjects of studies about operational 
codes. 
 A few studies in the operational code literature have focused on American 
Cabinet members, mostly from the Cold War. After the Cold War, however, only 
members of George W. Bush’s Cabinet were subjects of operational code research. The 
following Cabinet members were subjects of operational code studies: Dean Acheson,6 
John Foster Dulles,7 Dean Rusk,1 Henry Kissinger,2 Cyrus Vance,3 Donald Rumsfeld,4 
and Colin Powell.5  
                                                 
1 Peter Hanson, Too Weak to Govern: Majority Party Power and Appropriations in the US Senate (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2014). 
2 Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from 
Roosevelt to Reagan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). 
3 Loch K. Johnson, “Operational Codes and the Prediction of Leadership Behavior: Senator Frank Church 
at Midcareer,” in A Psychological Examination of Political Leaders, ed. Margaret G. Hermann et al. (New 
York: Free Press, 1977), 82-120.   
4 Kurt K. Tweraser, Changing Patterns of Political Beliefs: The Foreign Policy Operational Codes of J. 
William Fulbright, 1943-1967 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1974).  
5 Joel E. Jr. Anderson, “The ‘Operational Code’ Belief System of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg: An 
Application of the George Construct” (PhD diss., University of Michigan, 1973).  
6 David S. McLellan, “The “Operational Code” Approach to the Study of Political Leaders: Dean 
Acheson's Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 4, no. 1 (1971): 
52-75. 
7 Holsti, “John Foster Dulles' Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs.” 
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 Many of the operational code studies have chosen non-American leaders as their 
target of study. Among them are Mikhail Gorbachev,6 Vladimir Putin7, Mao Zedong8 Xi 
Jinping,9 Hu Jintao,10 Chen Shuibian,11 Jacques Chirac,12 Jack Straw,13 Toney Blair,14 
                                                                                                                                                 
1 Gilbert George Gutierrez, “Dean Rusk and Southeast Asia: An Operational Code Analysis” (PhD diss., 
University of California (Riverside), 1974). 
2 Stephen G. Walker, “The Interface between Beliefs and Behavior Henry Kissinger's Operational Code 
and the Vietnam War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 21, no. 1 (1977): 129-168. 
3 Melchiore Joseph Laucella, “Cyrus Vance's Worldview: The Relevance of the Motivated Tactician 
Perspective” (PhD diss., The Union Institute, 1996). 
4 Sam Robison, “George W. Bush and the Vulcans: Leader-Advisor Relations and America’s Response to 
the 9/11 Attacks,” in Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational 
Code Analysis, ed. Mark Schafer et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 101-126. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Winter et al., “The Personalities of Bush and Gorbachev.”  
7 Stephen Benedict Dyson, “Drawing Policy Implications from the ‘Operational Code’ of a ‘New’ Political 
Actor: Russian President Vladimir Putin,” Policy Sciences 34, no. 3-4 (2001): 329-346. 
8 Huiyun Feng, “The Operational Code of Mao Zedong: Defensive or Offensive Realist?” Security Studies 
14, no. 4 (2005): 637-662. 
9 Kai He and Huiyun Feng, “Xi Jinping’s Operational Code Beliefs and China’s Foreign Policy,” The 
Chinese Journal of International Politics 6, no. 3 (2013): 209-231. 
10 Huiyun Feng, “Crisis Deferred: an Operational Code Analysis of Chinese Leaders across the Strait,” in 
Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis, ed. 
Mark Schafer et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 151-170. 
11 Ibid. 
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Romulo Betancourt,5 and Eric Williams.6 Recently, the operational code literature has 
become interested in studying non-state actors, especially terrorist organizations and 
leaders, including Osama Bin Laden,7 Ayman al-Zawahiri,8 the Muslim Brotherhood,9 
international bankers,10 Islamists in Turkey,11 Hamas and Al-Qaida,12 and the U.S. 
Intelligence Community.13 
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4-2 Types of Operational Code Analysis by Their Methods 
 The operational code literature has used different methods for extracting the 
operational code of an actor. Some researchers identified operational code by analyzing 
interviews and questionnaires and by closely observing the actors. However, these types 
of methods are not always applicable to many actors, such as presidents or the leaders of 
an adversary.1 To address this lack of access, operational code researchers have 
developed methods to study operational codes at a distance. At-a-distance extraction of 
operational codes relies on the texts published by the actor(s) or published under the 
name of the actor(s) as its source of data.  
 At-a-distance study of the texts can be conducted qualitatively or quantitatively. 
Qualitative at-a-distance extraction is similar to the method that Leites applied to extract 
the operational code of the Bolshevik elite. Leites read the texts published by the Soviet 
leadership and tried to find patterns using the psychoanalytic paradigms. Researchers 
conducting qualitative at-a-distance operational code analysis based on Alexander 
George’s framework must read the actor’s texts and look for the answers to George’s 
questions. Operational codes of John Foster Dulles, Dean Acheson, William Fulbright, 
Frank Church, and Henry Kissinger have been extracted using the qualitative at-a-
distance method.2  
 One can argue that the qualitative at-a-distance method is the best approach to 
discern the operational code of an actor from the texts, especially when the target of study 
is an individual and the number of texts is limited. Because it factors in such qualities as 
                                                 
1 Walker and Schafer, “Operational Code Theory.”  
2 Ibid.  
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human conciseness and analytic adaptability, the qualitative at-a-distance method can 
find patterns and nuances in the texts that the quantitative at-a-distance approach is 
unable to discern. As of this writing, humans can read between the lines much easier and 
more effectively than a computer program pre-designed with some sets of rules. 
However, the qualitative at-a-distance approach is not efficient or effective when the 
number of texts is in thousands. Also, it is very difficult to aggregate the qualitative 
findings of multiple actors.1 To overcome these two obstacles and be able to tap into the 
resources available at today’s digital age, scholars have no other choice but to use 
quantitative at-a-distance methods. 
 Researchers conduct quantitative at-a-distance analysis by analyzing content. The 
idea behind content analysis is that the frequency of the words can reveal patterns in and 
among texts.2 The main shift toward quantitative extraction of the operational code 
analysis occurred after the introduction of the Verbs in Context System (VICS) by 
Stephen Walker, Mark Schafer and Michael Young in 1998.3 According to VICS, the 
balance, central tendency, and range of action verbs reveal the exercise of power and the 
underlying beliefs in a text.4 VICS assigns a range of positive and negative values to the 
transitive verbs. Then, after calculating the balance, central tendency and variation of 
positive/negative transitive verbs for the Self and the Other, it answers George’s ten 
                                                 
1 Ibid.  
2 Ole R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Mass.: Addison-Wesley 
Publishing Co., 1969). 
3 Walker, Schafer, and Young, “Systemic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis.” 
4 Walker and Schafer, “Operational Code Theory.”   
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questions. Figure 1-3 presents VICS and the steps it takes to extract the operational code 
from a text.1  
 The implementation of VICS has brought several benefits for the operational code 
research program: a) it added to the reliability of the operational code analysis; b) it made 
the operational code analysis easier; and c) it made the comparison of different actors 
possible. It has also resulted in creation of typology of beliefs.2 These categories of 
beliefs have been used to build “agent-based models of subjective games” like the Theory 
of Inference and Preferences.3 
 The aim of this dissertation is to conduct research similar to Leites’ study of 
Bolshevism, but by using the VICS method. It is similar to Leites’ Study of Bolshevism in 
that it chooses a collective entity as its target of study, conducts the research using the 
immersion-in-data strategy, and extracts the operational code using an at-a-distance 
method. However, unlike Leites, who adopted a qualitative at-a-distance approach, I use 
an automated at-a-distance approach based on VICS. To extract the operational code of 
the American foreign policy elite at-a-distance, I use Profiler Plus content analysis 
software. Profiler Plus, developed by Social Science Automation Incorporation, 
automates extraction of operational code using VICS.4 It counts the number of transitive 
verbs used for a subject and assigns values to them based on a predefined dictionary of 
transitive verbs. 
                                                 
1 Ibid. 
2 Gregory Marfleet and Hannah Simpson, “Cognitive Responses by U.S. Presidents to Foreign Policy 
Crisis,” in Rethinking Foreign Policy Analysis: States, Leaders, and the Microfoundations of Behavioral 
International Relations, ed. Stephen G. Walker et al. (New York: Routledge, 2011), 206-219. 
3 Marfleet and Walker, “A world of beliefs: Modeling Interactions Among Agents.” 
4 “Profiler Plus,” Social Science Automation, 2013, http://socialscience.net/tech/profilerplus.aspx. 
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( 
 The verbs used for a subject can be grouped in several levels of verb aggregation. 
Some studies choose a document as the aggregating level and count verbs used for a 
subject in each of the documents. Other studies select a specific time period, such as a 
particular year or a presidential term, as their level of verb aggregation. For instance, they 
Figure 1-3 Verbs In Context System (VICS) 
Source: Figure adopted from Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael Young, “Systemic 
Procedures for Operational Code Analysis: Measuring and Modeling Jimmy Carter’s Operational 
Code,” International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 1 (1998): 183. 
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might count the verbs used for a president in each of his terms.1 This research counts the 
verbs on the levels of texts, subjects, topics, time, and think tanks, and for each level 
there are two levels of aggregation under study. 
 The two levels of aggregation of the verbs used in texts are the level of the 
document and the level of the sentence. The two levels of verb aggregation for the 
subjects of sentences are the verbs used in conjunction with all the subjects and verbs 
used for the most frequent actors in the texts. The following twenty-two actors appeared 
most frequently in the texts, and the verbs used in conjunction with these actors were 
studied: Afghanistan, Britain, China, Europe, France, German, India, Iran, Iraq, the 
Muslim World, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, 
Terrorists, Turkey, the United Nations, and the United States. The two levels of verb 
aggregation for topics are verbs used for all topics and verbs employed in conjunction 
with military issues, political issues, and social issues. There are two levels of verb 
aggregation for time: verbs of all the time periods and verbs used in conjunction with 
each of the three time periods of the 2004 general election, 2008 general election, and 
2012 general election. Finally, for think tanks there are verbs used in conjunction with all 
the think tanks and verbs associated with each of the seven individual think tanks: AEI, 
Brookings, Carnegie, Cato, CFR, Heritage and RAND.  
5- Structure of the Research 
 This research is presented in six chapters. Chapter One presents the research 
design, main question, definition of concepts and structure of research. Chapter Two 
                                                 
1 Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker, “Operational Code Analysis at a Distance: The Verbs in Context 
System of Content Analysis,” in Beliefs and Leadership in World Politics: Methods and Applications of 
Operational Code Analysis, ed. Mark Schafer et al. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 43. 
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covers the data acquisition and methodology, and addresses the steps taken for gathering 
and polishing 7,000 documents. Then, it reviews the steps taken to label documents and 
sentences according to their topics. The supervised topic classification of the texts is done 
separately for the 7,000 documents and for the half a million sentences. To test the 
sensitivity of the VICS method, the operational code of the think tanks’ political texts is 
compared to the operational code of a batch of 5,000 nonpolitical texts from LexisNexis.  
 Chapter Three studies the elite by treating all the subjects as the Self. The first 
section of Chapter Three examines the overall rules of conduct of the seven think tanks. 
The second section analyzes dissimilarities among the seven think tanks according to 
their rules of conduct across the four worlds of action. The unit of analysis of the first 
section is the collectivity of the seven think tanks, which will be studied across the 
following four worlds of action: the world of all the issues and the worlds of military, 
political, and social issues. The unit of analysis of the second section is each individual 
think tank, which will also be studied across the four worlds of action. In Chapter Three, 
the smallest unit for the verb aggregation and for the topic/issue classification is the 
individual document. Texts will be compared using VICS indexes and the one-way 
Multivariate Analysis of Variance (hereafter cited in text as MANOVA) test. To examine 
the difference between any two think tanks, the MANOVA test is followed by post hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test. To map the approximate relative position of the 
seven think tanks from each other, the MANOVA test is followed by a Discriminant 
Function Analysis (hereafter cited in text as discriminant analysis).  
 Chapter Four studies the elite by considering only the American collective Self 
and it has two sections. The first section studies the collectivity of the seven think tanks 
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across the four worlds of action and tests the stability of the rules of conduct for the Self. 
The unit of analysis of the first section is the collectivity of the seven think tanks. The 
second section extracts the rules of conduct of the American collective Self from the 
perspective of each of the seven think tanks. It also compares the think tanks based on the 
actions they assigned to the American collective Self across the four worlds of action. 
The unit of analysis of the second section is the individual think tank. In Chapter Four, 
the smallest unit for the verb aggregation and for the topic classification is the individual 
document. The texts are compared using VICS indexes and the MANOVA test. To 
examine the difference between any two think tanks, the MANOVA test is followed by 
post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test. To map the approximate relative 
position of the seven think tanks from each other, the MANOVA test is followed by a 
discriminant analysis.  
Chapter Five studies the elite by comparing the rules of conduct of the twenty-two 
most frequent actors. It extracts the operational code/rules of conduct of the United States 
and twenty-one of the other actors from the perspective of the seven think tanks: 
Afghanistan, Britain, China, Europe, France, German, India, Iran, Iraq, the Muslim 
World, Israel, Japan, North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, South Korea, Syria, Taiwan, 
Terrorists, Turkey, and the United Nations. In Chapter Five and for each actor, the 
operational code of the actor, agreement among the seven think tanks in describing the 
strategy of the actor, and similarity of the actor to the other actors will be presented. The 
operational code calculations in this chapter are derived from the verbs used for each of 
the twenty-two actors across time, topic, and think tank. The index of direction of 
strategy (I1) will be used as the basis for comparing think tank perceptions towards an 
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actor. To show the similarity of the actors using their multiple operational codes, 
ALSCAL Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) is used to reduce the dimensions of 
comparison to two dimensions. Then, number of times any two actors shared a quadrant 
in any of the four worlds are counted. This process creates twenty-two different cognitive 
maps of the American foreign policy elite. In Chapter Five, the smallest unit for the verb 
aggregation is the actor and the smallest unit for the topic classification is the sentence.1 
Chapter Six is dedicated to assessment and conclusion. In this chapter, the 
findings and contributions of the research are presented in four sections: contribution to 
text classification methods; contribution to think tank studies; contribution to theories of 
IR; and contributions to VICS and operational code method.  
                                                 
1 For lack of a better word I chose the word, cognitive map, to refer to the relative positions of different 
actors from the perspective of the American foreign policy elite. This application of the concept of 
cognitive map is different from Robert Axelrod’s approach: Robert Axelrod, Structure of Decision: The 
Cognitive Maps of Political Elites (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976).  
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CHAPTER 2 : METHOD AND DATA ACQUISITION 
Introduction 
 Chapter Two describes the data acquisition, text preprocessing, the supervised 
automatic topic labeling, and the details of automated operational code analysis. It also 
tests the sensitivity of the VICS method. To identify the topics of documents and 
sentences and to increase the reliability of the analysis, I chose the supervised automatic 
topic labeling approach.1 The supervised topic labeling employed the RtextTools package 
in R and on two levels of text classification: supervised labeling of the 7,000 documents 
and supervised labeling of the 500,000 sentences. This chapter presents the details of the 
operational code method and the automated calculations of the Philosophical and 
Instrumental indexes. The automated operational code method is based on VICS, which 
measures the exercise of power by indexing the transitive verbs in a text. Chapter Two 
analyzes the sensitivity of VICS by evaluating how the VICS indexes of the political and 
nonpolitical texts differ from one another. 
1- Data Acquisition  
 The raw data used in this research were comprised of articles, op-eds, reports and 
testimonies published by the seven think tanks. For each of the seven think tanks, I 
visited the subsections of their websites related to foreign policy, international security, 
defense, intelligence, international trade, and international political economy. I manually 
imported the Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) of the publications that met the above 
                                                 
1 Peter Turney and Patrick Pantel, “From Frequency to Meaning: Vector Space Models of 
Semantics,” Journal of artificial intelligence research 37, no. 1 (2010): 141-188. 
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criteria and were published from May 1, 2004 to May 1, 2005; May 1, 2008 to May 1, 
2009; and May 1, 2012 to May 1, 2013, to a Mozilla Firefox Zotero database.1 
 There were several problems associated with this step. Some think tanks only post 
summaries and refer to the full text of an article via an external link. To rectify the 
problem, all the articles had to be checked thoroughly to make sure that they included the 
full text. If an article did not include the main text, the correct external link had to be 
added to the Zotero database manually. Also, sometimes the websites published a 
particular report under different names. The problem was recurrent enough that I 
included several measures to detect and eliminate the duplicates. Another problem was 
that some think tanks did not always include correct dates of publication on their 
websites. For instance, an article that was shown as published in 2012, in fact published 
in 2007. Therefore, the dates of the articles had to be checked to make sure that the 
articles were published in the three designated time periods.  
 The website of each think tank has a tagging system to classify its publications. In 
addition to the title and the URL, some of the think tanks assign topic tags to their 
publications in the format of HTML metadata. Websites use these tags to organize their 
publications. The advantage of using Zotero is that it automatically imports the metadata 
attached to any article to its database. Later, I used these topic tags to create a training 
batch for supervised automatic topic labeling. In this step, more than 8,000 URLs and 
                                                 
1 “Zotero is a project of the Roy Rosenzweig Center for History and New Media, and was initially funded 
by the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation, the Institute of Museum and Library Services, and the Alfred P. 
Sloan Foundation.” 
 “About,” ZOTERO, accessed March 16, 2015, https://www.zotero.org/about. 
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their metadata were manually imported to a Zotero database.1 While Zotero is a good tool 
for gathering online data, it is not an efficient database for information retrieval. 
Therefore, I migrated the Zotero database first to a SQLite database2 and then to an Excel 
file.  
 In the next step, all the URLs were downloaded. The problem in this step was to 
find a way to connect the downloaded files to the tags associated to their URLs. To 
resolve this problem, I wrote a BASH script in Linux and invoked the GNU Wget 
program.3 This script used the primary key associated to each URL in the Zotero database 
and renamed the downloaded document files using the primary key. Using the primary 
keys to rename the files enabled me to download the files and virtually connect the files 
to metadata associated to the URLs.  
 Duplicate reports were removed in two steps. First, the URLs were checked for 
exact duplicate addresses. Then, the duplicates were found and removed with a BASH 
script in Linux that invoked the FDUPS program. The FDUPS first checks files for 
similar size and MD5 signatures and then scans for byte to byte similarity.4 This step 
reduced the number of documents to 7,352 (Table 2-1). 
  
                                                 
1 At this stage the metadata included: URL, title, author, year of publication, think tank, and sometimes 
topic or geographical focus.  
2 “About SQLite,” SQLite, accessed March 16, 2015. https://sqlite.org. 
3 “GNU Wget is a free utility for non-interactive download of files from the Web. It supports HTTP, 
HTTPS, and FTP protocols, as well as retrieval through HTTP proxies.” 
“GNU Wget 1.16.2 Manual,” GNU Operating System, accessed March 16, 2015, 
https://www.gnu.org/software/wget/manual/.   
4 “Script to find duplicate files via their md5 sum. A batch script that executes find | md5sum | sort | uniq | 
xargs | sed. Duplicate files' whole path and their size are output.” 
Danriti, “fdups.py,” GitHub Gist, 2013, https://gist.github.com/danriti/5193327/. 
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2004 2008 2012 Total 
Carnegie 228 404 1166 1798 
Brookings 223 492 662 1377 
RAND 147 165 44 356 
CFR 287 437 299 1023 
Heritage 239 384 214 837 
AEI 428 334 569 1331 
Cato 159 294 177 630 
Total 1711 2510 3131 7352 
Table 2-1 Think Tanks’ Publications in Three General Elections 
2- Text Preprocessing 
 After all the files were downloaded, the HTML documents were converted into 
plain text files. However, when the HTML files were converted to plain text, the HTML 
codes were also imported with the main body of the text. These HTML codes caused 
several warnings in the Profiler Plus software. Moreover, almost always the HTML files 
included summaries of other articles and sometimes commercial ads. To solve these two 
problems and avoid processing sentences that were not the target of this research, the 
extra texts needed to be removed. The 4,000 files of the 2004 and 2008 general elections 
were checked individually, and the unwanted segments were deleted manually. For the 
2012 general election, this task was done by writing a python script that invoked the 
BoilerPipe Java library, which is taken from the paper presented by Kohlschütter, 
Fankhauser and Nejdl in 2010.1 The BoilerPipe library has several strategies to extract 
the main text of an HTML file, of which I used the ArticleExtractor strategy.2 Some of 
the reports from the think tanks were only available in PDF format. To extract the texts 
                                                 
1 Christian Kohlschütter, Peter Fankhauser, and Wolfgang Nejdl, “Boilerplate Detection using Shallow 
Text Features,” in The Third ACM International Conference on Web Search and Data Mining (New York: 
ACM, 2010), 441-450. 
2 “Boilerpipe is a Java library written by Christian Kohlschütter. It is released under the Apache License 
2.0.” Christian Kohlschütter, “Boilerpipe,” Google, 2011, https://code.google.com/p/boilerpipe.  
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from the PDF files, the Apache PDFBox library was used under Linux. This software 
proved to be the most accurate and effective PDF-to-text converter program.1 
 Most of the articles and reports have an abstract/summary section that typically 
repeats some parts of the document. The Profiler Plus counts transitive verbs, and when 
some sections were repeated twice, they were counted twice. However, despite this 
repetition, the abstract/summary sections were retained in this study because, if an author 
repeated something in the abstract section, then those points were presumably especially 
important to the author, and the duplicate consideration of those sections was warranted.  
 As mentioned earlier, the metadata imported to the Zotero database included tags 
pertaining to the topic or geographical location of the article. I used these topic tags as the 
starting point to create a training batch for the supervised topic labeling. To do so, the 
first step was to gather the think tanks’ tags and group them into the three main groups in 
this study: military issues, political issues, and social issues.2 There were three problems 
associated with this step. Most importantly, only 2,000 documents had topic tags. Also 
the seven think tanks used different criteria for assigning topic tags. A political article in 
one think tank could be tagged as a military article in another. Finally, some of the think 
tanks did not even have a consistent tagging system in their own websites. 
                                                 
1 “The Apache PDFBox™ library is an open source Java tool for working with PDF documents. This 
project allows creation of new PDF documents, manipulation of existing documents and the ability to 
extract content from documents. Apache PDFBox also includes several command line utilities. Apache 
PDFBox is published under the Apache License v2.0.”  
“Apache PDFBox - A Java PDF Library,” PDFBox, accessed March 16, 2015, 
https://pdfbox.apache.org/index.html. 
2 Please refer to the Appendix for the details of this step. 
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 To automatically tag the documents, I used the RTextTools package in R, which 
has nine text classifying algorithms, to find patterns in texts.1 The RTextTools package 
classifies the text files in the following steps. First, the plain text files are fed to the 
package in a training batch and a labeling batch. The training batch includes the already-
tagged documents. The labeling batch includes the documents designated to be tagged on 
the basis of the patterns found in the training batch. After importing the documents, the 
RTextTools package creates a document-term matrix. This matrix includes the frequency 
of words for each document. This is a very sparse matrix that generates memory shortage 
problems. To solve this problem, the RTextTools package has included several 
preprocessing functions, such as stripping whitespaces, defining the maximum length of 
words, removing numbers, removing punctuation, stemming the words, removing stop-
words, and removing sparse terms.2 In the next step, each of the nine classifying 
algorithms looks for possible patterns in the document-term matrix of the training group. 
Then, each of the nine algorithms labels the documents on the basis of the patterns found 
in the training batch. At the end, a summary of results is produced by the program, 
including a consensus tag, the number of algorithms in agreement with the assigned tag, 
and the probability of the correctness of the tag.  
 Each of the nine algorithms applies a different method to identify patterns inside 
the documents. The nine algorithms used in the RTextTools package are as follows: 
                                                 
1 Timothy P. Jurka et al., “RTextTools: Automatic Text Classification via Supervised Learning,” The 
Comprehensive R Archive Network, 2012, http://CRAN.R-project.org/package=RTextTools/. 
2 Stop-words are the most frequent words that do not help differentiating among the documents. 
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support vector machine,1 glmnet,2 maximum entropy,3 scaled linear discriminant 
analysis,4 bagging,5 boosting,6 random forest,7 neural networks,8 and classification and 
regression tree.9 Greater agreement among the nine algorithms on labeling a document 
creates greater confidence in the automatic labeling. According to Collingwood and 
Wilkerson, if four of the algorithms agree on a label there is a 90% chance that the 
automatic labeling is correct.10 Since generally in the social sciences, an inter-coder 
agreement of 90% is an acceptable agreement threshold, if four of the nine algorithms 
agree on a tag, the labeling process meets the acceptable standards of human coding.11 
 There were two problems associated with automatic tagging using the RTextTools 
package. Supervised tagging using the RTextTools package is very memory intensive. To 
                                                 
1 David Meyer et al., “e1071: Misc Functions of the Department of Statistics (e1071), TU Wien, 2012,” 
The Comprehensive R Archive Network, February 15, 2013, http://web.mit.edu/r_v3.0.1/e1071.pdf/. 
2 Jerome Friedman, Trevor Hastie, and Rob Tibshirani, “Regularization Paths for Generalized Linear 
Models via Coordinate Descent,” Journal of Statistical Software 33, no. 1 (2010): 1-22. 
3 Timothy P. Jurka, “maxent: An R Package for Low-memory Multinomial Logistic Regression with 
Support for Semi-automated Text Classification,” R Journal 4, no. 1 (2012): 56-59. 
4 Andrea Peters, Torsten Hothorn, and Berthold Lausen, “ipred: Improved Predictors,” R News 2, no. 2 
(2002): 33-36. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Jarek Tuszynski, “CaTools: Tools: Moving Window Statistics, GIF, Base64, ROC AUC, etc.,” The 
Comprehensive R Archive Network, 2014, http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/caTools/index.html/. 
7 Andy Liaw and Matthew Wiener, “Classification and Regression by Random Forest,” R News 2, no. 3 
(2002): 18-22. 
8 William N. Venables and Brian D. Ripley, Modern Applied Statistics with S (New York: Springer Science 
& Business Media, 2002). 
9 Brian Ripley, “tree: Classification and Regression Trees,” The Comprehensive R Archive Network, 2015, 
http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/tree/tree.pdf/. 
10 Loren Collingwood and J. Wilkerson, “Tradeoffs in Accuracy and Efficiency in Supervised Learning 
Methods,” Journal of Information Technology & Politics 9, no. 3 (2012):298–318. 
11 Jurka et al., "RTextTools.” 
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solve this problem, one possibility was to use less memory-intensive algorithms. Among 
the nine algorithms, the first three (support vector machine, glmnet, and maximum 
entropy) use relatively less memory than the other six. However, in order to increase the 
probability of meeting the four-algorithm agreement threshold, it is important to include 
as many of the nine algorithms as possible. Another solution was to use computers with 
higher memory capacities. I used the servers of the High Performance Computing (HPC) 
center at Florida International University (FIU) to perform the supervised tagging. The 
HPC provided servers with 256 gigabytes of RAM to run the tagging task. However, 
even this amount of memory was not enough, and multiple attempts at tagging failed 
because of the lack of available memory. From the nine algorithms, the two algorithms of 
neural networks and classification and regression tree used the most memory. 
 Another solution was to make the document-term matrix less sparse. Usually, the 
text classification packages have a list of words known as the stop-word list. The stop-
word list includes the most frequent words that do not help differentiate among 
documents: words like is, has, and am, among others. The RTextTools uses the tm 
package that has a stop-word list with 174 words.1 However, several attempts to label the 
texts using the default stop-word list did not produce satisfactory results. Therefore, I 
created a specific list of stop-words for this research.  
 To create the specific stop-word list, a list of the unique words used in all the 
documents was compiled to create a document file with thousands of words. Then, the 
words that were unrelated to topics were marked by the Stanford Part of Speech (POS) 
                                                 
1 Ingo Feinerer, Kurt Hornik, and Artifex Software Inc., “tm: Text Mining Package a framework for Text 
Mining Applications within R,” The Comprehensive R Archive Network, 2014, http://cran.r-
project.org/web/packages/tm/index.html/. 
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tagger.1 The Stanford POS tagger is a package that uses the log-linear part-of-speech 
tagging of Toutanova, Klein, Manning, and Singer.2 It uses several statistical taggers and 
assigns one of the thirty-six POS Pen Treebank tags to each word.3 From the different 
taggers that the Stanford POS tagger provides, I chose the english-left3words-
distsim.tagger model.4 Then, from the thirty-six possible POS tags, only the following 
tags (Table 2-2) were selected for topic classifications.  
 Tag Description 
 FW  Foreign word  
 JJ  Adjective  
 NN  Noun, singular or mass 
 NNS  Noun, plural  
 NNP  Proper noun, singular  
 NNPS Proper noun, plural  
 RB  Adverb  
Table 2-2 POS Tags Kept in the Texts 
 As a result of the above steps, a stop-word list with more than 12,000 unique 
words was created. Most of the words of the stop-word list belonged to the category of 
verbs. While the RTextTools package has a stop-word removal function of its own, 
several tests showed that removal of stop-words is done more efficiently before the 
documents are fed to the RTextTools package. Therefore, I invoked the tm package 
separately and outside the RTextTools package. The tm package used the above-
mentioned 12,000 stop-word list instead of its default list. 
                                                 
1 “Stanford Log-linear Part-Of-Speech Tagger,” The Stanford Natural Language Processing Group, 
accessed February 23, 2014, http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/tagger.shtml. 
2 Kristina Toutanova et al., “Feature-Rich Part-of-Speech Tagging with a Cyclic Dependency Network,” in 
HLT-NAACL, 2003 (Edmonton, Canada: HLT-NAACL, 2003), 252-259.  
3 Please refer to the Appendix. 
4 “Stanford POS tagger FAQ,” The Stanford Natural Language Processing Group, accessed February 23, 
2014, http://nlp.stanford.edu/software/pos-tagger-faq.shtml. 
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 The benefits of creating a specific list of stop-words were twofold. Removing 
more words that did not differentiate among documents enabled the algorithms to identify 
more precise word patterns for each topic. Also, removing the unnecessary words 
significantly reduced the size of the document-term matrix, thereby reducing the amount 
of memory required for the topic classification.  
3- Supervised Topic Classification 
 More than 2,000 documents were tagged by the think tanks in the 2004 and 2008 
general elections as military, political, or social.1 These documents created the training 
batch. However, there was little agreement among the think tanks’ tagging systems. 
Several tests showed that the tagging systems of the think tanks were not reliable enough 
to produce consistent tagging results. To resolve this problem, the training batch of 
already-tagged documents was used to tag itself. The documents were divided into nine 
groups of 300 documents. In each group, 270 documents were assigned the role of 
training batch and thirty documents the role of labeling group. On two occasions, the 
result of this automatic tagging was checked manually: when the result of the automatic 
labeling differed from the tag that the think tank had assigned to the document, and when 
fewer than four algorithms agreed with the think tanks’ tagging. The manual checking of 
the documents showed that in the majority of cases, the automatic tagging by the nine 
algorithms was correct. In cases where there was not an agreement between the human 
manual coding and the nine algorithms, the document was removed from the training 
batch. This process was repeated until a group of 1769 documents labeled itself correctly 
                                                 
1 For the complete list of the tags and how they were grouped into these three general tags, please refer to 
the Appendix. 
 41 
 
90% of the time. This batch of 1769 documents became the training batch used to tag the 
remaining documents.  
 After the training batch was created, the rest of the documents were divided into 
125 groups of fifty documents. For each group, 1769 documents were assigned the role of 
training batch and fifty documents the role of labeling batch. Table 2-3 shows the 
frequency of each of the topics and level of agreement between the algorithms. As Table 
2-3 shows, the majority of the documents in all the three topics had consensus agreement 
on more than four algorithms. Table 2-3 shows that the confidence of tagging in my 
research is higher than the 90% human inter-coder agreement. The high confidence on 
topic labeling increases the confidence on the subsequent analysis.  
Number of 
Algorithms in 
Agreement 
Military Political Social Grand Total 
4 99 51 13 163 
5 150 310 150 610 
6 123 442 149 714 
7 148 557 191 896 
8 127 897 296 1320 
9 30 2001 519 2550 
1769 Training  298 896 575 1769 
Manually Coded 9 31 10 50 
Grand Total 984 5185 1903 8072 
Table 2-3 The Consensus Agreement on File Labeling 
 Document labeling is useful when one wants to extract the operational code of a 
subject with the highest frequency. However, if one wants to extract the operational code 
of subjects with low frequency, the overall label of the document can be misleading. Any 
document has several sentences, and not all the sentences necessarily share the same 
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topic. In the case of low-frequency subjects, the probability that the topic of a sentence 
differs from the overall topic of the document is considerable.  
 To assign a topic to a sentence, first the sentences with transitive verbs were 
identified. The documents produced almost 500,000 sentences, of which more than 
366,000 were unique. To automatically label the 366,000 sentences, I employed the 
RTextTools package. I also used the University of Texas Policy Agendas Project coding 
system for News Media as the training batch.1 The Policy Agendas Project systematically 
gathers and manually labels the New York Times Index by topic. By 2014, its codebook 
had the records of more than 49,000 New York Times indexes published between 1946 to 
2008.2 “The New York Times Index Data Codebook” of 2014 had twenty-seven topic 
codes, of which I chose the following six indexes related to foreign relations: 
macroeconomics, environment, energy, defense, foreign trade, and security. Of the 
available 49,000 indexes, the labels of more than 20,000 New York Times indexes were 
found to be relevant for my research. However, since automatic labeling is a memory-
intensive task, I chose a sample of 20,000 indexes. To create a manageable training batch, 
I randomly chose 5,000 indexes from the 20,000 indexes.  
 In the next step, the 366,000 sentences were divided into 733 groups of 500 
sentences. Then, the New York Times training batch was invoked, and the 366,000 
                                                 
1 “The data used here were originally collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the 
support of National Science Foundation grant numbers SBR 9320922 and 0111611, and were distributed 
through the Department of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. Neither NSF nor the original 
collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis reported here.” 
“How to Cite,” Policy Agendas Project, accessed March 28, 2014, 
http://www.policyagendas.org/page/datasets-codebooks#new_york_times_index. 
2 “New York Times Index Data Codebook,” University of Texas, accessed March 28, 2014, 
http://www.utexas.edu/cola/files/4341573. 
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sentences were tagged by the nine classifying algorithms of the RTextTools package. For 
each group, 5,000 New York Times indexes were assigned the role of training batch and 
500 sentences the role of labeling batch. Then, the 366,000 unique and tagged sentences 
were used to tag the duplicate sentences. Overall, 486,882 sentences were tagged in this 
step. To adopt a consistent and more manageable coding system, the above six labels 
were grouped into three macro groups of military, political, and social.1 Table 2-4 shows 
the results of the supervised topic labeling of the sentences. It shows the frequency of 
each of the topics and level of agreement between the algorithms. As Table 2-4 shows, in 
98% of the sentences, at least four algorithms agreed on the assigned tag. Table 2-4 
shows that the tagging system of my research enjoys a high degree of accuracy, which 
increases the confidence in the subsequent analysis.  
Algorithms in 
Agreement 
Military Political Social Grand Total 
2 31 2 286 319  
3 1876 1657 5815 9348  
4 8373 14383 14607 37363 
5 19670 39864 15727 75261 
6 27497 45580 14046 87123  
7 18778 68183 10575 97536  
8 258 83881 10175 94314  
9 0 83564 2054 85618  
Grand Total 76483 337114 73285 486882  
Table 2-4 The Consensus Agreement on Sentence Labeling 
4- Profiler Plus 
 The software Profiler Plus performs the steps used by VICS automatically. It first 
identifies/parses transitive verbs and their subjects in each sentence. Then, using the 
VICS dictionary, it assigns a range of positive and negative values to the verbs. Next, 
                                                 
1 For more information, please refer to the Appendix.  
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using ten different formulas, it answers George’s ten questions about the operational code 
below.1  
 P1-Nature of Politics: What is the “essential” nature of political life? Is the 
political universe one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's 
political opponents? The answer to the first philosophical question is based on the 
assumption that the types of verbs used by the Self to describe the action of the Other will 
reveal how the Self views political life. The first philosophical question is answered by 
subtracting the percentage of positive verbs from negative verbs. The result is an index 
between -1 (very hostile) and +1 (very friendly).  
 P2-Realization of Political Values: What are the prospects for the eventual 
realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic 
or must one be pessimistic on this score, and in what respects the one and/or the other? 
The answer to the second philosophical question assumes that the intensity of positive 
and negative verbs used for the Other shows how optimistic or pessimistic the Self is. To 
calculate P2, first the frequency of each verb, mentioned in Figure 1-3, is multiplied by 
its assigned value in that figure, and then the sum of all the results is divided by the total 
number of the verbs. The result is an index between -1 (very pessimistic) and +1 (very 
optimistic). 
 P3-Predictability of Political Future: Is the political future predictable? In what 
sense and to what extent? The answer to the third philosophical question follows the 
information theory’s assertion that greater uniformity among the categories in a situation 
                                                 
1 The entire section on the operational code method is a summary of the works by Michael Young, Stephen 
G. Walker, and Mark Schafer including: Mark Schafer and Stephen G. Walker, Beliefs and Leadership in 
World Politics: Methods and Applications of Operational Code Analysis (New York: Palgrave, 2006).  
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suggests greater certainty. The third philosophical question is answered by measuring the 
Index of Qualitative Variation (IQV) for each text: “The Index of Qualitative Variation is 
a ratio of different pairs of observations in a distribution to the maximum possible 
number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N and the same number of 
variable classifications.”1 The third philosophical index varies between 0 (very low 
predictability) and +1 (very high predictability). 
 P4-Control over Historical Developments: How much “control” or “mastery” 
can one have over historical development? What is one's role in “moving” and 
“shaping” history in the desired direction? The fourth philosophical question is derived 
from the locus-of-control literature.2 The ratio of the frequency of transitive verbs for the 
Self to transitive verbs for the Other shows how in control the Self is. The index varies 
between 0 (very low control) and +1 (very high control).  
 P5-Role of Chance: What is the role of “chance” in human affairs and in 
historical development? The answer to the fifth philosophical question is derived from 
the assumption that if an actor’s control over history is low, and the actor cannot predict 
the future, then the role of chance is high. In other words, the answer to the fifth 
philosophical question is based on the answers to the third and fourth philosophical 
questions. The answer to the fifth philosophical question is measured by multiplying P3 
by P4. This index varies between 0 (very low role of chance) and +1 (very high role of 
chance). 
                                                 
1 George Watson and Dickinson McGaw, Statistical Inquiry (New York: Wiley, 1980), 88. 
2 Herbert M. Lefcourt, Locus of Control: Current Trends in Theory & Research (Hillsdale, N.J.: L. 
Erlbaum Associates, 1982). 
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 I1-Direction of Strategy: What is the best approach for selecting goals or 
objectives for political action? The first instrumental question is like the first 
philosophical question. The only difference is that this index measures the verbs used for 
the Self. The index varies between -1 (very conflictual) and +1 (very cooperative). 
 I2-Intensity of Tactics: How are the goals of action pursued most effectively? 
The second instrumental question is like the second philosophical question, with the 
exception that the transitive verbs for the Self are considered. The index varies between -
1 (very conflictual) and +1 (very cooperative). 
 I3-Risk Orientation: How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, 
and accepted? The third instrumental index measures the risk propensity of the Self. The 
more choices the Self has, the average risk associated with the failure of any of those 
choices will be lower. The lower risk for loss across choices makes the Self risk-averse. 
The fewer choices the Self has, the average risk associated with the failure of any of 
those choices will be higher. The higher risk for loss across choices makes the Self risk-
acceptant. To measure the index of Risk Orientation, 1 is subtracted from the Index of 
Qualitative Variation for the Self. The index varies between 0 (very risk-averse) and +1 
(very risk-acceptant). 
 I4-Flexibility of Tactics: What is the best “timing” of action to advance one's 
interests? The fourth instrumental index deals with the issue of timing of action and 
flexibility of the Self in taking action. The index of Flexibility of Tactics has two 
subcategories of I4a and I4b. The assumption behind I4a index is that higher degrees of 
shift between conflictual and cooperative verbs show higher flexibility, urgency for 
action and the fact that the strategy of the Self is not fixed. A text which is mainly 
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cooperative or mainly conflictual has less flexibility and depicts a fixed strategy that will 
not change, no matter what the other actors do. A text with a balanced distribution of 
cooperative and conflictual verbs shows the readiness to change strategy, higher degrees 
of flexibility and more readiness to act. I4a is measured by subtracting 1 from the 
absolute difference of the percentage of cooperative and conflictual verbs. It varies 
between 0 (very low flexibility) and +1 (very high flexibility). In measuring the I4b index 
the assumption is that higher shift propensity between words and deeds indicates a more 
risk-averse orientation. A lower degree of shift between words and deeds shows a more 
risk acceptant orientation. It varies between 0 (very risk-averse) and +1 (very risk-
acceptant).  
 I5-Utility of Means: What is the utility and role of different means for advancing 
one's interests? The fifth instrumental question measures the utility of different means to 
achieve goals. It includes six different indexes and is measured by computing the 
percentage of the total number of verbs that each of the six categories of verbs accounts 
for: Utility of Appealing (I5ap); Utility of promising (I5pr); Utility of Rewarding (I5re); 
Utility of Opposing (I5op); Utility of Threatening (I5th); and Utility of Punishing (I5pu). 
The measurement for each category varies between 0 (very low utility) and +1 (very high 
utility). Figure 2-1 presents the summary and calculations of the Philosophical and 
Instrumental Indexes. 
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Figure 2-1 VICS Indexes and their Formulas 
Source: Figure adopted with some modifications from Stephen G. Walker and Mark 
Schafer, “Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson as Cultural Icons of US Foreign 
Policy,” Political Psychology 28, no. 6 (2007): 758. 
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VICS Indexes Used in this Research 
VICS is all about counting the number of transitive verbs. When the number of 
texts is in the thousands, as in the case of this research, the frequency of the verbs of the 
Others will be exponentially higher than the frequency of the transitive verbs of the Self. 
For instance, the total number of transitive verbs of the Other will be in tens of thousands 
and the total number of transitive verbs of the Self will be at most in the hundreds. 
Because of this large difference, indexes like P4 and P5, which incorporate frequencies of 
the Self and the Other, lose their sensitivity. On the other hand and with the exception of 
the two indexes of P4 and P5, the formulas of the Philosophical indexes have exact 
counterparts in the Instrumental indexes. The two sets of formulas differ because 
Instrumental formulas use the transitive verbs of the Self, and the Philosophical formulas 
use the transitive verbs of the Other. Because of lack of sensitivity, I did not use the P4 
and P5 indexes. Instead, I used the eleven Instrumental formulas for the Other. By doing 
so, this research lost the two less sensitive indexes, but gained seven additional indexes to 
compare the texts (I4a, I4b, I5ap, I5pr, I5re, I5op, and I5th). This practice not only 
resolves the problem of lack of sensitivity of some indexes, it also creates more indexes 
for studying the Other. Instead of creating five operational code indexes, treating the 
Other as the Self will create eleven indexes for the Other. Therefore, in this research, the 
Instrumental formulas and their respective indexes are calculated both for the Self and the 
Other. Throughout the research, all of the VICS indexes are named Instrumental indexes 
(I-indexes), even if they measure the operational code of the Other.      
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5- Sensitivity of Method  
 Is the VICS method sensitive enough to produce indexes that differ between 
political1 and nonpolitical texts? To answer this question, a batch of random nonpolitical 
documents was gathered as a basis of comparison. The nonpolitical batch came from the 
LexisNexis database. The LexisNexis database was queried for the three random 
nonpolitical keywords, perfume, violin, and pasta in the exact three time periods of the 
project. Nine queries were conducted, and documents with at least 500 words were 
chosen. The data-gathering phase produced 7,000 nonpolitical documents from 
LexisNexis. In the next step, the nonpolitical texts were processed by the Profiler Plus 
software, using the same set of schemas that was used to process the think tank political 
texts.2  
 2004 2008 2012 Grand Total 
Think Tank Texts 1711 2510 3131 7352 
Military 228 379 381 988 
Political 1169 1488 2041 4698 
Social 314 643 709 1666 
LexisNexis Texts 1794 1747 1662 5203 
Pasta 604 569 558 1731 
Perfume 670 671 558 1899 
Violin 520 507 546 1573 
Grand Total 3505 4257 4793 12555 
Table 2-5 Number of Political and Nonpolitical Documents 
 In the next step, the positive and negative transitive verbs of all the subjects in 
each batch were aggregated, thereby treating all the subjects as the Self. After 
aggregating the number of positive and negative transitive verbs, those files that had 
                                                 
1 Here “political” refers to all the three categories of the think tanks’ texts.  
2 For the list of schemas, please refer to the Appendix.  
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fifteen or more transitive verbs were selected. This step reduced the number of 
nonpolitical texts to 5,000 (Table 2-5). After treating all the subjects as the Self, eleven 
Instrumental indexes were calculated for each batch. Table 2-8 shows the VICS indexes 
for both batches. Table 2-9 presents the description of the I-indexes according to their 
range. As Table 2-9 shows, without exception, nonpolitical texts were clearly more 
cooperative than the think tanks’ texts.  
 The differences in the Instrumental indexes of the two batches show that the 
VICS method is sensitive enough to separate the political and nonpolitical texts. To test 
the statistical significance of this difference, a MANOVA test was conducted using Batch 
as the independent variable and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the dependent 
variables.1 All statistical analysis was performed using IBM SPSS Statistics (v. 20). SPSS 
rounds off p-values less than 0.0005 to 0.000.2 The expectation was that political and 
nonpolitical texts would have different rules of conduct. Table 2-6 shows the result of the 
MANOVA test. Using Pillai's trace, there was a significant effect of type of text (Batch) 
on the eleven I-indexes. The MANOVA test showed that the political and nonpolitical 
texts produced different VICS indexes (rules of conduct/operational codes).  
Multivariate Tests 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 
df Error df Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Batch Pillai's Trace .372 675.858 11 12543 0.000 .372
Table 2-6 MANOVA - Impact of Type of Texts on the VICS Indexes 
                                                 
1 An alpha level of 0.05 was used for all statistical tests. 
2 Lee A. Kirkpatrick and Brooke C. Feeney, A Simple Guide to IBM SPSS Statistics for Version 20.0, 
(Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, Cengage Learning, 2013), 36. 
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However, how much does Batch differentiate between the two types of texts? In 
other words, considering the VICS indexes, how dissimilar were the political and 
nonpolitical batches? To answer this question, the effect size of the impact of Batch on 
the eleven I-indexes was calculated by estimating the Partial Eta Squared value (ηp2). The 
Partial Eta Squared value shows how much of the variance in the dependent variable is 
attributable to the independent variable. I used the following established convention to 
interpret the Partial Eta Squared estimate:1  
• Partial	Eta	Squared < 0.06	: Effect size is small. Less than 6% of the 
variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variable; 
• 0.06 ≤ Partial	Eta	Squared	 < 0.14	: Effect size is medium. Between 6% to 
14% of the variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent 
variable; 
• 0.14 ≤ Partial	Eta	Squared ∶ Effect size is large. More than 14% of the 
variance in the dependent variable is explained by the independent variable.  
 Table 2-6 shows that the effect of Batch on the eleven I-indexes was large. In 
other words, the type of texts (political or nonpolitical) made a large difference in the 
VICS indexes. Then, does the impact of type of text on the operational code indexes 
manifest itself in all the eleven indexes? The univariate tests of between-subject effects 
showed that Batch had a significant effect on all the eleven I-indexes, of which the 
indexes of Direction of Strategy (I1), Risk Aversion (I3), Flexibility of Tactics (I4a) and 
Utility of Opposing (I5-Oppose) had the largest effect size (Table 2-7). 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Karabi Nandy, “Understanding and Quantifying Effect Sizes,” University of California Los Angeles 
(UCLA), 2012, http://nursing.ucla.edu/workfiles/research/Effect%20Size%204-9-2012.pdf  
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Batch I1: Direction of Strategy 189.248 1 189.248 2553.852 0.000 .169
I2: Intensity of Tactics 57.881 1 57.881 1359.072 0.000 .098
I3: Risk Aversion 130.605 1 130.605 4076.181 0.000 .245
I4a: Flexibility of Tactics 172.252 1 172.252 3008.379 0.000 .193
I4b: Words and Deeds 21.244 1 21.244 421.165 0.000 .032
I5: Appeal 17.607 1 17.607 1077.842 0.000 .079
I5: Promise .145 1 .145 7.173 0.007 .001
I5: Reward 3.892 1 3.892 299.310 0.000 .023
I5: Oppose 46.179 1 46.179 4831.082 0.000 .278
I5: Threaten 14.860 1 14.860 1149.850 0.000 .084
I5: Punish 8.386 1 8.386 447.040 0.000 .034
Table 2-7 Impact of Type of Texts on the Individual VICS Indexes 
 After showing that VICS indexes could differentiate between the political and 
nonpolitical texts, the research asked whether their subcategories could be differentiated 
as well. As Table 2-8 shows, each of the two batches had three sub-groups. The files of 
the batch of think tank were labeled in categories of military, political, and social. The 
LexisNexis nonpolitical batch was divided into subcategories of pasta, perfume, and 
violin. While the subcategories of the think tanks’ texts resulted from supervised labeling, 
the nonpolitical subcategories resulted from a keyword search conducted at the time the 
nonpolitical batch was gathered. 
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Table 2-8 VICS Indexes of Political and Nonpolitical Batches 
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2004 228 0.18 0.24 0.05 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.76 0.17 0.82 0.14 0.32 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.26 0.11
2008 379 0.16 0.26 0.04 0.21 0.14 0.06 0.75 0.18 0.84 0.12 0.31 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.11
2012 381 0.13 0.26 0.02 0.21 0.14 0.06 0.76 0.17 0.85 0.13 0.30 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.09 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.27 0.12
Total 988 0.15 0.26 0.03 0.20 0.14 0.06 0.76 0.17 0.84 0.13 0.31 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.09 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.27 0.11
2004 1169 0.21 0.23 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.05 0.74 0.17 0.80 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.10
2008 1488 0.22 0.25 0.08 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.73 0.19 0.79 0.15 0.37 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.10
2012 2041 0.21 0.25 0.08 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.73 0.19 0.79 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.10
Total 4698 0.21 0.25 0.08 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.73 0.18 0.80 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.10
2004 314 0.33 0.23 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.05 0.64 0.19 0.84 0.13 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.29 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.09
2008 643 0.33 0.24 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.64 0.20 0.83 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.29 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.09
2012 709 0.32 0.24 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.65 0.20 0.82 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.28 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.09
Total 1666 0.33 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.65 0.20 0.82 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.29 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.09
2004 1711 0.23 0.24 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.72 0.18 0.81 0.15 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.10
2008 2510 0.24 0.25 0.10 0.19 0.15 0.06 0.71 0.19 0.81 0.15 0.35 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.10 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.10
2012 3131 0.23 0.26 0.09 0.19 0.14 0.06 0.72 0.19 0.81 0.15 0.35 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.11
Total 7352 0.23 0.25 0.09 0.19 0.14 0.06 0.72 0.19 0.81 0.15 0.35 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.10 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.10
2004 604 0.45 0.31 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.09 0.52 0.26 0.76 0.20 0.38 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.31 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.21 0.14
2008 569 0.43 0.31 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.09 0.54 0.26 0.74 0.20 0.38 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.29 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.22 0.14
2012 558 0.46 0.30 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.08 0.52 0.26 0.75 0.19 0.38 0.14 0.04 0.06 0.31 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.21 0.14
Total 1731 0.45 0.31 0.22 0.25 0.22 0.09 0.53 0.26 0.75 0.19 0.38 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.30 0.13 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.22 0.14
2004 670 0.43 0.32 0.20 0.25 0.23 0.11 0.52 0.24 0.73 0.19 0.41 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.26 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.19 0.15
2008 671 0.45 0.31 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.10 0.52 0.24 0.76 0.18 0.42 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.27 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.14
2012 558 0.47 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.10 0.51 0.24 0.75 0.17 0.42 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.28 0.13 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.11
Total 1899 0.45 0.31 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.10 0.51 0.24 0.75 0.18 0.42 0.15 0.04 0.06 0.27 0.12 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.18 0.13
2004 520 0.55 0.27 0.26 0.21 0.27 0.12 0.44 0.24 0.73 0.20 0.49 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.25 0.12 0.07 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.11
2008 507 0.56 0.25 0.27 0.19 0.27 0.12 0.43 0.24 0.73 0.19 0.49 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.26 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.10
2012 546 0.57 0.26 0.27 0.20 0.28 0.12 0.42 0.25 0.73 0.19 0.49 0.15 0.03 0.04 0.27 0.13 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.10
Total 1573 0.56 0.26 0.27 0.20 0.27 0.12 0.43 0.24 0.73 0.19 0.49 0.15 0.03 0.05 0.26 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.11
2004 1794 0.47 0.31 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.11 0.50 0.25 0.74 0.19 0.43 0.16 0.04 0.05 0.27 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.14
2008 1747 0.47 0.30 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.11 0.50 0.25 0.75 0.19 0.43 0.15 0.03 0.06 0.28 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.13
2012 1662 0.50 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.24 0.11 0.48 0.25 0.75 0.18 0.43 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.28 0.13 0.06 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.18 0.12
Total 5203 0.48 0.30 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.11 0.49 0.25 0.74 0.19 0.43 0.15 0.04 0.05 0.28 0.13 0.07 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.18 0.13
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Table 2-9 Comparison of Political and Nonpolitical Batches 
I1 - Direction of 
Strategy
I2 - Intensity of    
Tactics
I3 - Risk          
Orientation
I4a - Urgency    
of Action
Flexibility    
of Action
I5 - Utility of 
Appeal
I5 - Utility of  
Promise
I5 - Utility of  
Reward
I5 - Utility of  
Oppose
I5 - Utility of  
Threaten
I5 - Utility of  
Punish
2004 Mixed Mixed Very Risk-Averse High High Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Low
2008 Mixed Mixed Very Risk-Averse High High Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Low
2012 Mixed Mixed Very Risk-Averse High High Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Low
Total Mixed Mixed Very Risk-Averse High High Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Low
2004 Mixed Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2008 Mixed Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2012 Mixed Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
Total Mixed Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2004 Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2008 Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2012 Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
Total Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2004 Mixed Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2008 Mixed Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2012 Mixed Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
Total Mixed Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2004 Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2008 Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium Medium Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2012 Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
Total Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2004 Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium Medium Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2008 Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2012 Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
Total Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2004 Definitly Cooperative Somewhat Cooperative Risk-Averse Low Medium Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2008 Definitly Cooperative Somewhat Cooperative Risk-Averse Low Medium Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2012 Definitly Cooperative Somewhat Cooperative Risk-Averse Low Medium Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
Total Definitly Cooperative Somewhat Cooperative Risk-Averse Low Medium Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2004 Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium Medium Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2008 Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2012 Definitly Cooperative Somewhat Cooperative Very Risk-Averse Low High Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
Total Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Low Medium Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2004 Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2008 Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
2012 Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
Total Somewhat Cooperative Mixed Very Risk-Averse Medium High Low Very Low Low Very Low Very Low Very Low
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 To examine the effect of subcategories on the VICS indexes of the texts, a 
MANOVA test was conducted using Topic as the independent variable and the eleven 
Instrumental indexes as the dependent variables. The expectation was that texts with 
different topics (military, social, political, violin, pasta, perfume) would have different 
rules of conduct. Table 2-10 shows the result of the MANOVA test. Using Pillai's trace, 
there was a significant effect of Topic on the eleven Instrumental indexes. However, the 
effect of Topic on the eleven Instrumental indexes was medium.  
Multivariate Tests 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Topic Pillai's Trace .518 131.882 55 62,715 0.000 .104
Table 2-10 MANOVA - Impact of Subcategories of Texts on the VICS Indexes 
 In terms of the six subcategories, does the impact of type of text on the 
operational code indexes manifest in all the eleven I-indexes? The univariate tests of 
between-subject effects showed that Topic had a significant effect on the individual VICS 
indexes, of which the indexes of Direction of Strategy (I1), Risk Aversion (I3), 
Flexibility of Tactics (I4a) and Utility of Opposing (I5op) had the largest effect size 
(Table 2-11). 
 To test the difference between the six subcategories, the MANOVA test was 
followed by a discriminant analysis. The discriminant analysis was conducted using the 
VICS indexes as the independent variables and Topic as the grouping variable. The 
results of the discriminant analysis are shown in Table 2-12 and Table 2-13. The 
discriminant analysis revealed five functions, all of which were statistically significant 
(Table 2-13). As Table 2-12 shows, the first two functions explained 93% of the variance. 
Figure 2-2 shows the discriminant function plot produced by the first two functions. As 
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the plot shows, the first function clearly differentiated the texts of the think tanks from 
the LexisNexis nonpolitical texts. 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Topic I1: Direction of Strategy 227.456 5 45.491 639.985 0.000 .203
I2: Intensity of Tactics 78.256 5 15.651 381.934 0.000 .132
I3: Risk Aversion 138.369 5 27.674 880.418 0.000 .260
I4a: Flexibility of Tactics 196.144 5 39.229 708.463 0.000 .220
I4b: Words and Deeds 26.088 5 5.218 104.202 0.000 .040
I5: Appeal 29.680 5 5.936 385.993 0.000 .133
I5: Promise 1.301 5 .260 12.883 0.000 .005
I5: Reward 11.335 5 2.267 182.622 0.000 .068
I5: Oppose 50.027 5 10.005 1081.064 0.000 .301
I5: Threaten 15.196 5 3.039 235.574 0.000 .086
I5: Punish 17.567 5 3.513 194.836 0.000 .072
Table 2-11 Impact of Subcategories of Texts on the Individual VICS Indexes 
Eigenvalues 
Function Eigenvalue 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Canonical 
Correlation 
1 .639 82.4 82.4 .624 
2 .082 10.6 93.0 .275 
3 .033 4.3 97.3 .179 
4 .013 1.7 99.0 .115 
5 .008 1.0 100.0 .087 
Table 2-12 Eigenvalues - Subcategories of Political and Nonpolitical Texts 
Wilks' Lambda 
Test of Function(s) Wilks' Lambda 
Chi-
square df Sig. 
1 through 5 0.535 7855.531 55 .000 
2 through 5 0.876 1658.646 40 .000 
3 through 5 0.948 672.07 27 .000 
4 through 5 0.979 261.226 16 .000 
5 0.992 94.617 7 .000 
Table 2-13 Wilks' Lambda - Subcategories of Political and Nonpolitical Texts 
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Figure 2-2 Discriminant Functions Plot – Subcategories of Political and Nonpolitical Texts 
Summary  
 This chapter described the data acquisition process and identified the most 
important segment of data acquisition as the supervised automatic labeling of files and 
sentences. Then, the operational code method and its indexes were reviewed. At the end, 
the sensitivity of the VICS method was tested. As this chapter shows, the difference 
between the VICS indexes of the political and nonpolitical texts was statistically 
significant and large. However, while the difference between the VICS indexes of the six 
subcategories of political and nonpolitical texts was significant, the magnitude of this 
difference was medium. 
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CHAPTER 3 : THE WORLDS OF THE SEVEN THINK TANKS 
Introduction 
 Chapter Three studies the American foreign policy elite by treating all the 
subjects as the Self. It uses all the transitive verbs and their subsequent I-indexes to 
differentiate among the worlds of American foreign policy think tanks. This chapter has 
two sections. Section one examines the existence of different worlds of action for the 
collectivity of American foreign policy think tanks. Second section examines the 
dissimilarity among the seven think tanks in different worlds of action. The unit of 
analysis of the first section is the collectivity of the seven think tanks; in the second 
section it is the individual think tanks. The smallest unit for the verb aggregation and for 
the topic classification is the individual document.  
1- The Worlds of the Collectivity of the Seven Think Tanks 
 Nicholas Onuf argues that agents act in multiple worlds1 with different governing 
rules, and these rules are constructed via speech acts.2 The collectivity of the seven think 
tanks can potentially have many worlds of action as well. On the basis of the topic 
classifications of Chapter Two, the collectivity of the seven think tanks can potentially 
have four worlds: the world of all the issues and the worlds of military issues, political 
issues, and social issues. The task of this section is to use the VICS indexes to empirically 
test the existence of these worlds. The main questions ask whether the rules of conduct 
for the collectivity of the think tanks changed over time (2004, 2008, and 2012). What is 
the impact of the issue areas on the rules of conduct for the collectivity of think tanks? 
                                                 
1 The title of my research was inspired from Nicholas Onuf’s theory.  
2 Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations 
(Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).  
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What is the impact of time on the rules of conduct for the collectivity of think tanks, in 
each of the issue areas?  
 To answer the above questions, the text files were grouped in the following 
sixteen groups: Four groups consisted of all the texts published by the collectivity of the 
seven think tanks regardless of time, and twelve groups consisted of the texts in each 
general election. Table 3-1 presents the rules of conduct (eleven VICS indexes) related to 
these sixteen groups.  
1-1 The Impact of Time on the Rules of Conduct for the Collectivity of the Think 
Tanks  
 The collectivity of the seven think tanks published documents before and after the 
three elections of 2004, 2008, and 2012. In each of these elections the political contexts 
(domestic and international) in which these texts were published differed, raising the 
question whether, considering all the verbs, the difference in the context had any impact 
on the VICS indexes of the collectivity of the think tanks. On this level, all the texts of 
the think tanks were considered together, regardless of the think tank, subject, or topic of 
the texts. The Instrumental indexes derived from this level of verb aggregation reflected 
the rules of conduct for the collectivity of the American think tanks towards the world in 
three different periods.  
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Table 3-1 VICS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks 
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Military 228 0.18 0.24 0.05 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.76 0.17 0.82 0.14 0.32 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.26 0.11
Political 1169 0.21 0.23 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.05 0.74 0.17 0.80 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.10
Social 314 0.33 0.23 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.05 0.64 0.19 0.84 0.13 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.29 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.09
Total 1711 0.23 0.24 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.72 0.18 0.81 0.15 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.10
Military 379 0.16 0.26 0.04 0.21 0.14 0.06 0.75 0.18 0.84 0.12 0.31 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.11
Political 1488 0.22 0.25 0.08 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.73 0.19 0.79 0.15 0.37 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.10
Social 643 0.33 0.24 0.19 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.64 0.20 0.83 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.29 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.09
Total 2510 0.24 0.25 0.10 0.19 0.15 0.06 0.71 0.19 0.81 0.15 0.35 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.10 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.10
Military 381 0.13 0.26 0.02 0.21 0.14 0.06 0.76 0.17 0.85 0.13 0.30 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.09 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.27 0.12
Political 2041 0.21 0.25 0.08 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.73 0.19 0.79 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.10
Social 709 0.32 0.24 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.65 0.20 0.82 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.28 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.09
Total 3131 0.23 0.26 0.09 0.19 0.14 0.06 0.72 0.19 0.81 0.15 0.35 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.11
Military 988 0.15 0.26 0.03 0.20 0.14 0.06 0.76 0.17 0.84 0.13 0.31 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.09 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.27 0.11
Political 4698 0.21 0.25 0.08 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.73 0.18 0.80 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.10
Social 1666 0.33 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.65 0.20 0.82 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.29 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.09
Total 7352 0.23 0.25 0.09 0.19 0.14 0.06 0.72 0.19 0.81 0.15 0.35 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.10 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.10
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 As Table 3-1 shows, the Instrumental indexes in the three general elections, Total-
2004, Total-2008, and Total-2012, were very similar. This finding shows that the rules of 
conduct for the collectivity of the think tanks did not change between 2004, 2008, and 
2012. To test the statistical significance of this finding, a MANOVA test was conducted 
using Time as the independent variable and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the 
dependent variables. The expectation was that texts published in different periods (2004, 
2008, and 2012) would have similar rules of conduct. The result of the MANOVA test 
appears in Table 3-2. Using Pillai's trace, there was a significant effect of Time on the 
eleven Instrumental indexes. However, the effect of Time on the I-indexes was small.  
Multivariate Tests 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Time Pillai's Trace 0.007 2.363 22 14680 0.000 0.004
Table 3-2 MANOVA - Impact of Time on the VICS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks 
 The above test shows that while the rules of conduct for the collectivity of think 
tanks differed among the three general elections, the magnitude of difference was small. 
The tests of between-subjects effects showed that Time had significant effect on three 
indexes of Intensity of Tactics (I2), Flexibility of Tactics (I4a), and Utility of Punishing 
(I5pu). However, the effect of Time on these indexes was small (Table 3-3). The VICS 
indexes and the subsequent MANVOVA test showed that the rules of conduct for the 
collectivity of the think tanks did not change much between the three general elections.  
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared
Time I1: Direction of Strategy .327 2 .163 2.585 .075 .001
I2: Intensity of Tactics .265 2 .132 3.763 .023 .001
I3: Risk Orientation .065 2 .033 1.158 .314 .000
I4a: Flexibility of Tactics .326 2 .163 3.367 .035 .001
I4b: Words and Deeds .034 2 .017 .402 .669 .000
I5: Appeal .019 2 .010 .863 .422 .000
I5: Promise .001 2 .001 .055 .946 .000
I5: Reward .056 2 .028 2.683 .068 .001
I5: Oppose .008 2 .004 .407 .666 .000
I5: Threaten .011 2 .006 .459 .632 .000
I5: Punish .097 2 .048 3.656 .026 .001
Table 3-3 Impact of Time on the Individual VICS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks 
1-2 The Impact of Topic on the Rules of Conduct for the Collectivity of the Think 
Tanks  
 As mentioned in Chapter Two, the texts of the think tanks were categorized 
according to military, political and social issues. This section (1-2) tests the impact of 
issue area on the rules of conduct for the collectivity of the think tanks. As Table 3-1 
shows, the Instrumental indexes in the three topics differed significantly from one 
another. Generally, the social texts were the most cooperative and military texts were the 
most conflictual. Table 3-1 shows that the rules of conduct for the collectivity of the think 
tanks changed based on the issue area. To test the statistical significance of this 
difference, a MANOVA test was conducted using Topic as the independent variable and 
the eleven Instrumental indexes as the dependent variables. The expectation was that 
texts with different topics (military, social, and political) would have different rules of 
conduct. The result of the MANOVA test appears in Table 3-4. Using Pillai's trace, there 
was a significant effect of Topic on the eleven Instrumental indexes, and the estimated 
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effect of Topic was medium. The MANOVA test showed that the rules of conduct for the 
collectivity of the think tanks in the three issue areas differed moderately from one 
another. The tests of between-subjects effects (Table 3-5) showed that the impact of 
Topic on the rules of conduct for the collectivity of the think tanks was statistically 
significant in all the Instrumental indexes. However and with the exception of I2 and 
I5re, the effect of Topic on the rest of indexes was small. The impact of Topic on two 
indexes of Intensity of Tactics (I2) and Utility of Rewarding (I5re) was medium. The 
VICS indexes and the subsequent MANVOVA test showed that the collectivity of the 
think tanks had at least three different worlds of action: world of military issues, world of 
political issues, and world of social issues.  
Multivariate Tests 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 
df Error df Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Topic Pillai's Trace .137 49.027 22 14680 .000 .068
Table 3-4 MANOVA - Impact of Topic on the VICS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Topic I1: Direction of Strategy 23.890 2 11.945 199.079 .000 .051
I2: Intensity of Tactics 17.484 2 8.742 266.479 .000 .068
I3: Risk Orientation .787 2 .393 14.002 .000 .004
I4a: Flexibility of Tactics 14.356 2 7.178 154.273 .000 .040
I4b: Words and Deeds 4.156 2 2.078 49.235 .000 .013
I5: Appeal 1.988 2 .994 91.978 .000 .024
I5: Promise .120 2 .060 6.360 .002 .002
I5: Reward 5.716 2 2.858 292.840 .000 .074
I5: Oppose 1.695 2 .847 83.141 .000 .022
I5: Threaten .134 2 .067 5.523 .004 .002
I5: Punish 4.583 2 2.292 181.423 .000 .047
 Table 3-5 Impact of Topic on the Individual VICS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks 
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1-3 The Impact of Time on the Three Worlds for the Collectivity of the Think Tanks  
 After establishing that the collectivity of the think tanks had separate worlds of 
action, the next question asks how stable these three worlds were over time. As the topic 
segments of Table 3-1 show, the VICS indexes in each of the three topics remained very 
similar across time. Therefore, the VICS indexes support the idea that the rules of 
conduct of the three worlds were very stable across time. To statistically examine the 
significance of this finding, a MANOVA test was conducted using Time as the 
independent variable and the eleven I-indexes as the dependent variables in each of the 
three issue areas. For each topic, the expectation was that texts published in different 
periods (2004, 2008, and 2012) would have similar rules of conduct. Table 3-6 presents 
the result of the MANOVA test for each of the three worlds.  
Multivariate Tests 
Topic Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Military Time Pillai's Trace .029 1.298 22 1952 .160 .014
Political Time Pillai's Trace .010 2.229 22 9372 .001 .005
Social Time Pillai's Trace .017 1.261 22 3308 .186 .008
Table 3-6 MANOVA - Impact of Time on Each World 
 The Pillai's trace method showed that only in the political world was there a 
significant effect of Time on the eleven Instrumental indexes. The military and social 
worlds did not show statistically significant change between 2004, 2008, and 2012. The 
MANOVA test showed that the social and military worlds were more stable than the 
political world. On the other hand, even in the case of the political world, where the 
MANOVA test showed a significant effect of Time, the estimated effect size of Time was 
small. The tests of between-subjects effects showed that, in the world of political issues, 
Time had significant effect on one index: Utility of Punishing (I5pu). However, the effect 
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of Time on Utility of Punishing was small (Table 3-7). The VICS indexes and the 
subsequent MANVOVA tests showed that the collectivity of the American foreign policy 
think tanks had three separate worlds of action, and two of these worlds (military and 
social) were stable across time.  
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Year I1: Direction of Strategy .166 2 .083 1.379 .252 .001
I2: Intensity of Tactics .131 2 .066 2.068 .126 .001
I3: Risk Orientation .036 2 .018 .625 .535 .000
I4a: Flexibility of Tactics .129 2 .065 1.399 .247 .001
I4b: Words and Deeds .092 2 .046 1.030 .357 .000
I5: Appeal .041 2 .020 1.823 .162 .001
I5: Promise .029 2 .015 1.557 .211 .001
I5: Reward .031 2 .016 1.606 .201 .001
I5: Oppose .002 2 .001 .112 .894 .000
I5: Threaten .032 2 .016 1.310 .270 .001
I5: Punish .095 2 .047 3.672 .026 .002
Table 3-7 Impact of Topic on the Individual VICS Indexes of the Collectivity of the Think Tanks – 
World of Political Issues 
2- The Worlds of Each of the Seven Think Tanks 
 In the first section of this chapter the rules of conduct for the collectivity of the 
think tanks were calculated and compared based on the transitive verbs used for all the 
subjects. The main aim of the first section was to examine the existence and stability of 
different worlds of the collectivity of the think tanks. In the second section, the level of 
verb aggregation drops down to the individual think tanks. In other words, the VICS 
indexes are calculated and compared based on all the transitive verbs used by a think 
tank.  
 Like the collectivity of the think tanks, each think tank as a collective entity or 
organization can potentially have its own sets of worlds. The rules of conduct in each of 
those worlds can be similar or different inside and between the think tanks and across 
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time and issues. The task of the second section is to explore the existence of these worlds 
for each think tank and compare think tanks in any of these worlds. The next segments of 
this chapter ask whether the rules of conduct of the seven think tanks differed from each 
other. If they did, which think tanks were the most different?  
2-1 The World of All the Issues 
 The main question of this section (2-1) asks whether the rules of conduct of the 
seven think tanks differed from each other in the world of all the issues, and if they did, 
which think tanks were the most different. Table 3-10 presents the VICS indexes of the 
seven think tanks in the world of all the issues. The VICS indexes were calculated using 
the transitive verbs that each think tank used in the three general elections and without 
any topic specification. As Table 3-10 shows, and without any topic specification, the 
VICS indexes of the seven think tanks were generally similar. The only exceptions were 
AEI and Cato, which used more conflictual verbs than the other six think tanks. To 
statistically examine the significance of this finding, a MANOVA test was conducted 
using Think Tank as the independent variable and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the 
dependent variables. The expectation was that different think tanks (AEI, Brookings, 
Carnegie, Cato, CFR, Heritage, and RAND) would have different rules of conduct. The 
result of the MANOVA test appears in Table 3-8. Using Pillai's trace, there was a 
significant effect of Think Tank on the eleven Instrumental indexes. However, the 
estimated effect size was small. In other words, in the world of all the issues, the rules of 
conduct of the seven think tanks were slightly different from one another. The tests of 
between-subjects effects (Table 3-9) showed that the effect of Think Tank on all the 
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eleven Instrumental indexes was significant. However, as expected, on each of the 
Instrumental indexes, the effect of Think Tank was small.  
Multivariate Tests 
Effect Value F 
Hypothesis 
df Error df Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Think Tank Pillai's Trace .064 7.220 66 44040 .000 .011
Table 3-8 MANOVA - Impact of Think Tanks on the VICS Indexes of the World of All the Issues 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Think Tank I1: Direction of Strategy 12.085 6 2.014 32.676 .000 .026
I2: Intensity of Tactics 6.762 6 1.127 32.871 .000 .026
I3: Risk Orientation 1.616 6 .269 9.620 .000 .008
I4a: Flexibility of Tactics 8.289 6 1.381 29.158 .000 .023
I4b: Words and Deeds 1.459 6 .243 5.708 .000 .005
I5: Appeal .962 6 .160 14.635 .000 .012
I5: Promise .405 6 .067 7.210 .000 .006
I5: Reward 1.355 6 .226 21.803 .000 .017
I5: Oppose .586 6 .098 9.442 .000 .008
I5: Threaten .286 6 .048 3.933 .001 .003
I5: Punish 1.944 6 .324 24.929 .000 .020
Table 3-9 Impact of Think Tanks on the Individual VICS Indexes 
The question then arises, in the world of all the issues, which think tanks were the 
most different? I used two methods to address this question: post hoc comparisons using 
the Tukey HSD test, which examined the dissimilarity among the rules of conduct of any 
two think tanks, and discriminant analysis, which examined the relative position of the 
seven think tanks based on their rules of conduct. The Tukey’s test examined the 
difference between any two think tanks in each of the eleven Instrumental indexes. Table 
3-11 shows the number of times that any two think tanks were statistically different.1 The 
maximum number of times any two think tanks could differ from each other was eleven 
times.  
                                                 
1 p ≤ 0.05 
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Table 3-10 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of All the Issues
N
M
e
a
n
S
D
M
e
a
n
S
D
M
e
a
n
S
D
M
e
a
n
S
D
M
e
a
n
S
D
M
e
a
n
S
D
M
e
a
n
S
D
M
e
a
n
S
D
M
e
a
n
S
D
M
e
a
n
S
D
M
e
a
n
S
D
2004 114 0.20 0.23 0.08 0.18 0.13 0.05 0.74 0.17 0.85 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.23 0.10
2008 1286 0.25 0.25 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.71 0.19 0.79 0.15 0.37 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.10
2012 398 0.34 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.64 0.19 0.82 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.29 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.09
Total 1798 0.26 0.25 0.12 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.70 0.19 0.80 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.10
2004 144 0.15 0.27 0.02 0.21 0.15 0.06 0.74 0.17 0.82 0.14 0.32 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.28 0.13
2008 849 0.25 0.25 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.71 0.19 0.78 0.15 0.37 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.10
2012 384 0.38 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.06 0.61 0.21 0.83 0.14 0.36 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.29 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.09
Total 1377 0.28 0.26 0.12 0.19 0.15 0.06 0.68 0.20 0.80 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.10
2004 161 0.23 0.25 0.09 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.71 0.19 0.85 0.13 0.32 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.27 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.25 0.11
2008 138 0.26 0.24 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.69 0.17 0.83 0.14 0.36 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.10
2012 57 0.47 0.21 0.29 0.16 0.17 0.05 0.52 0.18 0.86 0.12 0.37 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.34 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.08
Total 356 0.28 0.26 0.13 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.67 0.19 0.84 0.13 0.34 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.10
2004 167 0.07 0.24 -0.03 0.20 0.14 0.05 0.80 0.15 0.84 0.12 0.30 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.30 0.11
2008 608 0.21 0.24 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.06 0.74 0.18 0.80 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.10
2012 248 0.30 0.23 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.67 0.19 0.84 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.09
Total 1023 0.21 0.25 0.07 0.19 0.14 0.06 0.73 0.18 0.81 0.15 0.34 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.11
2004 160 0.16 0.26 0.05 0.20 0.13 0.05 0.75 0.18 0.85 0.13 0.31 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.26 0.12
2008 563 0.23 0.23 0.08 0.16 0.14 0.06 0.73 0.18 0.79 0.15 0.37 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.08 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.09
2012 114 0.33 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.65 0.22 0.82 0.13 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.28 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.09
Total 837 0.23 0.24 0.09 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.72 0.19 0.81 0.15 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.10
2004 172 0.11 0.25 0.00 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.78 0.15 0.83 0.13 0.31 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.28 0.11
2008 952 0.16 0.24 0.03 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.77 0.17 0.80 0.15 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.20 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.10
2012 207 0.27 0.25 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.69 0.19 0.81 0.15 0.34 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.27 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.20 0.10
Total 1331 0.17 0.25 0.04 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.76 0.17 0.81 0.15 0.34 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.10
2004 70 0.13 0.26 0.02 0.23 0.14 0.09 0.77 0.18 0.83 0.14 0.30 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.27 0.10
2008 302 0.14 0.24 0.02 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.78 0.17 0.81 0.14 0.33 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.10
2012 258 0.29 0.22 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.69 0.18 0.82 0.14 0.33 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.29 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.09
Total 630 0.20 0.25 0.08 0.19 0.14 0.06 0.74 0.18 0.82 0.14 0.33 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.25 0.11 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.10
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   AEI Brookings Carnegie Cato CFR Heritage RAND 
Grand 
Total 
AEI   10 7 2 3 6 7 35
Brookings 10   2 7 8 6 3 36
Carnegie 7 2   6 5 5 4 29
Cato 2 7 6   1 3 7 26
CFR 3 8 5 1   0 6 23
Heritage 6 6 5 3 0   7 27
RAND 7 3 4 7 6 7   34
Grand 
Total 35 36 29 26 23 27 34 210
Table 3-11 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of All the Issues 
  As Table 3-11 shows, AEI differed most from Brookings and least from Cato. 
Brookings was most different from AEI and least different from Carnegie. Carnegie 
differed most from AEI and least from Brookings. Cato differed most from Brookings 
and RAND and least from CFR. CFR differed most from Brookings and least from 
Heritage. Heritage was most different from RAND and least different from CFR. RAND 
differed most from AEI, Cato, and Heritage and least from Brookings. The above 
analysis shows that, with the exception of CFR, the ideological orientation assigned to 
the think tanks at the beginning of the research was mainly correct. The Left think tanks 
differed least from each other and most from the Right. The Right think tanks differed 
least from each other and most from the Left. However, CFR differed less from the Right 
than from RAND and the Left.  
 To map the approximate relative position of the seven think tanks from each 
other, the MANOVA test was followed by a discriminant analysis to investigate how the 
eleven Instrumental indexes could separate texts of think tanks from one another. The 
discriminant analysis was conducted using eleven I-indexes as the independent variables 
and Think Tank as the grouping variable. The results of the discriminant analysis appear 
in Table 3-12 and Table 3-13. As Table 3-13 shows, the analysis found six discriminant 
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functions of which five were statistically significant. According to Table 3-12, the first 
two discriminant functions explained 79% of the variance thus the discriminant analysis 
plot is the representative of 79% of variance. Figure 3-1 presents the discriminant 
function plot, which is produced by the first two functions. This plot reveals the closeness 
of the think tanks’ centroids, which suggests that the separation between the seven think 
tanks was not very strong, thus confirming the small effect size.  
Eigenvalues 
Function Eigenvalue % of Variance
Cumulative 
% 
Canonical 
Correlation 
1 .036 54.1 54.1 0.185 
2 .016 24.6 78.7 0.126 
3 .007 11.2 89.9 0.086 
4 .003 4.9 94.8 0.057 
5 .002 3.3 98.1 0.047 
6 .001 1.9 100 0.035 
Table 3-12 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks’ World of All the Issues 
Wilks' Lambda
Test of Function(s) Wilks' Lambda Chi-square df Sig. 
1 through 6 .937 477.178 66 .000 
2 through 6 .970 220.534 50 .000 
3 through 6 .986 102.603 36 .000 
4 through 6 .993 48.684 24 .002 
5 through 6 .997 25.139 14 .033 
6 .999 9.118 6 .167 
Table 3-13 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks’ World of All the Issues 
 The quadrants of Figure 3-1 place the seven think tanks into the following groups: 
Brookings paired with Carnegie; Cato paired with CFR; AEI paired with Heritage, and 
RAND stood alone as a single member.   
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Figure 3-1 Discriminant Functions Plot – Think Tanks’ World of All the Issues 
2-2 The World of Military Issues 
 In the previous sections (1-1 and 2-1) it was established that the rules of conduct 
of the seven think tanks differed from each other, though this difference was small. It was 
also shown that the ideological grouping of a think tank can generally be estimated by its 
VICS indexes. In this section (2-2), the same comparison will be done among the think 
tanks but only considering the military texts. The subsequent sections (2-3 and 2-4) will 
repeat the comparison and use the identical methodology, but for political and social 
texts, respectively.  
 The main question asks whether the rules of conduct of the seven think tanks 
differ from each other in regard to military texts. Table 3-17 presents the VICS indexes of 
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the seven think tanks in the world of military issues. The VICS indexes were calculated 
using the transitive verbs that each think tank used in the world of military issues. As 
Table 3-17 shows, and relative to other think tanks, RAND and to some extent Carnegie 
used more cooperative verbs in the world of military issues. To statistically examine the 
significance of this finding, a MANOVA test was conducted using Think Tank as the 
independent variable and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the dependent variables. The 
expectation was that different think tanks (AEI, Brookings, Carnegie, Cato, CFR, 
Heritage, and RAND) would have different rules of conduct. The result of the MANOVA 
test appears in Table 3-14. Using Pillai's trace, there was a significant effect of Think 
Tank on the eleven Instrumental indexes. However, the estimated effect size was small, 
and therefore the rules of conduct of the seven think tanks differed slightly from one 
another. 
Multivariate Tests 
Topic Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Military Think Tank Pillai's Trace .128 1.935 66 5856 .000 .021
Table 3-14 MANOVA - Impact of Think Tanks on the VICS Indexes of the World of Military Issues 
 The tests of between-subjects effects (Table 3-15) showed that in regard to the 
military world the effect of Think Tank on all but three Instrumental indexes was 
significant. The three non-significant Instrumental indexes were Words and Deeds (I4b), 
Utility of Appealing (I5ap), and Utility of Threatening (I5th). In other words, in the world 
of military issues, the seven think tanks used transitive verbs associated with appealing 
and threatening actions at about the same frequency. As expected, the effect of Think 
Tank on the eight significant Instrumental indexes was also small.  
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Think Tank I1: Direction of Strategy 2.785 6 .464 7.313 .000 .043
I2: Intensity of Tactics 1.852 6 .309 7.920 .000 .046
I3: Risk Orientation .421 6 .070 2.886 .009 .017
I4a: Flexibility of Tactics 1.177 6 .196 4.933 .000 .029
I4b: Words and Deeds .172 6 .029 .808 .564 .005
I5: Appeal .079 6 .013 1.505 .173 .009
I5: Promise .104 6 .017 2.206 .040 .013
I5: Reward .394 6 .066 6.642 .000 .039
I5: Oppose .152 6 .025 2.822 .010 .017
I5: Threaten .066 6 .011 .994 .428 .006
I5: Punish .368 6 .061 5.000 .000 .030
Table 3-15 Impact of Think Tanks on the Individual VICS Indexes of the World of Military Issues 
 To test the dissimilarity of rules of conduct of any two think tanks in the world of 
military issues, the MANOVA test was followed by post hoc comparisons using the 
Tukey HSD test. Table 3-16 shows the number of times that any two think tanks were 
statistically different in the world of military issues.1   
  AEI Brookings Carnegie Cato CFR Heritage RAND 
Grand 
Total 
AEI   0 3 0 0 0 5 8
Brookings 0   1 0 1 1 2 5
Carnegie 3 1   0 5 0 0 9
Cato 0 0 0   0 0 0 0
CFR 0 1 5 0   4 6 16
Heritage 0 1 0 0 4   0 5
RAND 5 2 0 0 6 0   13
Grand 
Total 8 5 9 0 16 5 13 56
Table 3-16 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of Military Issues 
                                                 
1 p ≤ 0.05 
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Table 3-17 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of Military Issues 
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2004 15 0.24 0.19 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.04 0.73 0.15 0.81 0.11 0.34 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.24 0.09
2008 27 0.25 0.25 0.10 0.21 0.14 0.04 0.71 0.19 0.86 0.12 0.34 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.10 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.23 0.11
2012 72 0.18 0.24 0.08 0.18 0.13 0.05 0.76 0.17 0.86 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.09 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.24 0.09
Total 114 0.20 0.23 0.08 0.18 0.13 0.05 0.74 0.17 0.85 0.11 0.32 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.23 0.10
2004 25 0.19 0.24 0.05 0.17 0.17 0.08 0.75 0.18 0.77 0.18 0.35 0.14 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.11 0.15 0.09 0.01 0.02 0.24 0.10
2008 51 0.18 0.25 0.05 0.19 0.14 0.04 0.74 0.16 0.85 0.12 0.32 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.25 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.11
2012 68 0.11 0.29 -0.01 0.23 0.16 0.06 0.73 0.17 0.82 0.14 0.31 0.12 0.02 0.04 0.22 0.08 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.30 0.14
Total 144 0.15 0.27 0.02 0.21 0.15 0.06 0.74 0.17 0.82 0.14 0.32 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.28 0.13
2004 63 0.23 0.25 0.10 0.20 0.15 0.05 0.72 0.18 0.82 0.14 0.31 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.28 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.25 0.11
2008 80 0.23 0.27 0.09 0.20 0.14 0.05 0.70 0.19 0.85 0.11 0.33 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.26 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.24 0.11
2012 18 0.24 0.18 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.05 0.75 0.17 0.90 0.13 0.32 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.29 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.25 0.09
Total 161 0.23 0.25 0.09 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.71 0.19 0.85 0.13 0.32 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.27 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.25 0.11
2004 59 0.11 0.23 0.01 0.19 0.13 0.05 0.80 0.15 0.82 0.12 0.29 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.24 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.29 0.11
2008 71 0.02 0.22 -0.08 0.19 0.14 0.06 0.82 0.14 0.85 0.13 0.30 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.32 0.12
2012 37 0.10 0.27 0.00 0.20 0.14 0.04 0.77 0.16 0.84 0.14 0.30 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.23 0.10 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.27 0.11
Total 167 0.07 0.24 -0.03 0.20 0.14 0.05 0.80 0.15 0.84 0.12 0.30 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.22 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.30 0.11
2004 26 0.16 0.26 0.05 0.20 0.13 0.05 0.74 0.16 0.85 0.15 0.30 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.25 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.26 0.12
2008 58 0.17 0.28 0.05 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.74 0.19 0.81 0.13 0.32 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.08 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.25 0.11
2012 76 0.16 0.24 0.05 0.20 0.13 0.06 0.77 0.17 0.87 0.12 0.30 0.07 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.12
Total 160 0.16 0.26 0.05 0.20 0.13 0.05 0.75 0.18 0.85 0.13 0.31 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.08 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.26 0.12
2004 33 0.19 0.19 0.04 0.14 0.15 0.06 0.78 0.16 0.82 0.13 0.36 0.10 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.25 0.09
2008 48 0.14 0.23 0.03 0.20 0.13 0.04 0.77 0.15 0.85 0.12 0.30 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.24 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.27 0.11
2012 91 0.06 0.26 -0.03 0.20 0.14 0.06 0.78 0.16 0.82 0.14 0.30 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.29 0.11
Total 172 0.11 0.25 0.00 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.78 0.15 0.83 0.13 0.31 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.28 0.11
2004 7 0.04 0.30 -0.08 0.21 0.16 0.06 0.78 0.18 0.82 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.08 0.15 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.31 0.12
2008 44 0.17 0.24 0.06 0.22 0.15 0.10 0.77 0.19 0.83 0.15 0.30 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.27 0.15 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.09
2012 19 0.06 0.28 -0.03 0.24 0.13 0.06 0.77 0.17 0.86 0.12 0.29 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.12 0.16 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.29 0.12
Total 70 0.13 0.26 0.02 0.23 0.14 0.09 0.77 0.18 0.83 0.14 0.30 0.09 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.27 0.10
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 As Table 3-16 shows, AEI was most different from RAND and least different 
from Cato, Brookings, CFR, and Heritage. Brookings did not show much difference from 
other think tanks. Carnegie differed most from CFR and least from Cato, Heritage, and 
RAND. Cato was not different from any of the other six think tanks. CFR differed most 
from RAND and least from Cato and AEI. Heritage differed most from CFR and least 
from AEI, Carnegie, Cato, and RAND. RAND was most different from CFR and least 
different from Carnegie, Heritage, and Cato. The above analysis shows that the 
ideological groupings of think tanks could not be estimated by the verbs they used in the 
military world. In the world of military issues, Cato and RAND were closer to the Left, 
Heritage was closer to the Center, and CFR was closer to the Right.  
 The MANOVA test was followed by a discriminant analysis to investigate how 
the eleven Instrumental indexes could separate the seven think tanks from each other. The 
discriminant analysis used the eleven Instrumental indexes as the independent variables 
and Think Tank as the grouping variable. The result of this discriminant analysis appears 
in Table 3-18 and Table 3-19. As Table 3-19 shows, the analysis found six discriminant 
functions, of which only the first two were significant. As Table 3-18 shows, the first two 
discriminant functions explained 70% of the variance among the think tanks. Figure 3-2 
presents the discriminant function plot, which is produced by the first two functions. It 
shows the closeness of the think tanks’ centroids, which suggests that the separation 
among the seven think tanks was not very strong, thus confirming the small effect size. 
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Eigenvalues 
Topic Eigenvalue 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Canonical 
Correlation 
Military 1 0.064 47.8 47.8 .245 
2 0.029 22.1 69.9 .169 
3 0.016 12.2 82.1 .127 
4 0.011 8.3 90.4 .105 
5 0.008 5.6 96.1 .086 
6 0.005 3.9 100.0 .072 
Table 3-18 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks’ World of Military Issues 
Wilks' Lambda 
Topic 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
Chi-
square df Sig. 
Military 1 through 6 .878 127.700 66 .000 
2 through 6 .933 67.346 50 .051 
3 through 6 .961 38.998 36 .336 
4 through 6 .977 23.194 24 .508 
5 through 6 .987 12.399 14 .574 
6 .995 5.074 6 .534 
Table 3-19 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks’ World of Military Issues 
 Considering only the first two significant functions, the discriminant analysis 
positioned the centroids of the seven think tanks as follows: Heritage paired with 
Carnegie; AEI paired with CFR, and Brookings; and RAND and Cato were each single-
member groups. 
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Figure 3-2 Discriminant Functions Plot – Think Tanks’ World of Military Issues 
2-3 The World of Political Issues 
 In the previous section (2-2) it was established that in terms of the military issues, 
the rules of conduct of the seven think tanks differed from each other, although this 
difference was small. It was also shown that the ideological groupings of think tanks 
could not be estimated by the verbs they used in the military world. This section            
(2-3) considers whether a significant difference in the political world existed among the 
rules of conduct of the seven think tanks.  
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Table 3-21 presents the VICS indexes of the seven think tanks in the world of 
political issues. The VICS indexes were calculated using the transitive verbs that each 
think tank used in the world of political issues. As Table 3-21 shows, and relative to other 
think tanks, AEI and Cato used more conflictual verbs in the world of political issues. To 
statistically examine the significance of this finding, a MANOVA test was conducted 
using Think Tank, as the independent variable, and the eleven Instrumental indexes, as 
the dependent variables. The expectation was that different think tanks (AEI, Brookings, 
Carnegie, Cato, CFR, Heritage, and RAND) would have different rules of conduct. The 
result of the MANOVA test appears in Table 3-20. The Pillai's trace method showed that 
Think Tank had a significant effect on the eleven Instrumental indexes. However, the 
effect of Think Tank on the eleven Instrumental indexes was small, and the rules of 
conduct of the seven think tanks differed only slightly from each other. The tests of 
between-subjects effects (Table 3-22) showed that the effect of Think Tank on all of the 
Instrumental indexes was significant. As expected, the effect of Think Tank on all of the 
Instrumental indexes was also small.  
Multivariate Tests 
Topic Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Political Think Tank Pillai's Trace .059 4.206 66 28116 .000 .010
Table 3-20 MANOVA - Impact of Think Tanks on the VICS Indexes of the World of Political Issues 
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Table 3-21 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of Political Issues 
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2004 189 0.20 0.22 0.07 0.16 0.14 0.05 0.74 0.15 0.81 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.08 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.09
2008 299 0.23 0.25 0.08 0.19 0.15 0.06 0.72 0.20 0.80 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.10
2012 798 0.26 0.25 0.11 0.18 0.15 0.07 0.69 0.20 0.79 0.15 0.37 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.10
Total 1286 0.25 0.25 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.71 0.19 0.79 0.15 0.37 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.10
2004 156 0.26 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.06 0.71 0.17 0.77 0.16 0.38 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.10
2008 253 0.33 0.24 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.07 0.65 0.20 0.79 0.14 0.39 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.09
2012 440 0.21 0.25 0.07 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.74 0.19 0.78 0.16 0.36 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.10
Total 849 0.25 0.25 0.10 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.71 0.19 0.78 0.15 0.37 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.10
2004 61 0.33 0.24 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.64 0.18 0.80 0.16 0.37 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.26 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.09
2008 63 0.20 0.26 0.06 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.72 0.16 0.84 0.12 0.35 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.07 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.23 0.11
2012 14 0.24 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.02 0.75 0.14 0.95 0.05 0.33 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.27 0.03 0.14 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.06
Total 138 0.26 0.24 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.69 0.17 0.83 0.14 0.36 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.25 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.10
2004 184 0.20 0.24 0.06 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.74 0.18 0.80 0.14 0.36 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.09 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.24 0.11
2008 248 0.22 0.23 0.08 0.16 0.14 0.07 0.73 0.18 0.78 0.17 0.37 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.09
2012 176 0.19 0.24 0.06 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.76 0.18 0.82 0.14 0.34 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.24 0.11
Total 608 0.21 0.24 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.06 0.74 0.18 0.80 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.10
2004 188 0.23 0.22 0.09 0.16 0.13 0.06 0.73 0.18 0.82 0.14 0.36 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.08 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.09
2008 256 0.22 0.25 0.08 0.17 0.14 0.07 0.73 0.19 0.78 0.15 0.37 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.08 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.09
2012 119 0.23 0.23 0.08 0.17 0.14 0.06 0.73 0.17 0.79 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.08 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.21 0.11
Total 563 0.23 0.23 0.08 0.16 0.14 0.06 0.73 0.18 0.79 0.15 0.37 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.22 0.08 0.16 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.09
2004 336 0.17 0.22 0.03 0.17 0.14 0.05 0.77 0.16 0.80 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.20 0.09 0.16 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.10
2008 243 0.15 0.24 0.03 0.17 0.14 0.06 0.77 0.16 0.81 0.15 0.34 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.08 0.17 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.11
2012 373 0.15 0.25 0.03 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.77 0.18 0.80 0.16 0.34 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.09 0.16 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.11
Total 952 0.16 0.24 0.03 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.77 0.17 0.80 0.15 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.20 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.10
2004 55 0.15 0.25 0.04 0.19 0.14 0.05 0.77 0.16 0.82 0.15 0.33 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.10 0.17 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.10
2008 126 0.17 0.23 0.04 0.16 0.14 0.05 0.77 0.18 0.80 0.15 0.35 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.23 0.09
2012 121 0.10 0.24 -0.01 0.19 0.14 0.06 0.79 0.16 0.81 0.13 0.31 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.26 0.11
Total 302 0.14 0.24 0.02 0.18 0.14 0.05 0.78 0.17 0.81 0.14 0.33 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.09 0.16 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.24 0.10
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Think Tank I1: Direction of Strategy 7.891 6 1.315 22.44 0.000 0.028
I2: Intensity of Tactics 4.346 6 0.724 23.5 0.000 0.029
I3: Risk Orientation 0.746 6 0.124 4.331 0.000 0.006
I4a: Flexibility of Tactics 5.038 6 0.84 18.58 0.000 0.023
I4b: Words and Deeds 1.019 6 0.17 3.803 0.001 0.005
I5: Appeal 0.577 6 0.096 8.636 0.000 0.011
I5: Promise 0.25 6 0.042 4.443 0.000 0.006
I5: Reward 0.546 6 0.091 9.415 0.000 0.012
I5: Oppose 0.13 6 0.022 2.116 0.048 0.003
I5: Threaten 0.195 6 0.033 2.656 0.014 0.003
I5: Punish 1.424 6 0.237 18.79 0.000 0.023
Table 3-22 Impact of Think Tanks on the Individual VICS Indexes of the World of Political Issues 
  AEI Brookings Carnegie Cato CFR Heritage RAND 
Grand 
Total 
AEI   9 6 0 3 7 4 29
Brookings 9   0 6 4 1 1 21
Carnegie 6 0   5 4 2 1 18
Cato 0 6 5   5 6 5 27
CFR 3 4 4 5   0 2 18
Heritage 7 1 2 6 0   1 17
RAND 4 1 1 5 2 1   14
Grand Total 29 21 18 27 18 17 14 144
Table 3-23 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of Political Issues 
 To test the dissimilarity of rules of conduct of any two think tanks, the MANOVA 
test was followed by post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test. Table 3-23 shows 
the number of times that any two think tanks were statistically different.1 As Table 3-23 
shows, AEI differed most from Brookings and least from Cato. Brookings was most 
different from AEI and least different from Carnegie. Carnegie differed most from AEI, 
and least from Brookings. Cato was most different from Heritage and Brookings and least 
different from AEI. CFR differed most from Cato and least from Heritage. Heritage was 
most different from AEI and least different from CFR. RAND differed most from Cato 
                                                 
1 p ≤ 0.05 
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and least from Carnegie, Brookings, and Heritage. The above analysis shows that in 
terms of the political issues, the ideological categorization of the seven think tanks 
remained generally valid. In this world, Heritage distanced itself from the other two 
conservative think tanks (AEI and Cato) and landed more in the Center. Also, in the 
world of the political issues CFR was less Right than in the worlds of all the issues and 
military issues. 
 The MANOVA test was followed by a discriminant analysis to investigate how 
the eleven Instrumental indexes could separate political texts issued by any think tank 
from those of the others. The discriminant analysis was conducted using the eleven 
Instrumental indexes, as the independent variables, and Think Tank, as the grouping 
variable. The result of this discriminant analysis appears in Table 3-24 and in Table 3-25, 
which shows that the discriminant analysis found six discriminant functions, of which the 
first three discriminant functions were statistically significant. 
Eigenvalues 
Topic Eigenvalue 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Canonical 
Correlation 
Political 1 0.04 65.9 65.9 .196 
2 0.008 14.0 79.9 .091 
3 0.005 8.7 88.7 .072 
4 0.004 6.3 95.0 .061 
5 0.002 3.3 98.3 .044 
6 0.001 1.7 100.0 .032 
Table 3-24 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks’ World of Political Issues 
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Wilks' Lambda 
Topic 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
Chi-
square df Sig. 
Political 1 through 6 .942 278.800 66 .000 
2 through 6 .980 96.002 50 .000 
3 through 6 .988 56.600 36 .016 
4 through 6 .993 31.959 24 .128 
5 through 6 .997 14.202 14 .435 
6 .999 4.911 6 .555 
Table 3-25 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks’ World of Political Issues 
 As Table 3-24 shows, the first two functions explained 80% of the total variance. 
The discriminant function plot (Figure 3-3) reveals closeness of the think tanks’ 
centroids, suggesting that the separation among the seven think tanks in the political 
world was not strong. Considering the first two functions, the discriminant analysis 
positioned the centroids of the seven think tanks in the following groups: Heritage paired 
with RAND; CFR paired with Cato; Brookings paired with Carnegie, and AEI stood 
alone as a single member.   
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Figure 3-3 Discriminant Functions Plot – Think Tanks’ World of Political Issues 
2-4 The World of Social Issues 
 This section (2-4) asks if there exists any difference among the seven think tanks 
in terms of social issues. Table 3-28 presents the VICS indexes of the seven think tanks 
in the world of social issues. The VICS indexes were calculated using the transitive verbs 
that each think tank used in the world of social issues. As Table 3-28 shows, and relative 
to other think tanks, RAND used more cooperative verbs in the world of social issues. To 
statistically examine the significance of this finding, a MANOVA test was conducted 
using Think Tank as the independent variable, and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the 
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dependent variables. The expectation was that different think tanks (AEI, Brookings, 
Carnegie, Cato, CFR, Heritage, and RAND) would have different rules of conduct. The 
result appears in Table 3-26. Using Pillai's trace, there was a significant effect of Think 
Tank on the eleven Instrumental indexes. However, the estimated effect size was small. 
The tests of between-subjects effects (Table 3-27) showed that the effect of Think Tank 
on all of the Instrumental indexes was significant but small.  
Multivariate Tests 
Topic Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Social Think 
Tank 
Pillai's Trace .092 2.347 66 9924 .000 .015
Table 3-26 MANOVA - Impact of Think Tanks on the VICS Indexes of the World of Social Issues 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Source 
Type 
III Sum 
of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared
Think Tank I1: Direction of Strategy 3.349 6 .558 10.325 .000 .036
I2: Intensity of Tactics 1.608 6 .268 8.807 .000 .031
I3: Risk Orientation .889 6 .148 5.367 .000 .019
I4a: Flexibility of Tactics 3.137 6 .523 10.632 .000 .037
I4b: Words and Deeds .525 6 .088 2.272 .035 .008
I5: Appeal .232 6 .039 3.633 .001 .013
I5: Promise .152 6 .025 2.488 .021 .009
I5: Reward .248 6 .041 4.421 .000 .016
I5: Oppose .325 6 .054 5.150 .000 .018
I5: Threaten .186 6 .031 2.532 .019 .009
I5: Punish .391 6 .065 5.591 .000 .020
Table 3-27 Impact of Think Tanks on the Individual VICS Indexes of the World of Social Issue 
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Table 3-28 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of Social Issues 
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2004 24 0.35 0.17 0.22 0.13 0.13 0.04 0.65 0.17 0.87 0.11 0.32 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.32 0.07 0.13 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.07
2008 78 0.36 0.23 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.05 0.63 0.21 0.85 0.13 0.35 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.30 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.10
2012 296 0.33 0.23 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.65 0.19 0.81 0.14 0.35 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.28 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.09
Total 398 0.34 0.22 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.64 0.19 0.82 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.29 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.09
2004 42 0.34 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.14 0.04 0.65 0.20 0.87 0.11 0.34 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.30 0.10 0.12 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.08
2008 188 0.40 0.22 0.22 0.17 0.16 0.06 0.59 0.19 0.84 0.13 0.37 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.30 0.10 0.11 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.17 0.09
2012 154 0.36 0.26 0.19 0.19 0.16 0.07 0.62 0.23 0.81 0.15 0.36 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.29 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.10
Total 384 0.38 0.24 0.21 0.18 0.16 0.06 0.61 0.21 0.83 0.14 0.36 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.29 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.09
2004 23 0.39 0.24 0.23 0.17 0.16 0.05 0.57 0.17 0.86 0.12 0.36 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.32 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.08
2008 22 0.54 0.15 0.33 0.13 0.19 0.05 0.46 0.15 0.84 0.14 0.39 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.34 0.10 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.07
2012 12 0.48 0.22 0.31 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.52 0.22 0.92 0.06 0.34 0.07 0.04 0.04 0.37 0.06 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.08
Total 57 0.47 0.21 0.29 0.16 0.17 0.05 0.52 0.18 0.86 0.12 0.37 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.34 0.09 0.10 0.06 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.08
2004 44 0.31 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.14 0.04 0.67 0.15 0.87 0.10 0.36 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.19 0.08
2008 118 0.29 0.26 0.16 0.19 0.14 0.06 0.67 0.20 0.83 0.13 0.34 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.27 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.09
2012 86 0.31 0.22 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.67 0.19 0.85 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.10 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.19 0.09
Total 248 0.30 0.23 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.67 0.19 0.84 0.13 0.34 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.09
2004 25 0.42 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.17 0.07 0.56 0.26 0.85 0.11 0.37 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.31 0.09 0.12 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.16 0.11
2008 70 0.29 0.22 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.06 0.69 0.20 0.82 0.14 0.34 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.28 0.10 0.14 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.08
2012 19 0.39 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.16 0.07 0.61 0.21 0.78 0.12 0.40 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.25 0.09 0.11 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.18 0.10
Total 114 0.33 0.24 0.18 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.65 0.22 0.82 0.13 0.35 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.28 0.10 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.18 0.09
2004 59 0.32 0.26 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.06 0.64 0.19 0.78 0.15 0.37 0.11 0.03 0.03 0.26 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.18 0.11
2008 43 0.24 0.24 0.13 0.18 0.14 0.06 0.70 0.17 0.81 0.16 0.33 0.11 0.02 0.02 0.28 0.11 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.20 0.10
2012 105 0.26 0.24 0.13 0.16 0.14 0.06 0.70 0.20 0.82 0.14 0.33 0.12 0.03 0.04 0.27 0.09 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.21 0.09
Total 207 0.27 0.25 0.14 0.18 0.15 0.06 0.69 0.19 0.81 0.15 0.34 0.11 0.03 0.04 0.27 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.20 0.10
2004 97 0.31 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.67 0.18 0.83 0.14 0.34 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.29 0.09 0.13 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.20 0.09
2008 124 0.28 0.24 0.15 0.19 0.15 0.06 0.69 0.19 0.81 0.13 0.32 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.30 0.12 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.09
2012 37 0.23 0.23 0.10 0.15 0.14 0.07 0.73 0.18 0.82 0.14 0.34 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.25 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.22 0.08
Total 258 0.29 0.22 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.06 0.69 0.18 0.82 0.14 0.33 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.29 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.21 0.09
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AEI Brookings Carnegie Cato CFR Heritage RAND 
Grand 
Total 
AEI   6 2 0 0 0 7 15
Brookings 6   1 6 5 0 3 21
Carnegie 2 1   2 0 0 6 11
Cato 0 6 2   0 0 5 13
CFR 0 5 0 0   0 6 11
Heritage 0 0 0 0 0   5 5
RAND 7 3 6 5 6 5   32
Grand 
Total 15 21 11 13 11 5 32 108
Table 3-29 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of Social Issues 
 Which think tanks were the most different in terms of social issues? Relying on 
the same procedures used in the sections for military and political issues, Table 3-29 
shows the number of times that any two think tanks were statistically different.1 As Table 
3-29 shows, AEI was most different from RAND and least different from Cato, Heritage, 
and CFR. Brookings was most different from AEI and Cato and differed least from 
Heritage. Carnegie differed most from RAND and was least different from CFR and 
Heritage. Cato was most different from Brookings and least different from AEI, CFR, 
and Heritage. CFR differed most from RAND and least from AEI, Carnegie, Cato, and 
Heritage. Heritage differed most from RAND and had no difference from the other think 
tanks. RAND differed most from AEI and least from Brookings. The above test shows 
that I-indexes for social issues did not position the think tanks according to the expected 
ideological orientations assigned to them. The above analysis shows that, in the world of 
social issues, the Left became closer to the Right, but the difference between RAND and 
both Right and Left think tanks increased.  
 The MANOVA test was followed by a discriminant analysis to investigate how 
the eleven Instrumental indexes could separate the think tanks based on their social texts. 
                                                 
1 p ≤ 0.05 
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The discriminant analysis was conducted using the eleven Instrumental indexes as the 
independent variables and Think Tank as the grouping variable. The result of this 
discriminant analysis appears in Table 3-30 and Table 3-31. As Table 3-31 shows, the 
discriminant analysis found six discriminant functions, of which only the first two 
functions were significant. 
Eigenvalues 
Topics Eigenvalue 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Canonical 
Correlation 
Social 1 0.052 54.4 54.4 .222 
2 0.02 21.5 75.9 .142 
3 0.01 10.2 86.2 .098 
4 0.008 8.0 94.1 .087 
5 0.005 4.9 99.1 .068 
6 0.001 .9 100.0 .030 
Table 3-30 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks’ World of Social Issues 
Wilks' Lambda 
Topics 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
Chi-
square df Sig. 
Social 1 through 6 .911 155.262 66 .000 
2 through 6 .958 71.482 50 .025 
3 through 6 .977 37.895 36 .383 
4 through 6 .987 21.799 24 .591 
5 through 6 .994 9.227 14 .816 
6 .999 1.469 6 .962 
Table 3-31 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks’ World of Social Issues 
 As Table 3-30 shows, the first two discriminant functions explained 76% of the 
total variance. Figure 3-4 shows the discriminant function plot. This figure reveals 
closeness of the think tanks’ centroids, suggesting that the separation between the seven 
think tanks was not very strong. Considering the first two functions, the discriminant 
analysis positioned the centroids of the seven think tanks in the following groups: 
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Brookings paired with RAND; AEI paired with Heritage, CFR, and Carnegie; and Cato 
stood alone as a single-member group.  
 
Figure 3-4 Discriminant Functions Plot – Think Tanks’ World of Social Issues 
Summary 
In the third chapter, it was shown that the collectivity of the seven think tanks had 
three separate worlds of action: the worlds of military issues, political issues, and social 
issues. This chapter also showed that verbs used by the seven think tanks in conjunction 
with the subsequent VICS indexes could sometimes predict the ideological orientation of 
the think tanks.   
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CHAPTER 4 : THE AMERICAN COLLECTIVE SELF 
Introduction 
 Chapter Three compared the worlds of the American foreign policy elite by 
considering all the subjects without differentiating between the Self and the Other. 
Chapter Four examines the rules of conduct of the United States by calculating the VICS 
indexes of the American collective Self. The first section studies rules of conduct of the 
United States based on the verbs of the collectivity of the think tanks. The second section 
studies rules of conduct of the United States based on the verbs used by individual think 
tanks. In this chapter, only the subjects related to the American collective Self are 
considered, and the smallest unit for the verb aggregation and for the topic classification 
is the document.  
 The first section of Chapter Four asks whether the rules of conduct of the 
American collective Self showed stability over time and whether the Self had distinct 
rules of conduct for military, political, and social issues. The second section examines the 
stability of rules of conduct attributed to the American collective Self by each of the 
individual think tanks. The main questions ask about the rules of conduct that each of the 
think tanks assigned to the American collective Self, and they seek to identify differences 
among the think tanks in terms of those rules of conduct.  
 To answer the above questions, two lists of subjects were compiled to represent 
the American collective Self. First, all of the subjects of the sentences were gathered. 
Then, two lists consisting of subjects related to the government of the United States were 
created. The first list (Narrow) narrowed the definition of the Self by including only the 
nouns related directly to the U.S. government, nouns like Washington, United States, 
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United States government, White House, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, 
Defense Department, USAID. This list did not include proper names.1 The second list 
(Broad) provided a broad definition of the Self: this list included most of the nouns that 
related to the U.S. government. It included the Narrow list plus the names of people who 
have hold official positions in the U.S. government, names like Rumsfeld, Cheney, 
Powell, Clinton, Albright, and Rice among others. 
 There were two reasons for creating two datasets for the American collective Self. 
While names like Rumsfeld and Kerry are not always considered as part of the Self, they 
obviously should not be counted as the Other. On the other hand, the expectation is that 
the inclusion of more nouns will increase the frequencies of the considered transitive 
verbs, which might lead to different VICS indexes for the American collective Self. To 
control for the impact of definition of the Self in the measurement of I-indexes, two 
separate datasets were compiled to represent the American collective Self.  
 After preparing the two lists of the Self, only those files that had six or more 
instances of the American collective Self were selected. The operational code literature 
chooses a threshold of fifteen to twenty verbs.2 However, unlike my research, that 
literature includes formulas that consider both the Self and the Other. Also in their texts 
with fifteen transitive verbs, the majority of the verbs belong to the Other, and the Self 
very rarely is assigned more than six transitive verbs. Then, the I-indexes of the 
American collective Self were calculated for all the levels of analysis in this chapter 
                                                 
1 With the exception of President Barack Obama and President George W. Bush. 
2 Schafer and Walker, “Operational Code Analysis at a Distance,” 44. 
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 The first question asks whether the two definitions of the Self differ from each 
other. Table 4-2 shows the VICS indexes of the American collective Self on all the levels 
of topic, time, and definition of the Self. As this table shows, the VICS indexes of the two 
definitions of the Self were not always similar. To statistically examine the significance 
of this finding, a MANOVA test was conducted using Batch as the independent variable 
and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the dependent variables in each of the four worlds. 
The expectation was that the two definitions of the Self (Narrow and Broad) would have 
different VICS indexes. The results appear in Table 4-1. Using Pillai's trace, there was a 
statistically significant difference between the two definitions of the Self in all of the four 
worlds. More importantly, as the Partial Eta Squared values show, the size of difference 
between the operational code of Narrow and Broad definitions of the Self was large in all 
four worlds. This finding shows that the two definitions of the Self produced different 
VICS indexes.  
Multivariate Tests 
World Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Tests of  
Between-Subjects Effects 
 Non-Significant Indexes 
All Batch Pillai's Trace .491 183.308 11 2092 .000 0.49 I1; I5ap; I5pr 
Military Batch Pillai's 
Trace 
.554 52.266 11 462 .000 .554 I5pr 
Political Batch Pillai's 
Trace 
.464 104.793 11 1331 .000 .464 I1 
Social Batch Pillai's 
Trace 
.586 35.448 11 275 .000 .586 I2; I3; I4a; I4b; I5pr; I5re; 
I5th; I5pu 
Table 4-1 MANOVA - Difference Between the Broad and Narrow Definitions of the Self 
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Table 4-2 VICS Indexes of the American Collective Self - World of All the Issues 
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Military 252 0.37 0.48 0.15 0.33 0.37 0.20 0.48 0.32 0.53 0.32 0.48 0.24 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.19
Political 815 0.32 0.47 0.12 0.30 0.36 0.22 0.52 0.30 0.50 0.31 0.47 0.25 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.17
Social 170 0.36 0.48 0.15 0.33 0.36 0.23 0.49 0.33 0.55 0.29 0.45 0.25 0.03 0.07 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.01 0.06 0.17 0.18
Total 1237 0.34 0.47 0.13 0.31 0.36 0.22 0.51 0.31 0.51 0.31 0.47 0.25 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.18
Military 222 0.28 0.40 0.11 0.29 0.27 0.15 0.59 0.26 0.64 0.25 0.42 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.16
Political 528 0.35 0.39 0.14 0.25 0.30 0.18 0.56 0.28 0.56 0.28 0.48 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.14
Social 117 0.51 0.32 0.24 0.22 0.33 0.16 0.46 0.27 0.56 0.27 0.52 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.21 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.12
Total 867 0.35 0.39 0.14 0.26 0.29 0.17 0.56 0.28 0.58 0.27 0.47 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.14
2004 351 0.34 0.46 0.13 0.31 0.36 0.21 0.52 0.31 0.53 0.30 0.47 0.24 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.01 0.05 0.15 0.17
2008 495 0.34 0.49 0.13 0.33 0.37 0.22 0.49 0.31 0.50 0.31 0.47 0.25 0.03 0.07 0.17 0.19 0.16 0.18 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.19
2012 391 0.33 0.47 0.12 0.30 0.37 0.23 0.52 0.32 0.51 0.32 0.47 0.25 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.18
Total 1237 0.34 0.47 0.13 0.31 0.36 0.22 0.51 0.31 0.51 0.31 0.47 0.25 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.18
2004 228 0.33 0.41 0.13 0.29 0.31 0.18 0.56 0.29 0.56 0.28 0.45 0.21 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.16 0.17
2008 380 0.37 0.37 0.16 0.24 0.29 0.16 0.55 0.28 0.57 0.27 0.47 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.19 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.14
2012 259 0.35 0.38 0.14 0.25 0.29 0.17 0.56 0.27 0.62 0.28 0.47 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.14
Total 867 0.35 0.39 0.14 0.26 0.29 0.17 0.56 0.28 0.58 0.27 0.47 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.14
Narrow
I3 I4a I4b I5ap
Broad
Narrow
I1 I2 I5th I5op I5pu
Broad
I5pr I5re
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1- The Collectivity of the Seven Think Tanks 
 The main goal of this section is to investigate the rules of conduct of the 
American collective Self from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks. It 
examines the stability of the rules of conduct of the American collective Self over time in 
the four issue areas. The first question asks whether the rules of conduct of the American 
collective Self changed over time. Table 4-4, presents the VICS indexes of the American 
Collective Self in each world and over time. To answer the question of this section, a 
MANOVA test was conducted using Time as the independent variable and the eleven 
Instrumental indexes as the dependent variables. The MANOVA test was conducted for 
each of the definitions of the Self (Narrow and Broad) and for each of the four worlds. 
The expectation was that the American collective Self would not have different rules of 
conduct across time (2004, 2008, and 2012). The results of these eight MANOVA tests 
are shown in Table 4-3. As this table shows, neither the Broad definition nor the Narrow 
definition showed any statistically significant change across time in any of their four 
worlds. The MANOVA tests show that the rules of conduct of the American collective 
Self were stable across time, regardless of the definition of the Self as Broad or Narrow.  
Multivariate Tests 
Batch Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Broad All Time Pillai's Trace .016 .881 22 2450 .622 .008 
Military Time Pillai's Trace .086 .984 22 480 .484 .043 
Political Time Pillai's Trace .032 1.201 22 1606 .236 .016 
Social Time Pillai's Trace .114 .870 22 316 .635 .057 
Narrow All Time Pillai's Trace .037 1.483 22 1710 .069 .019 
Military Time Pillai's Trace .103 1.042 22 420 .411 .052 
Political Time Pillai's Trace .052 1.247 22 1032 .199 .026 
Social Time Pillai's Trace .178 .930 22 210 .556 .089 
Table 4-3 MANOVA - Impact of Time on the VICS Indexes of the American Collective Self -                             
All the Four Worlds 
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Table 4-4 VICS Indexes of the American Collective Self over Time - World of All the Issues
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Military 59 0.45 0.50 0.18 0.34 0.39 0.22 0.42 0.33 0.55 0.30 0.51 0.25 0.02 0.06 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.14 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.20
Political 257 0.32 0.45 0.13 0.30 0.36 0.21 0.53 0.29 0.51 0.31 0.48 0.24 0.02 0.06 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.02 0.06 0.14 0.16
Social 35 0.30 0.45 0.11 0.35 0.30 0.18 0.58 0.33 0.60 0.27 0.40 0.21 0.04 0.09 0.21 0.18 0.13 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.22
Military 111 0.39 0.46 0.15 0.32 0.37 0.19 0.49 0.31 0.50 0.32 0.50 0.22 0.02 0.06 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.01 0.05 0.14 0.19
Political 307 0.31 0.50 0.12 0.33 0.37 0.23 0.49 0.30 0.49 0.32 0.46 0.26 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.19
Social 77 0.38 0.48 0.17 0.34 0.35 0.22 0.48 0.31 0.57 0.26 0.45 0.25 0.03 0.07 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.17 0.01 0.05 0.16 0.17
Military 82 0.30 0.50 0.13 0.32 0.36 0.20 0.50 0.30 0.55 0.33 0.44 0.25 0.03 0.07 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.19
Political 251 0.33 0.44 0.12 0.28 0.36 0.24 0.55 0.31 0.50 0.31 0.48 0.24 0.02 0.06 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.02 0.07 0.15 0.18
Social 58 0.38 0.51 0.15 0.32 0.40 0.27 0.46 0.34 0.51 0.34 0.49 0.28 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.18
Military 252 0.37 0.48 0.15 0.33 0.37 0.20 0.48 0.32 0.53 0.32 0.48 0.24 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.19
Political 815 0.32 0.47 0.12 0.30 0.36 0.22 0.52 0.30 0.50 0.31 0.47 0.25 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.19 0.02 0.06 0.15 0.17
Social 170 0.36 0.48 0.15 0.33 0.36 0.23 0.49 0.33 0.55 0.29 0.45 0.25 0.03 0.07 0.20 0.19 0.14 0.17 0.01 0.06 0.17 0.18
Military 54 0.24 0.44 0.08 0.37 0.30 0.20 0.59 0.28 0.62 0.24 0.39 0.20 0.02 0.04 0.21 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.00 0.01 0.22 0.22
Political 152 0.34 0.40 0.13 0.27 0.31 0.18 0.56 0.29 0.53 0.29 0.47 0.21 0.03 0.06 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.15 0.14
Social 22 0.47 0.36 0.21 0.21 0.33 0.20 0.49 0.30 0.56 0.28 0.50 0.23 0.01 0.03 0.22 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.14 0.13
Military 104 0.35 0.38 0.14 0.26 0.27 0.13 0.56 0.26 0.63 0.26 0.45 0.19 0.02 0.04 0.21 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.17 0.14
Political 219 0.35 0.37 0.14 0.24 0.29 0.17 0.57 0.28 0.55 0.27 0.48 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.14 0.13
Social 57 0.48 0.35 0.22 0.24 0.33 0.16 0.48 0.27 0.55 0.27 0.49 0.22 0.02 0.06 0.22 0.18 0.11 0.12 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.13
Military 64 0.22 0.37 0.07 0.25 0.25 0.14 0.64 0.24 0.65 0.26 0.41 0.19 0.02 0.07 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.15 0.01 0.03 0.19 0.14
Political 157 0.35 0.39 0.14 0.25 0.29 0.18 0.56 0.28 0.61 0.29 0.47 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.15 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.14
Social 38 0.59 0.24 0.27 0.18 0.32 0.15 0.41 0.23 0.58 0.26 0.57 0.13 0.03 0.05 0.20 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.10
Military 222 0.28 0.40 0.11 0.29 0.27 0.15 0.59 0.26 0.64 0.25 0.42 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.16
Political 528 0.35 0.39 0.14 0.25 0.30 0.18 0.56 0.28 0.56 0.28 0.48 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.14
Social 117 0.51 0.32 0.24 0.22 0.33 0.16 0.46 0.27 0.56 0.27 0.52 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.21 0.16 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.12
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 The question arises whether the rules of conduct of the American collective Self 
differed across topics. To answer this question, a MANOVA test was conducted using 
Topic as the independent variable and eleven instrumental indexes as the dependent 
variables. The MANOVA test was conducted for each of the definitions of the Self. The 
expectation was that the American collective Self would have different rules of conduct 
in each issue area (military, political, and social). The results of the two MANOVA tests 
appear in Table 4-5, which indicates that the results for two definitions of the Self were 
different. For the Broad definition, there was no statistically significant effect of Topic on 
VICS indexes. However, based on the Narrow definition, there was a statistically 
significant effect of Topic on VICS indexes, but the effect size was small. The tests of 
between-subjects effects (Table 4-6) showed that using the Narrow definition of 
American collective Self, the difference among the three worlds was significant in all but 
two of the eleven Instrumental indexes: Utility of Promising (I5pr) and Utility of 
Threatening (I5th). However, as expected, the effect of Topic on the rest of the VICS 
indexes was small.  
Multivariate Tests 
Batch Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Broad Topic Pillai's Trace .026 1.481 22 2450 .069 .013
Narrow Topic Pillai's Trace .063 2.528 22 1710 .000 .032
Table 4-5 MANOVA - Impact of Topic on the VICS Indexes of the American Collective Self 
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Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Batch 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared
Narrow Topic I1: Direction of Strategy 5.052 2 2.526 14.073 .000 .032
I2: Intensity of Tactics 1.294 2 .647 9.915 .000 .022
I3: Risk Orientation 3.241 2 1.621 5.326 .005 .012
I4a: Flexibility of Tactics 1.421 2 .710 9.388 .000 .021
I4b: Words and Deeds .410 2 .205 5.495 .004 .013
I5: Appeal .797 2 .398 10.049 .000 .023
I5: Promise .004 2 .002 .701 .496 .002
I5: Reward 1.739 2 .870 4.605 .010 .011
I5: Oppose 3.337 2 1.668 9.426 .000 .021
I5: Threaten .003 2 .001 1.307 .271 .003
I5: Punish 3.135 2 1.567 7.887 .000 .018
Table 4-6 Impact of Topic on the Individual VICS Indexes of the American Collective Self 
2- Seven Think Tanks, Seven Rules of Conduct?  
 The focus of the second section is to compare the American collective Self from 
the perspective of the seven think tanks. The main question asks whether the seven think 
tanks assigned different rules of conduct to the American collective Self. If they did, 
which think tanks were the most different?  
2-1 The American Collective Self and Differences among the Seven Think Tanks 
 Section 2-1 asks whether the seven think tanks assigned different rules of conduct 
to the American collective Self. To answer this question, a MANOVA test was conducted 
using Think Tank as the independent variable and the eleven Instrumental indexes as the 
dependent variables. The MANOVA test was conducted for both of definitions of the 
Self (Broad and Narrow) and in any of the four worlds of action. The expectation was 
that different think tanks (AEI, Brookings, Carnegie, Cato, CFR, Heritage, and RAND) 
would assign different rules of conduct to the American collective Self. Table 4-7 shows 
the results of these eight MANOVA tests. The Pillai's trace method showed that based on 
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the Broad definition of the Self there was no statistically significant difference among the 
seven think tanks when they allocated actions to the American collective Self. 
Multivariate Tests 
Batch Value F 
Hypothesis 
df 
Error 
df Sig. 
Partial 
Eta 
Squared 
Broad All Think Tank Pillai's Trace 0.038 0.719 66 7350 0.96 0.006 
Military Think Tank Pillai's Trace 0.189 0.711 66 1440 0.96 0.032 
Political Think Tank Pillai's Trace 0.068 0.832 66 4818 0.83 0.011 
Social Think Tank Pillai's Trace 0.272 0.682 66 948 0.97 0.045 
Narrow All Think Tank Pillai's Trace 0.161 2.143 66 5130 0.00 0.027 
Military Think Tank Pillai's Trace 0.423 1.447 66 1260 0.01 0.070 
Political Think Tank Pillai's Trace 0.188 1.516 66 3096 0.00 0.031 
Social Think Tank Pillai's Trace 0.601 1.063 66 630 0.35 0.100 
Table 4-7 MANOVA - Impact of Think Tanks on the VICS Indexes of the American Collective Self 
 On the other hand, the Pillai's trace method showed that, based on the Narrow 
definition of the Self, there was a statistically significant difference among the seven 
think tanks in the three worlds of all the issues, military issues, and political issues. In the 
worlds of all the issues and political issues, the magnitude of difference among the seven 
think thinks was small. On the other hand, the magnitude of difference among the seven 
think tanks in regard to military issues was medium. In the world of social issues, the 
seven think tanks’ allocation of action to the United States did not show any significant 
difference. 
 Now that it has been established that the seven think tanks differed in allocation 
of action to American collective Self in the three worlds of all the issues, political issues 
and military issues, the question becomes which think tanks differed most in any of the 
three worlds. Since only the Narrow definition of the Self showed statistically significant 
difference among the think tanks, only the Narrow batch will be considered. To test the 
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dissimilarity of rules of conduct of any two think tanks, the MANOVA test was followed 
by post hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test. To map the approximate relative 
position of the seven think tanks from each other, the MANOVA test was followed by a 
discriminant analysis.  
2-2 The World of All the Issues 
 In the previous section (2-1), it was shown that when considering all the issues, 
the seven think tanks differed from each other when they allocated actions to the 
American collective Self. It was also shown that the magnitude of this difference was 
small. The main question of this section (2-2) asks which think tanks were the most 
dissimilar in assigning actions to the American collective Self in regard to all the issues. 
Table 4-8 presents the VICS indexes of the seven think tanks in the world of all the 
issues. The VICS indexes were calculated using the transitive verbs that each think tank 
used for the American collective Self in the world of all the issues. As Table 4-8 shows, 
in the world of all the issues, and relative to other think tanks, CATO, AEI, and CFR 
used more conflictual verbs for the American collective self, while Heritage, Brookings, 
and RAND used more cooperative verbs. 
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Table 4-8 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of All the Issues - Self 
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Carnegie Narrow 127 0.35 0.41 0.14 0.27 0.30 0.17 0.55 0.29 0.58 0.29 0.48 0.21 0.02 0.06 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.16
Brookings Narrow 176 0.42 0.39 0.16 0.25 0.33 0.18 0.50 0.29 0.55 0.26 0.52 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.13
RAND Narrow 127 0.40 0.34 0.17 0.21 0.26 0.15 0.55 0.26 0.64 0.23 0.48 0.17 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.12
CFR Narrow 92 0.23 0.44 0.07 0.32 0.29 0.17 0.58 0.26 0.60 0.28 0.40 0.22 0.02 0.04 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.22 0.19
Heritage Narrow 182 0.44 0.34 0.21 0.24 0.31 0.19 0.53 0.29 0.55 0.30 0.48 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.21 0.18 0.15 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.13
AEI Narrow 103 0.23 0.37 0.07 0.27 0.25 0.13 0.65 0.25 0.61 0.27 0.41 0.18 0.02 0.06 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.01 0.03 0.20 0.16
Cato Narrow 60 0.22 0.39 0.08 0.22 0.25 0.14 0.63 0.25 0.57 0.27 0.42 0.21 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.14 0.21 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.12
Total Narrow 867 0.35 0.39 0.14 0.26 0.29 0.17 0.56 0.28 0.58 0.27 0.47 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.14
I5puI1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5th I5op
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  AEI Brookings Carnegie Cato CFR Heritage RAND 
Grand 
Total 
AEI   7 5 0 0 6 4 22 
Brookings 7   0 6 4 1 0 18 
Carnegie 5 0   3 4 0 0 12 
Cato 0 6 3   0 4 3 16 
CFR 0 4 4 0   4 4 16 
Heritage 6 1 0 4 4   1 16 
RAND 4 0 0 3 4 1   12 
Grand 
Total 22 18 12 16 16 16 12 112 
Table 4-9 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of All the Issues - Self  
 Table 4-9 shows the number of times that the allocation of action to the American 
collective Self by any two think tanks were found statistically different in the eleven post 
hoc comparison tests using the Tukey HSD test.1 As Table 4-9 shows, AEI was most 
different from Brookings and least different from Cato and CFR. Brookings differed most 
from AEI and least from Carnegie and RAND. Carnegie was most different from AEI 
and least different from Brookings, Heritage, and RAND. Cato differed most from 
Brookings and least from AEI and CFR. CFR was most different from Brookings, 
Carnegie, Heritage, and RAND and least different from AEI and Cato. Heritage differed 
most from AEI and least from Carnegie. RAND was most different from AEI and CFR 
and least different from Brookings and Carnegie. The above analysis shows that, in the 
world of all the issues, the allocation of action to the American collective Self could be 
generally used to predict the ideological grouping of a think tank. The two exceptions 
were Heritage and CFR. As in the other levels of comparison, CFR was least different 
from the Right than from the Left or the Center. In regard to the American collective Self, 
Heritage showed a sharp difference from the conservative camp. Allocation of action to 
                                                 
1 p ≤ 0.05 
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the American collective Self by Heritage was the most different from the Right and least 
different from the Left.  
 To map the relative position of the seven think tanks from one another, a 
discriminant analysis was conducted using the eleven Instrumental indexes as the 
independent variables and Think Tank as the grouping variable. The results of the 
discriminant analysis are presented in Table 4-10 and Table 4-11. As Table 4-11 shows, 
the discriminant analysis revealed three statistically significant functions.  
Eigenvalues 
Batch Eigenvalue 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Canonical 
Correlation 
Narrow 1 .066 39.5 39.5 .249 
2 .038 22.9 62.4 .192 
3 .027 15.9 78.3 .161 
4 .017 10.1 88.5 .129 
5 .014 8.1 96.5 .116 
6 .006 3.5 100.0 .076 
Table 4-10 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks’ Collective Self in the World of All the Issues 
Wilks' Lambda 
Batch 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
Chi-
square df Sig. 
Narrow 1 through 6 .849 140.791 66 .000 
2 through 6 .905 85.760 50 .001 
3 through 6 .940 53.471 36 .031 
4 through 6 .965 30.933 24 .156 
5 through 6 .981 16.497 14 .284 
6 .994 4.977 6 .547 
Table 4-11 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks’ Collective Self in the World of All the Issues 
 As Table 4-10 shows, the first two functions explained 62% of the total variance. 
The discriminant function plot (Figure 4-1) shows how the centroids of the seven think 
tanks were positioned relative to each other based on the first two discriminant functions. 
As Figure 4-1 shows, and based on the 62% variance, the two discriminant functions 
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separated the think tanks into four groups, Heritage paired with Brookings and Carnegie; 
RAND and Cato were each single-member groups, and AEI paired with CFR.  
 
Figure 4-1 Discriminant Functions Plot – Think Tanks’ Collective Self in the World of All the Issues 
2-3 The World of Military Issues 
 Section 2-2 showed the dissimilarity among the think tanks in the world of all the 
issues and based on their perception of the rules of conduct of the American collective 
Self. This section (2-3) compares the seven think tanks on the basis of their allocation of 
action to the American collective Self in the world of military issues. Table 4-13 presents 
the VICS indexes of the seven think tanks in the world of military issues. The VICS 
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indexes were calculated using the transitive verbs that each think tank used for the 
American collective Self in the world of military issues. As Table 4-13 shows, in the 
world of military issues, and relative to other think tanks, CFR used more conflictual 
verbs for the American collective self, while Heritage used more cooperative verbs.   
AEI Brookings Carnegie Cato CFR Heritage RAND 
Grand 
Total 
AEI   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Brookings 0   0 2 2 0 0 4 
Carnegie 0 0   0 0 0 0 0 
Cato 0 2 0   1 3 1 7 
CFR 0 2 0 1   3 1 7 
Heritage 0 0 0 3 3   0 6 
RAND 0 0 0 1 1 0   2 
Grand 
Total 0 4 0 7 7 6 2 26 
Table 4-12 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of Military Issues - Self 
 Table 4-12 shows the number of times that the allocation of action to the 
American collective Self by any two think tanks was found to be statistically different in 
the eleven post hoc comparison tests using the Tukey HSD test.1 As Table 4-12 shows, 
no two think tanks were different from each other with moderate confidence.  
 To map the relative position of the seven think tanks from each other, a 
discriminant analysis was conducted using the eleven Instrumental indexes as the 
independent variables and Think Tank as the grouping variable. The results of the 
discriminant analysis appear in Table 4-14 and Table 4-15. As Table 4-15 shows, the 
discriminant analysis found only one statistically significant function, which explained 
43% of the variance (Table 4-14). Since there was only one significant function, the 
discriminant plot and its subsequent analysis were not computed at this level. 
                                                 
1 p ≤ 0.05 
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Table 4-13 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of Military Issues - Self 
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Carnegie Narrow 18 0.15 0.40 0.02 0.26 0.24 0.14 0.66 0.25 0.66 0.26 0.40 0.17 0.01 0.03 0.16 0.10 0.21 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.21 0.17
Brookings Narrow 27 0.38 0.33 0.12 0.25 0.30 0.14 0.57 0.25 0.61 0.26 0.50 0.19 0.02 0.05 0.17 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.01 0.03 0.18 0.12
RAND Narrow 66 0.33 0.35 0.12 0.23 0.25 0.15 0.61 0.27 0.65 0.23 0.45 0.17 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.10 0.16 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.17 0.14
CFR Narrow 28 0.06 0.56 -0.04 0.43 0.33 0.21 0.54 0.31 0.64 0.26 0.31 0.24 0.01 0.02 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.31 0.24
Heritage Narrow 44 0.43 0.32 0.24 0.27 0.29 0.16 0.54 0.27 0.62 0.27 0.43 0.19 0.02 0.04 0.27 0.20 0.14 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.13 0.14
AEI Narrow 26 0.23 0.35 0.08 0.27 0.23 0.11 0.64 0.21 0.69 0.24 0.39 0.18 0.03 0.10 0.20 0.13 0.18 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.15
Cato Narrow 13 0.15 0.42 0.05 0.24 0.26 0.10 0.61 0.19 0.49 0.31 0.40 0.22 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.26 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.13
Total Narrow 222 0.28 0.40 0.11 0.29 0.27 0.15 0.59 0.26 0.64 0.25 0.42 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.01 0.02 0.19 0.16
I4b I5apI1 I2 I3 I4a I5pr I5re I5th I5op I5pu
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Eigenvalues 
Batch Eigenvalue 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Canonical 
Correlation
Narrow Military 1 0.203 42.6 42.6 .410
2 0.091 19.1 61.7 .288
3 0.083 17.4 79.1 .276
4 0.057 12.1 91.2 .233
5 0.03 6.3 97.6 .171
6 0.012 2.4 100.0 .107
Table 4-14 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks’ Collective Self in the World of Military Issues 
Wilks' Lambda 
Batch 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
Chi-
square df Sig. 
Narrow Military 1 through 6 .639 94.886 66 .011
2 through 6 .769 55.792 50 .266
3 through 6 .838 37.386 36 .405
4 through 6 .908 20.559 24 .665
5 through 6 .960 8.715 14 .849
6 .989 2.434 6 .876
Table 4-15 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks’ Collective Self in the World of Military Issues 
2-4 The World of Political Issues 
 This section (2-4) compares the seven think tanks based on their allocation of 
action to the American collective Self in the world of political issues. Table 4-17 presents 
the VICS indexes of the seven think tanks in the world of political issues. The VICS 
indexes were calculated using the transitive verbs that each think tank used for the 
American collective Self in the world of political issues. As Table 4-17 shows, in the 
world of political issues, and relative to other think tanks, AEI, CFR, and CATO used 
more conflictual verbs for the American collective Self, while Heritage, RAND, and 
Brookings used more cooperative verbs. Table 4-16 shows the number of times that the 
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allocation of action to the American collective Self by any two think tanks was found to 
be statistically different in the eleven post hoc comparison tests using the Tukey HSD.1     
  AEI Brookings Carnegie Cato CFR Heritage RAND 
Grand 
Total 
AEI   4 3 0 1 6 4 18 
Brookings 4   0 0 2 0 1 7 
Carnegie 3 0   0 0 1 0 4 
Cato 0 0 0   0 1 1 2 
CFR 1 2 0 0   2 2 7 
Heritage 6 0 1 1 2   2 12 
RAND 4 1 0 1 2 2   10 
Grand Total 18 7 4 2 7 12 10 60 
Table 4-16 Dissimilarity among the Pairs of Think Tanks in the World of Political Issues - Self 
 As Table 4-16 shows, AEI was most different from Heritage and least different 
from Cato. Brookings was most different from AEI and least different from Carnegie, 
Cato, and Heritage. Carnegie, Cato, and CFR did not show with at least moderate 
confidence any dissimilarity to the other think tanks. Heritage differed most from AEI 
and least from Brookings. RAND was most different from AEI and least different from 
Carnegie. The above analysis shows that in the world of political issues, the VICS 
indexes were not able to predict the political orientation of the think tanks all the time.  
 To map the relative position of the seven think tanks from each other, a 
discriminant analysis was conducted using the eleven Instrumental indexes as the 
independent variables and Think Tank as the grouping variable. The result of this 
discriminant analysis appears in Table 4-18 and Table 4-19. As Table 4-18 shows, the 
discriminant analysis found only one statistically significant function, which explained 
43% of the variance (Table 4-19). Since there was only one significant function, the 
discriminant plot and its subsequent analysis were not computed at this level.  
                                                 
1 p ≤ 0.05 
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Table 4-17 VICS Indexes of the Individual Think Tanks - World of Political Issues - Self 
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Carnegie Narrow 87 0.33 0.41 0.13 0.27 0.30 0.18 0.56 0.29 0.59 0.30 0.47 0.22 0.03 0.06 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.15 0.16
Brookings Narrow 119 0.40 0.42 0.15 0.25 0.33 0.20 0.51 0.30 0.53 0.27 0.52 0.21 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.02 0.04 0.13 0.13
RAND Narrow 43 0.43 0.30 0.21 0.19 0.25 0.10 0.53 0.22 0.63 0.22 0.48 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.22 0.11 0.16 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.09
CFR Narrow 47 0.23 0.35 0.07 0.23 0.25 0.15 0.65 0.23 0.59 0.29 0.41 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.16 0.18 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.20 0.14
Heritage Narrow 122 0.44 0.35 0.21 0.24 0.33 0.20 0.52 0.29 0.52 0.30 0.50 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.12
AEI Narrow 71 0.21 0.38 0.05 0.26 0.27 0.14 0.66 0.27 0.58 0.29 0.42 0.18 0.02 0.04 0.17 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.01 0.04 0.20 0.17
Cato Narrow 39 0.25 0.35 0.09 0.20 0.23 0.13 0.65 0.25 0.61 0.27 0.43 0.19 0.03 0.06 0.17 0.12 0.20 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.10
Total Narrow 528 0.35 0.39 0.14 0.25 0.30 0.18 0.56 0.28 0.56 0.28 0.48 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.18 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.14
I1 I2 I3 I4a I5puI4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5th I5op
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Eigenvalues 
Batch Eigenvalue 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Canonical 
Correlation
Narrow Political 1 0.085 42.8 42.8 .279
2 0.046 23.5 66.3 .211
3 0.031 15.5 81.8 .173
4 0.023 11.8 93.6 .151
5 0.008 4.2 97.8 .091
6 0.004 2.2 100.0 .066
Table 4-18 Eigenvalues - Think Tanks’ Collective Self in the World of Political Issues 
Batch 
Wilks' 
Lambda 
Chi-
square df Sig. 
Narrow Political 1 through 6 .825 99.875 66 .005
2 through 6 .895 57.745 50 .211
3 through 6 .936 34.214 36 .554
4 through 6 .965 18.539 24 .776
5 through 6 .987 6.564 14 .950
6 .996 2.265 6 .894
Table 4-19 Wilks' Lambda - Think Tanks’ Collective Self in the World of Political Issues 
Summary 
 Chapter Four showed that the rules of conduct of the American collective Self 
were very stable across time and not very different across topics. It showed that Broad 
and Narrow definitions of the American collective Self differed from each other and that 
the Broad definition was more stable than the Narrow definition. This chapter also 
showed that, pertaining to social actions of the American collective Self, there was no 
statistically significant difference among the think tanks. It also showed that, in terms of 
the world of all the issues, the allocation of action to the American collective Self could 
generally predict the ideological grouping of a think tank.  
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CHAPTER 5 : U.S. SIGNIFICANT OTHERS 
Introduction 
In this chapter, the view of the American foreign policy think tanks towards other 
actors will be assessed and compared. The operational code literature does not 
differentiate among members of the Other. Therefore, the operational code of the Other is 
calculated based on the transitive verbs that are used for allies, enemies, and rivals 
combined. Some of these actors are countries and some are non-state actors. I argue that 
the Other should not be treated as a single entity. The operational code of a status quo 
actor is likely to differ from the operational code of a revolutionary actor. Also, it is 
likely that states assign different types of actions to other countries based on their power. 
I also argue that the operational code of the Other should be calculated separately for 
each of the issue areas (all topics, military, political, and social).  
This chapter will calculate and compare the operational code of the United States 
and its twenty-one most frequent “significant Others” in the four worlds of action. It first 
describes the process of identifying the twenty-two actors and then studies the United 
States and its twenty-one significant Others from the following three perspectives: 
Operational Code of the Actor, which asks what were the rules of conduct of the actor 
from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks; Agreement among Think 
Tanks, which asks which think tanks assigned overall cooperative/conflictual strategy to 
the actor, and Similarity of the Actors, which asks what was the relative position of the 
actor to other actors in the four worlds of American foreign policy think tanks. The 
smallest unit for the verb aggregation is the political actor and the smallest unit for the 
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topic classification is the sentence. Therefore, 500,000 labeled sentences are used in this 
chapter.  
1- Significant Others in Relation to the United States 
 To find the significant Others in relation to the United States, first all the 
documents published by the think tanks in the time periods bracketing the three general 
elections of 2004, 2008, and 2012, were merged together. Then all the sentences that had 
transitive verbs were separated out. In this step, a total of 580,493 sentences was 
identified. Then the subjects of these sentences were extracted. In this step, 9,000 unique 
subjects were found, of which the majority were sparsely known or unknown subjects. In 
the next step, all the 9,000 subjects were checked manually, and those subjects referring 
to a particular political entity were tagged to be grouped under one name. For instance, 
the words, Russia, Russians, Moscow, Putin, Gorbachev, and Kremlin were all grouped 
under the general noun of Russia. Then, using a python script, all the subjects of the 
sentences were changed to more general nouns. Table 5-1 presents the result of this 
process and shows the most frequent general subjects that were mentioned by the 
American foreign policy think tanks.  
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The Most Frequent 
Actors 
        
 AEI Brookings Carnegie Cato CFR Heritage RAND Grand 
Total 
OTHER SUBJECTS 58679 104217 105750 26109 49714 51202 116298 511969 
USA* 2779 3676 2854 1289 2166 3538 4283 20585 
CHINA* 569 1154 1312 392 573 645 1834 6479 
RUSSIA* 712 807 2038 136 244 646 537 5120 
IRAN* 1077 603 772 94 335 291 1164 4336 
EUROPE* 602 638 1198 272 219 424 623 3976 
TERRORIST* 485 589 676 94 417 481 1088 3830 
IRAQ* 505 450 231 119 330 133 844 2612 
INDIA* 152 261 518 139 132 265 253 1720 
NORTH KOREA* 266 331 107 162 102 301 309 1578 
ARAB WORLD 111 297 466 25 137 52 288 1376 
PAKISTAN* 53 271 330 70 133 132 260 1249 
TURKEY* 206 270 330 36 43 68 271 1224 
JAPAN* 248 284 208 47 78 150 201 1216 
ISRAEL* 154 257 286 45 250 84 125 1201 
AFGHANISTAN* 147 221 232 46 124 80 349 1199 
MUSLIM WORLD* 129 166 380 36 103 64 261 1139 
UNITED NATIONS* 117 231 93 39 185 140 187 992 
EGYPT 60 245 436 9 83 27 100 960 
SYRIA* 114 174 317 34 86 73 90 888 
BRITAIN* 139 111 164 42 74 168 138 836 
SOUTH KOREA* 41 91 41 63 89 73 413 811 
GERMANY* 111 78 295 51 45 57 93 730 
TAIWAN* 50 179 109 52 24 58 181 653 
FRANCE* 83 145 167 38 62 68 34 597 
VENEZUELA 60 57 43 26 65 277 31 559 
PALESTINE 62 81 150 18 90 38 50 489 
AFRICA 51 159 28 72 56 56 54 476 
MUSLIM 
BROTHERHOOD 
14 108 195 1 10 14 25 367 
SUNNI 34 38 43 10 38 14 86 263 
MEXICO 11 72 22 3 36 67 27 238 
SHIAH 41 20 26 9 36 7 29 168 
LEBANON 8 11 116 2 7 4 7 155 
BREZIL 17 54 20  15 7 2 115 
VIETNAM 15 14 15 4 20 22 19 109 
TALIBAN 12 22 30 6 4 7 25 106 
LATIN AMERICA 8 17 5 2 5 18 9 64 
SALAFIS 1 11 41   1 9 63 
CHRISTIAN 6 13 7 11 2 3 3 45 
Grand Total 67929 116423 120051 29603 56132 59755 130600 580493 
Table 5-1 Most Frequent Subjects with Transitive Verbs 
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 As this table shows, the United States was the most frequent subject. The rest of 
the table is the list of the most frequent significant Others in relation to the United States. 
As Table 5-1 shows, not all of the significant Others of the United States were nation 
states. The American foreign policy think tanks frequently referred to political entities 
such as Terrorists, Arab world, Muslims, Europe, Shiahs, and Sunnis. Some of these non-
state actors were geographical (e.g., Europe); some were ideological (e.g., the Muslim 
World); some were international organizations (e.g., the United Nations and the European 
Union); some were based on a tactic of warfare (e.g., Terrorists); and some were based on 
ethnicity (e.g., Arab World). In the next step, the political entities were selected that had 
overall high frequency and utterances in all the three worlds of military issues, political 
issues, and social issues. The result was the following list of twenty-two actors: 
1. Afghanistan 
2. Britain 
3. China 
4. Europe 
5. France 
6. Germany 
7. India 
8. Iran 
9. Iraq 
10. Islam 
11. Israel 
12. Japan 
13. North Korea 
14. Pakistan 
15. Russia 
16. South Korea 
17. Syria 
18. Taiwan 
19. Terrorist 
20. Turkey 
21. United Nations 
22. United States 
2- Operational Code of the Actor  
 To extract the rules of conduct of a particular actor the sentences in which that 
actor was the subject of a transitive verb were chosen. These sentences were then 
grouped according to the time period during which they were published, the think tank 
that published them, and the topic of each sentence (all the issues, military issues, 
political issues, and social issues). Based on these attributes, the operational code of the 
actor was measured on fifty-seven levels:  
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1) Level of the transitive verbs used for an actor by each of the seven think tanks in 
each of the three elections (21 levels); 
2) Level of the transitive verbs used for an actor by each of the seven think tanks in 
each of the three topics (21 levels); 
3) Average of operational codes of an actor for each of the seven think tanks (7 
levels); 
4) Level of the transitive verbs used for an actor by the collectivity of the think tanks 
in each of the three elections (3 levels); 
5) Level of transitive verbs used for an actor by the collectivity of the think tanks in 
all of the three elections (1 level); 
6) Level of the transitive verbs used for an actor by the collectivity of the think tanks 
in each of the three topics (3 levels); 
7) Average of operational codes of an actor by the collectivity of the think tanks. (1 
Level). 
 As the result of these fifty-seven levels of verb aggregation, the operational code 
of any actor was calculated fifty-seven times. The result of this process appears in tables 
such as Table 5-5, which shows the operational code of Afghanistan from the perspective 
of the American foreign policy elite on fifty-seven levels. As Table 5-5 shows, the I-
indexes of Afghanistan are colored relative to the I-indexes of other actors. Indexes with 
(+1) value are colored dark green and the indexes with (-1) or (0) value are colored dark 
red. The rest of the values are colored by different shades of green and red. 
3- Comparing Think Tanks 
 The index of direction of strategy (I1) was chosen as the basis for comparing 
think tanks’ attitudes towards an actor. As Table 5-5 shows, each think tank produced 
seven instances of I1 index (2004, 2008, 2012, Military, Political, Social, and Three 
Topics) for an actor. Any time an I1 index was above the average of its level, it was 
considered cooperative; otherwise, it was classified as conflictual. The maximum number 
of times a think tank could attribute cooperative or conflictual actions/strategies to an 
actor was seven times. The result of this comparison was a table like Table 5-3. As this 
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table shows, RAND attributed cooperative actions to Afghanistan seven times (100% 
attribution of cooperative strategy to Afghanistan). On the other hand, Cato assigned 
conflictual actions to Afghanistan for all of the same seven instances (100% attribution of 
conflictual strategy to Afghanistan).  
 Table 5-4 shows the relative confidence of the seven think tanks in assigning 
strategy to a political actor. For instance, as Table 5-4 shows, the seven think tanks 
described the strategy of Terrorists fifty-seven times as conflictual. This shows that the 
seven think tanks had 100% confidence/certainty/agreement in describing the direction of 
the strategy of Terrorists. To compare different levels of confidence of the American 
foreign policy think tanks in describing the strategy of the actors, the following standard 
was used. A percentage of confidence between 100% and 50% indicated a high level of 
confidence/certainty/agreement; a percentage of confidence between 25% and 50% 
indicated a medium level of confidence/certainty/agreement; and less than 25% indicated 
a low level of confidence/certainty/agreement.  
4- Similarity of the Actors 
 Based on the actions assigned to the United States and its significant Others, what 
was the relative similarity of these actors in the four worlds of American foreign policy 
think tanks? Which actors were most similar and which were least similar? To answer 
these questions, I used the eleven Instrumental indexes as the basis of comparison. I used 
the ALSCAL Multi-Dimensional Scaling (MDS) method to reduce the dimensions of 
comparison to two dimensions.1 The ALSCAL scaling method looks for patterns in the 
                                                 
1 Forrest W. Young, “ALSCAL Software for Multidimensional Scaling,” ALSCAL, accessed May 3, 2015, 
http://forrest.psych.unc.edu/research/alscal.html. 
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distances among the actors. It first calculates the Euclidian distance between any two 
actors based on their I-indexes. Then it creates a distance matrix from all the distances 
between actors. Then, using Young's S-stress formula and S-stress convergence of 0.001, 
it reduces the dimensions between the actors to two dimensions. By reducing the 
dimension to two, the ALSCAL creates a two dimensional map and locates actors relative 
to each other.  
 I compared the twenty-two actors on forty-four levels of verb aggregation. Table 
5-2 shows the details of these forty-four levels of comparison. As this table shows, the 
actors were compared eleven times in any of the four worlds. The Appendix presents the 
plots of these forty-four multi-dimensional comparisons. As these plots show, any 
multidimensional scaling map has four quadrants. To estimate the similarity/dissimilarity 
of any two actors, I counted the number of times any two actors shared a quadrant in any 
of the four worlds. The result was four similarity-tables for each of the twenty-two actors. 
The maximum number of times that any two actors could be grouped together was forty-
four times, which indicates 100% of similarity (0% of dissimilarity). If, in the forty-four 
times of comparison, two actors never shared a quadrant, they were regarded as 100% 
dissimilar (0% similar).   
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Think Tank Year Topic Level(s) 
Each of the Seven Think Tanks All All 7 
Each of the Seven Think Tanks All Social 7 
Each of the Seven Think Tanks All Political 7 
Each of the Seven Think Tanks All Military 7 
All the Think Tanks  All All 1 
All the Think Tanks  2012 All 1 
All the Think Tanks  2012 Social 1 
All the Think Tanks  2012 Political 1 
All the Think Tanks  2012 Military 1 
All the Think Tanks  2008 All 1 
All the Think Tanks  2008 Social 1 
All the Think Tanks  2008 Political 1 
All the Think Tanks  2008 Military 1 
All the Think Tanks  2004 All 1 
All the Think Tanks  2004 Social 1 
All the Think Tanks  2004 Political 1 
All the Think Tanks  2004 Military 1 
All the Think Tanks  All Military 1 
All the Think Tanks  All Political 1 
All the Think Tanks  All Social 1 
Table 5-2 Forty-Four Levels of Verb Aggregation/Comparison 
 To visualize the relative position of the actors in the worlds of American foreign 
policy think tanks, I created twenty-two separate radar charts based on the four similarity-
tables. These radar charts should be read clockwise, with most similar actor positioned at 
the end of the hour. These radar charts visualize the similarity of an actor to other twenty-
one actors in five colors: 
1) Red: shows the number of times an actor shared a quadrant with another actor in 
the world of military issues; 
2) Green: shows the number of times an actor shared a quadrant with another actor 
in the world of social issues; 
3) Yellow: shows the number of times an actor shared a quadrant with another actor 
in the world of political issues; 
4) Light Blue: shows the number of times an actor shared a quadrant with another 
actor in the world of all the issues;  
5) Black: shows the total number of times an actor shared a quadrant with another 
actor.  
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 The next section presents the result of the above analysis for all the twenty-two 
actors. For each of the actors, the following three questions will be answered: 
1) How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive the actor’s operational 
code, and did they agree in their assessment? 
2) Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to the actor? 
Did any of the think tanks show consistency in assigning actions to the actor 
across the levels of time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks 
view the actions by the actor?  
3) What was the actor’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy 
think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to that actor?  
Afghanistan 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Afghanistan’s 
operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of Afghanistan’s actions?  
Table 5-5 shows the I-indexes of Afghanistan on fifty-seven levels of time and 
topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Afghanistan, the overall perception 
of the American foreign policy think tanks was neither cooperative nor conflictual. Table 
5-3 presents the number of times Afghanistan’s index of direction of strategy was above 
or below the average of I1 (direction of strategy) on seven levels.1 In this table, whenever 
the index of direction of strategy was above the average of its level it was considered 
cooperative; otherwise it was considered conflictual. As Table 5-3 shows, the American 
think tanks described Afghanistan’s strategy as conflictual twenty-seven times and 
cooperative thirty times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and 
cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a very low 
level of certainty about the direction of strategy of Afghanistan. As Table 5-4 shows, the 
seven American foreign policy think tanks had 5% agreement in describing 
                                                 
1 2004, 2008, 2012, military issues, political issues, social issues, and all the issues. From now on, they are 
referred to as “seven levels” or “seven instances.”  
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Afghanistan’s direction of strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign 
policy think tanks ranked Afghanistan tenth based on its conflictual actions and 
fourteenth based on its cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-3 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Afghanistan 
 
 
Table 5-4 Ranking of Twenty-two Actors Based on their Direction of Strategy 
AFGHANISTAN
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
RAND 7
Brookings 1 6
Carnegie 2 5
CFR 2 5
Seven Think Tanks 3 5
AEI 6 1
Heritage 6 1
Cato 7
Grand Total 27 30
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE CONFLICTUAL-RANK COOPERATIVE-RANK % CONFIDENCE
Terrorists 57 0 1 22 100
Muslim World 45 12 2 21 58
Israel 44 13 3 20 54
Britain 41 16 4 19 44
Syria 40 17 5 18 40
North Korea 35 22 6 16 23
Iraq 35 22 7 17 23
Germany 29 28 8 15 2
Iran 27 30 9 13 5
Afghanistan 27 30 10 14 5
Turkey 26 31 11 12 9
Russia 25 32 12 11 12
Pakistan 22 35 13 10 23
France 21 36 14 9 26
India 18 39 15 8 37
Japan 16 41 16 6 44
Taiwan 16 41 17 7 44
United Nations 15 42 18 5 47
Europe 11 46 19 3 61
United States 11 46 20 4 61
South Korea 9 48 21 2 68
China 7 50 22 1 75
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Table 5-5 Operational Code of Afghanistan from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
AFGHANISTAN AEI 2004 0.20 -0.02 0.23 0.74 0.83 0.37 0.00 0.23 0.05 0.01 0.35
AFGHANISTAN AEI 2008 -0.03 -0.14 0.34 0.53 0.65 0.24 0.03 0.22 0.08 0.03 0.42
AFGHANISTAN AEI 2012 0.05 0.03 0.24 0.70 0.80 0.24 0.00 0.29 0.17 0.05 0.25
AFGHANISTAN AEI Military -0.19 -0.29 0.22 0.76 0.70 0.24 0.00 0.17 0.05 0.07 0.48
AFGHANISTAN AEI Political 0.45 0.26 0.16 0.55 0.88 0.41 0.02 0.30 0.12 0.01 0.14
AFGHANISTAN AEI Social -0.18 -0.19 0.58 0.51 0.51 0.14 0.00 0.27 0.11 0.00 0.48
AFGHANISTAN AEI Three Topics 0.20 0.06 0.11 0.80 0.95 0.34 0.01 0.24 0.12 0.03 0.25
AFGHANISTAN Brookings 2004 0.58 0.36 0.47 0.42 0.73 0.36 0.00 0.43 0.02 0.00 0.19
AFGHANISTAN Brookings 2008 0.41 0.21 0.19 0.60 0.85 0.40 0.01 0.30 0.10 0.03 0.17
AFGHANISTAN Brookings 2012 0.27 0.06 0.16 0.73 0.81 0.40 0.01 0.22 0.08 0.02 0.27
AFGHANISTAN Brookings Military 0.09 -0.11 0.21 0.91 0.92 0.38 0.01 0.16 0.07 0.04 0.35
AFGHANISTAN Brookings Political 0.43 0.21 0.18 0.57 0.89 0.43 0.01 0.28 0.11 0.01 0.17
AFGHANISTAN Brookings Social 0.78 0.56 0.56 0.22 0.45 0.33 0.00 0.55 0.00 0.00 0.11
AFGHANISTAN Brookings Three Topics 0.39 0.18 0.16 0.61 0.92 0.41 0.01 0.27 0.10 0.02 0.19
AFGHANISTAN Carnegie 2004 0.36 0.19 0.26 0.64 0.82 0.18 0.20 0.30 0.03 0.00 0.29
AFGHANISTAN Carnegie 2008 0.15 -0.01 0.14 0.85 0.97 0.35 0.02 0.21 0.12 0.01 0.31
AFGHANISTAN Carnegie 2012 0.29 0.15 0.24 0.71 0.76 0.27 0.08 0.29 0.11 0.01 0.24
AFGHANISTAN Carnegie Military 0.04 -0.10 0.23 0.96 0.87 0.24 0.17 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.36
AFGHANISTAN Carnegie Political 0.38 0.22 0.15 0.62 0.76 0.33 0.05 0.31 0.12 0.01 0.19
AFGHANISTAN Carnegie Social 0.50 0.42 0.59 0.50 0.50 0.19 0.00 0.57 0.07 0.00 0.19
AFGHANISTAN Carnegie Three Topics 0.29 0.15 0.10 0.71 0.81 0.30 0.07 0.26 0.14 0.01 0.21
AFGHANISTAN Cato 2004 0.17 -0.03 0.23 0.84 0.59 0.29 0.00 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.42
AFGHANISTAN Cato 2008 -0.39 -0.32 0.34 0.57 0.65 0.11 0.00 0.19 0.20 0.03 0.47
AFGHANISTAN Cato 2012 -0.40 -0.43 0.31 0.60 0.51 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.10 0.00 0.59
AFGHANISTAN Cato Military -0.42 -0.33 0.19 0.59 0.75 0.13 0.00 0.17 0.25 0.00 0.46
AFGHANISTAN Cato Political -0.01 -0.10 0.25 0.72 0.63 0.23 0.00 0.26 0.08 0.03 0.40
AFGHANISTAN Cato Social -1.00 -1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
AFGHANISTAN Cato Three Topics -0.19 -0.22 0.21 0.81 0.64 0.18 0.00 0.23 0.13 0.01 0.45
AFGHANISTAN CFR 2004 0.60 0.37 0.59 0.40 0.26 0.48 0.00 0.32 0.13 0.02 0.06
AFGHANISTAN CFR 2008 0.35 0.11 0.35 0.65 0.53 0.43 0.01 0.24 0.06 0.01 0.25
AFGHANISTAN CFR 2012 0.33 0.20 0.38 0.62 0.62 0.25 0.00 0.41 0.06 0.00 0.28
AFGHANISTAN CFR Military 0.33 0.02 0.46 0.60 0.46 0.51 0.00 0.15 0.05 0.00 0.28
AFGHANISTAN CFR Political 0.21 0.08 0.16 0.79 0.69 0.36 0.01 0.24 0.15 0.01 0.23
AFGHANISTAN CFR Social 1.00 0.78 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
AFGHANISTAN CFR Three Topics 0.16 0.02 0.14 0.84 0.71 0.34 0.00 0.24 0.12 0.03 0.27
AFGHANISTAN Heritage 2004 0.00 0.00 0.45 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50
AFGHANISTAN Heritage 2008 -0.14 -0.24 0.17 0.86 0.85 0.33 0.00 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.34
AFGHANISTAN Heritage 2012 0.25 0.04 0.15 0.75 0.83 0.43 0.00 0.19 0.09 0.06 0.23
AFGHANISTAN Heritage Military -0.19 -0.25 0.25 0.68 0.50 0.23 0.00 0.18 0.09 0.10 0.41
AFGHANISTAN Heritage Political 0.19 0.11 0.23 0.78 0.56 0.24 0.00 0.36 0.07 0.07 0.26
AFGHANISTAN Heritage Social 0.00 -0.33 0.40 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50
AFGHANISTAN Heritage Three Topics 0.06 -0.03 0.20 0.89 0.57 0.24 0.00 0.29 0.08 0.07 0.33
AFGHANISTAN RAND 2004 0.32 0.13 0.16 0.69 0.89 0.38 0.01 0.27 0.10 0.00 0.24
AFGHANISTAN RAND 2008 0.53 0.30 0.16 0.48 0.83 0.40 0.05 0.32 0.09 0.00 0.15
AFGHANISTAN RAND 2012 0.43 0.12 0.41 0.58 0.42 0.62 0.00 0.10 0.15 0.03 0.12
AFGHANISTAN RAND Military 0.22 0.05 0.19 0.78 0.79 0.39 0.01 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.25
AFGHANISTAN RAND Political 0.32 0.16 0.13 0.68 0.76 0.40 0.03 0.23 0.17 0.03 0.15
AFGHANISTAN RAND Social 0.78 0.35 0.50 0.22 0.51 0.64 0.03 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.11
AFGHANISTAN RAND Three Topics 0.37 0.16 0.15 0.63 0.80 0.43 0.02 0.23 0.14 0.01 0.17
AFGHANISTAN Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.34 0.16 0.35 0.62 0.60 0.31 0.03 0.33 0.05 0.00 0.27
AFGHANISTAN Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.13 -0.01 0.24 0.65 0.76 0.32 0.02 0.22 0.11 0.03 0.30
AFGHANISTAN Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.21 0.06 0.29 0.66 0.64 0.34 0.01 0.25 0.12 0.03 0.26
AFGHANISTAN Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.22 0.07 0.29 0.64 0.67 0.33 0.02 0.27 0.09 0.02 0.28
AFGHANISTAN Seven Think Tanks Military 0.01 -0.13 0.25 0.76 0.71 0.31 0.03 0.17 0.10 0.03 0.37
AFGHANISTAN Seven Think Tanks Political 0.28 0.13 0.18 0.67 0.74 0.34 0.02 0.28 0.12 0.02 0.22
AFGHANISTAN Seven Think Tanks Social 0.45 0.25 0.66 0.30 0.40 0.33 0.01 0.39 0.03 0.00 0.25
AFGHANISTAN Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.18 0.05 0.15 0.76 0.77 0.32 0.02 0.25 0.12 0.03 0.27
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Afghanistan? 
Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Afghanistan’s actions 
across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view 
Afghanistan’s actions?  
 As Table 5-3 shows, relative to other think tanks, Cato assigned the most 
conflictual actions to Afghanistan, while RAND assigned the most cooperative actions. 
Two think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about 
Afghanistan. Cato assigned conflictual actions to Afghanistan across the seven instances 
of 2004, 2008, 2012, military, political, social, and the three topics considered together. 
RAND, on the other hand, assigned cooperative actions to Afghanistan in the same seven 
instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a 
manifestation of an organizational identity relating to Afghanistan. As Table 5-3 shows, 
and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of 
Afghanistan was 63% cooperative. 
What was Afghanistan’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy 
think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Afghanistan?  
 As Figure 5-1 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of Afghanistan were most similar to those of the Muslim World and 
Pakistan and least similar to actions of Turkey and South Korea. From the total of forty-
four instances, Afghanistan was placed seventeen times in the same quadrant as the 
Muslim World and Pakistan, which shows 39% similarity (61% dissimilarity). On the 
other hand, Afghanistan was placed five times in the same quadrant as Turkey and South 
Korea which shows 89% dissimilarity (11% similarity).  
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 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Afghanistan 
were most similar to actions of Pakistan and North Korea and least similar to actions of 
Turkey, South Korea, the United States, Syria, Russia, Europe, and the United Nations. 
From the total of eleven instances, Afghanistan was placed six times in the same quadrant 
as Pakistan and North Korea, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the 
other hand, Afghanistan was placed only once in the same quadrant as Turkey, South 
Korea, the United States, Syria, Russia, Europe, and the United Nations, which indicates 
91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).  
 Political Issues: Political actions of Afghanistan were most similar to political 
actions of China and least similar to those of France. From the total of eleven instances, 
Afghanistan appeared seven times in the same quadrant as China, which shows 64% 
similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Afghanistan never appeared in the 
same quadrant as France, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of Afghanistan were most similar to social actions of 
the Muslim World and France and least similar to social actions of South Korea, the 
United States, Europe, and China. From the total of eleven instances, Afghanistan was 
placed six times in the same quadrant as the Muslim World and France, which shows 
55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Afghanistan 
never appeared in the same quadrant as social actions of South Korea, the United States, 
Europe, and China, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Military Issues: Military actions of Afghanistan were most similar to military 
actions of Terrorists and least similar to military actions of Taiwan. From the total of 
eleven instances, Afghanistan was placed seven times in the same quadrant as Terrorists, 
 123 
 
which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of 
Afghanistan did not appear in the same quadrant as military actions of Taiwan, which 
indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 
Figure 5-1 Similarity of Actions of Afghanistan to other Actors 
Britain  
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Britain’s operational 
code, and did they agree in their assessment of Britain’s actions?  
Table 5-7 shows the operational code of Britain on fifty-seven levels of time and 
topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Britain, the overall perception of 
the American foreign policy think tanks was conflictual. Table 5-6 presents the number 
of times Britain’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of 
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direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Britain’s 
strategy as conflictual forty-one times and cooperative sixteen times. The difference 
between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American 
foreign policy think tanks had a medium level of certainty about the direction of strategy 
of Britain. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 44% 
agreement in describing Britain’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American 
foreign policy think tanks ranked Britain fourth based on its conflictual actions and 
nineteenth based on its cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-6 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Britain 
 
BRITAIN
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
Brookings 2 5
AEI 3 4
CFR 3 4
Heritage 4 3
Cato 7
RAND 7
Carnegie 7
Seven Think Tanks 8
Grand Total 41 16
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Table 5-7 Operational Code of Britain from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
BRITAIN AEI 2004 0.20 0.16 0.19 0.75 0.58 0.22 0.04 0.34 0.17 0.03 0.21
BRITAIN AEI 2008 0.40 0.35 0.23 0.61 0.95 0.27 0.01 0.42 0.20 0.02 0.09
BRITAIN AEI 2012 0.22 0.15 0.15 0.78 0.72 0.14 0.12 0.35 0.10 0.00 0.29
BRITAIN AEI Military 0.45 0.37 0.34 0.56 0.45 0.17 0.00 0.56 0.06 0.00 0.22
BRITAIN AEI Political 0.21 0.10 0.13 0.72 0.85 0.31 0.01 0.29 0.13 0.04 0.23
BRITAIN AEI Social 0.25 0.31 0.24 0.75 0.75 0.10 0.16 0.37 0.26 0.00 0.11
BRITAIN AEI Three Topics 0.25 0.17 0.11 0.75 0.88 0.28 0.02 0.32 0.15 0.02 0.20
BRITAIN Brookings 2004 0.62 0.62 0.49 0.38 0.38 0.06 0.06 0.70 0.08 0.00 0.11
BRITAIN Brookings 2008 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.85 0.79 0.22 0.01 0.35 0.19 0.02 0.21
BRITAIN Brookings 2012 0.32 0.05 0.23 0.69 0.61 0.47 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.00 0.22
BRITAIN Brookings Military 0.00 -0.33 0.40 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50
BRITAIN Brookings Political 0.34 0.21 0.12 0.66 0.77 0.29 0.08 0.30 0.12 0.01 0.19
BRITAIN Brookings Social 0.48 0.45 0.52 0.52 0.17 0.19 0.05 0.50 0.18 0.00 0.08
BRITAIN Brookings Three Topics 0.38 0.28 0.18 0.62 0.71 0.26 0.07 0.36 0.13 0.01 0.17
BRITAIN Carnegie 2004 -0.44 -0.59 0.64 0.44 0.42 0.25 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.68
BRITAIN Carnegie 2008 0.24 -0.07 0.32 0.74 0.62 0.51 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.29
BRITAIN Carnegie 2012 0.03 -0.18 0.37 0.62 0.63 0.38 0.04 0.10 0.07 0.01 0.40
BRITAIN Carnegie Military -0.03 -0.22 0.53 0.30 0.24 0.28 0.11 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.45
BRITAIN Carnegie Political 0.16 -0.07 0.20 0.81 0.82 0.45 0.01 0.12 0.09 0.03 0.29
BRITAIN Carnegie Social -0.14 -0.35 0.54 0.48 0.62 0.33 0.00 0.10 0.02 0.00 0.55
BRITAIN Carnegie Three Topics 0.12 -0.10 0.20 0.88 0.82 0.44 0.02 0.10 0.11 0.02 0.31
BRITAIN Cato 2004 -0.40 -0.15 0.23 0.60 0.82 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.37 0.09 0.23
BRITAIN Cato 2008 -0.03 0.07 0.43 0.53 0.42 0.13 0.02 0.34 0.27 0.05 0.20
BRITAIN Cato 2012 -0.42 -0.32 0.36 0.59 0.53 0.09 0.00 0.20 0.21 0.05 0.45
BRITAIN Cato Military -1.00 -0.63 0.82 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.44
BRITAIN Cato Political 0.01 0.05 0.14 0.64 0.79 0.18 0.00 0.32 0.18 0.14 0.18
BRITAIN Cato Social 0.00 0.09 0.33 1.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.13 0.00 0.38
BRITAIN Cato Three Topics 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.78 0.91 0.14 0.05 0.31 0.20 0.07 0.23
BRITAIN CFR 2004 0.14 -0.05 0.43 0.64 0.58 0.18 0.30 0.09 0.03 0.03 0.37
BRITAIN CFR 2008 0.28 -0.01 0.32 0.73 0.77 0.52 0.00 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.27
BRITAIN CFR 2012 0.30 0.07 0.30 0.46 0.86 0.38 0.02 0.25 0.05 0.00 0.31
BRITAIN CFR Military 0.17 -0.11 0.65 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.42
BRITAIN CFR Political 0.03 -0.08 0.16 0.78 0.72 0.29 0.04 0.18 0.14 0.02 0.32
BRITAIN CFR Social 0.67 0.30 0.42 0.33 0.89 0.56 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.17
BRITAIN CFR Three Topics 0.08 -0.10 0.17 0.81 0.83 0.34 0.05 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.35
BRITAIN Heritage 2004 0.37 0.27 0.42 0.63 0.45 0.17 0.02 0.49 0.03 0.00 0.29
BRITAIN Heritage 2008 -0.13 -0.09 0.17 0.71 0.61 0.30 0.01 0.13 0.34 0.05 0.18
BRITAIN Heritage 2012 0.00 -0.07 0.31 0.50 0.58 0.19 0.03 0.29 0.09 0.01 0.40
BRITAIN Heritage Military -0.44 -0.31 0.39 0.56 0.22 0.08 0.00 0.19 0.25 0.06 0.42
BRITAIN Heritage Political 0.38 0.16 0.15 0.62 0.92 0.40 0.04 0.25 0.08 0.01 0.22
BRITAIN Heritage Social 0.17 0.22 0.55 0.50 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.50 0.17 0.00 0.25
BRITAIN Heritage Three Topics 0.23 0.09 0.11 0.77 0.86 0.31 0.04 0.26 0.12 0.02 0.25
BRITAIN RAND 2004 0.00 -0.02 0.22 0.51 0.83 0.21 0.00 0.29 0.19 0.02 0.30
BRITAIN RAND 2008 0.09 -0.01 0.15 0.72 0.76 0.34 0.00 0.21 0.17 0.03 0.26
BRITAIN RAND 2012 0.04 -0.11 0.19 0.91 0.86 0.37 0.02 0.13 0.16 0.00 0.33
BRITAIN RAND Military 0.00 -0.01 0.16 0.67 0.67 0.23 0.00 0.27 0.20 0.03 0.27
BRITAIN RAND Political 0.23 0.07 0.13 0.77 0.88 0.38 0.01 0.22 0.14 0.01 0.23
BRITAIN RAND Social -0.22 -0.30 0.33 0.56 0.89 0.28 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.00 0.44
BRITAIN RAND Three Topics 0.15 0.05 0.12 0.85 0.82 0.34 0.01 0.23 0.18 0.02 0.23
BRITAIN Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.07 0.02 0.38 0.57 0.58 0.17 0.06 0.30 0.12 0.03 0.32
BRITAIN Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.14 0.05 0.25 0.69 0.70 0.33 0.02 0.22 0.19 0.02 0.21
BRITAIN Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.10 -0.02 0.24 0.65 0.71 0.29 0.04 0.22 0.12 0.01 0.32
BRITAIN Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.10 0.02 0.29 0.64 0.66 0.27 0.04 0.24 0.14 0.02 0.28
BRITAIN Seven Think Tanks Military -0.17 -0.19 0.49 0.46 0.42 0.19 0.07 0.15 0.18 0.01 0.39
BRITAIN Seven Think Tanks Political 0.19 0.06 0.15 0.71 0.82 0.33 0.03 0.24 0.13 0.04 0.24
BRITAIN Seven Think Tanks Social 0.18 0.11 0.42 0.57 0.55 0.23 0.03 0.33 0.13 0.00 0.28
BRITAIN Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.17 0.06 0.14 0.78 0.83 0.30 0.04 0.25 0.14 0.03 0.25
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Britain? Did 
any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Britain’s actions across time 
and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Britain’s actions?  
 As Table 5-6 shows, relative to other think tanks, Brookings assigned the most 
cooperative actions to Britain, while Carnegie, RAND, and Cato assigned the most 
conflictual actions. Three think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances 
of talking about Britain. Carnegie, RAND, and Cato assigned conflictual actions to 
Britain across all seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and 
topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in relation to Britain. As 
Table 5-6 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think 
Tanks), the strategy of Britain was 100% conflictual. 
What was Britain’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy think 
tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Britain?  
 As Figure 5-2 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, Britain’s actions were most similar to actions of Japan and China and least similar 
to those of the United States and Syria. From the total of forty-four instances, Britain was 
placed thirteen times in the same quadrant as Japan and China, which shows 30% 
similarity (70% dissimilarity). Britain was placed six times in the same quadrant as the 
United States and Syria, which shows 86% dissimilarity (14% similarity).  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Britain were 
most similar to actions of Afghanistan and least similar to actions of the United States 
and Iran. From the total of eleven instances, Britain was placed five times in the same 
quadrant as Afghanistan, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other 
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hand, Britain was not placed in the same quadrant as the United States and Iran, which 
indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of Britain were most similar to political actions 
of China, Japan, Iraq, Europe, and South Korea and least similar to political actions of 
Syria, Israel, and Terrorists. From the total of eleven instances, Britain was placed four 
times in the same quadrant as China, Japan, Iraq, Europe, and South Korea, which shows 
36% similarity (64% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Britain was not placed in the same 
quadrant as Syria, Israel, and Terrorists, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of Britain were most similar to social actions of 
Terrorists and Russia and least similar to those of Syria. From the total of eleven 
instances, Britain was placed five times in the same quadrant as Russia and Terrorists, 
which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of 
Britain were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of Syria, which indicates 
100% dissimilarity.  
 Military Issues: Military actions of Britain were most similar to those of the 
Muslim World and least similar to military actions of Iran, South Korea, the United 
Nations, Europe, Iraq, and Russia. From the total of eleven instances, Britain was placed 
six times in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, which shows 55% similarity (45% 
dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of Britain were not placed in the same 
quadrant as military actions of Iran, South Korea, the United Nations, Europe, Iraq, and 
Russia, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
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China 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive China’s operational code, 
and did they agree in their assessment of China’s strategy?  
Table 5-9 shows the operational code of China on fifty-seven levels of time and 
topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to China, the overall perception of the 
American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-8 presents the number of 
times China’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction 
of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described China’s strategy as 
conflictual seven times and cooperative fifty times, which was the highest allocation of 
cooperative actions ascribed to any of the twenty-two actors. The difference between the 
Figure 5-2 Similarity of Actions of Britain to other Actors 
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frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign 
policy think tanks had a very high level of certainty about the direction of strategy of 
China. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 75% 
agreement in describing China’s strategy. This is the highest level of confidence 
expressed for actors with a cooperative strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the 
American foreign policy think tanks ranked China twenty-second based on its conflictual 
actions and first based on its cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-8 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to China 
CHINA
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
Brookings 7
Seven Think Tanks 8
Heritage 7
Cato 1 6
AEI 1 6
RAND 1 6
Carnegie 2 5
CFR 2 5
Grand Total 7 50
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Table 5-9 Operational Code of China from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
CHINA AEI 2004 0.40 0.27 0.16 0.60 0.85 0.35 0.02 0.34 0.16 0.02 0.13
CHINA AEI 2008 0.42 0.24 0.17 0.58 0.78 0.42 0.01 0.28 0.14 0.02 0.13
CHINA AEI 2012 0.20 0.03 0.17 0.80 0.83 0.39 0.01 0.21 0.15 0.01 0.25
CHINA AEI Military 0.32 0.14 0.23 0.68 0.79 0.40 0.00 0.26 0.13 0.00 0.21
CHINA AEI Political 0.22 0.12 0.11 0.78 0.76 0.36 0.02 0.23 0.22 0.03 0.15
CHINA AEI Social 0.55 0.32 0.20 0.45 0.89 0.41 0.00 0.37 0.06 0.00 0.16
CHINA AEI Three Topics 0.27 0.14 0.12 0.73 0.84 0.37 0.02 0.25 0.18 0.02 0.17
CHINA Brookings 2004 0.44 0.25 0.14 0.57 0.78 0.42 0.03 0.27 0.13 0.03 0.12
CHINA Brookings 2008 0.48 0.27 0.19 0.52 0.77 0.46 0.01 0.27 0.14 0.01 0.11
CHINA Brookings 2012 0.35 0.22 0.11 0.65 0.79 0.34 0.08 0.26 0.18 0.01 0.14
CHINA Brookings Military 0.46 0.29 0.14 0.54 0.64 0.39 0.10 0.24 0.17 0.02 0.08
CHINA Brookings Political 0.40 0.22 0.15 0.60 0.77 0.42 0.02 0.25 0.15 0.01 0.13
CHINA Brookings Social 0.43 0.23 0.16 0.57 0.91 0.41 0.01 0.30 0.11 0.02 0.16
CHINA Brookings Three Topics 0.40 0.23 0.14 0.60 0.80 0.41 0.02 0.27 0.16 0.01 0.12
CHINA Carnegie 2004 -0.04 -0.13 0.26 0.54 0.58 0.32 0.03 0.14 0.18 0.03 0.31
CHINA Carnegie 2008 0.40 0.21 0.14 0.60 0.73 0.43 0.03 0.24 0.14 0.03 0.13
CHINA Carnegie 2012 0.24 0.09 0.18 0.60 0.69 0.39 0.03 0.20 0.16 0.03 0.19
CHINA Carnegie Military -0.12 -0.18 0.29 0.45 0.63 0.26 0.02 0.16 0.18 0.02 0.36
CHINA Carnegie Political 0.35 0.16 0.16 0.65 0.58 0.46 0.04 0.18 0.18 0.02 0.12
CHINA Carnegie Social 0.42 0.22 0.14 0.58 0.87 0.40 0.03 0.28 0.11 0.03 0.15
CHINA Carnegie Three Topics 0.30 0.14 0.13 0.70 0.67 0.42 0.03 0.20 0.18 0.03 0.14
CHINA Cato 2004 0.56 0.46 0.35 0.44 0.59 0.26 0.03 0.50 0.12 0.01 0.10
CHINA Cato 2008 0.40 0.23 0.15 0.60 0.82 0.37 0.02 0.31 0.12 0.01 0.17
CHINA Cato 2012 0.13 0.02 0.12 0.87 0.68 0.35 0.08 0.14 0.22 0.02 0.20
CHINA Cato Military 0.48 0.38 0.45 0.52 0.43 0.26 0.00 0.48 0.09 0.02 0.15
CHINA Cato Political 0.24 0.15 0.11 0.76 0.77 0.35 0.03 0.24 0.22 0.01 0.15
CHINA Cato Social 0.43 0.24 0.15 0.57 0.79 0.33 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.00 0.18
CHINA Cato Three Topics 0.31 0.18 0.11 0.69 0.79 0.36 0.04 0.25 0.19 0.01 0.15
CHINA CFR 2004 0.36 0.28 0.32 0.55 0.62 0.23 0.04 0.42 0.10 0.03 0.19
CHINA CFR 2008 0.26 0.11 0.13 0.74 0.80 0.37 0.04 0.22 0.16 0.01 0.21
CHINA CFR 2012 0.05 0.02 0.10 0.78 0.84 0.25 0.05 0.23 0.21 0.01 0.25
CHINA CFR Military 0.33 0.28 0.46 0.45 0.61 0.19 0.00 0.47 0.11 0.00 0.22
CHINA CFR Political 0.29 0.15 0.11 0.71 0.75 0.39 0.04 0.22 0.18 0.02 0.15
CHINA CFR Social 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.81 0.83 0.22 0.09 0.23 0.15 0.02 0.29
CHINA CFR Three Topics 0.21 0.10 0.08 0.79 0.82 0.34 0.04 0.22 0.19 0.02 0.19
CHINA Heritage 2004 0.38 0.18 0.14 0.62 0.80 0.41 0.05 0.24 0.10 0.06 0.16
CHINA Heritage 2008 0.30 0.15 0.13 0.70 0.94 0.34 0.01 0.31 0.11 0.02 0.23
CHINA Heritage 2012 0.29 0.17 0.12 0.71 0.78 0.37 0.02 0.25 0.19 0.03 0.14
CHINA Heritage Military 0.22 0.07 0.13 0.78 0.89 0.37 0.00 0.24 0.11 0.06 0.22
CHINA Heritage Political 0.24 0.12 0.12 0.76 0.78 0.37 0.03 0.22 0.18 0.02 0.18
CHINA Heritage Social 0.55 0.35 0.16 0.45 0.88 0.37 0.04 0.37 0.07 0.02 0.13
CHINA Heritage Three Topics 0.27 0.13 0.11 0.73 0.81 0.38 0.03 0.23 0.16 0.03 0.17
CHINA RAND 2004 0.42 0.21 0.16 0.58 0.78 0.44 0.03 0.24 0.13 0.01 0.15
CHINA RAND 2008 0.44 0.24 0.16 0.56 0.87 0.41 0.02 0.29 0.12 0.02 0.15
CHINA RAND 2012 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.80 0.90 0.30 0.02 0.27 0.15 0.03 0.23
CHINA RAND Military 0.06 -0.05 0.12 0.92 0.86 0.33 0.02 0.18 0.16 0.02 0.29
CHINA RAND Political 0.36 0.20 0.13 0.64 0.82 0.39 0.02 0.26 0.16 0.01 0.15
CHINA RAND Social 0.61 0.36 0.19 0.39 0.85 0.42 0.04 0.35 0.06 0.02 0.11
CHINA RAND Three Topics 0.35 0.19 0.13 0.65 0.86 0.38 0.02 0.27 0.15 0.02 0.16
CHINA Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.36 0.22 0.22 0.56 0.71 0.34 0.03 0.31 0.13 0.03 0.16
CHINA Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.39 0.21 0.15 0.61 0.81 0.40 0.02 0.27 0.13 0.01 0.16
CHINA Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.22 0.10 0.12 0.75 0.80 0.35 0.04 0.23 0.18 0.02 0.19
CHINA Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.32 0.17 0.16 0.64 0.77 0.36 0.03 0.27 0.15 0.02 0.17
CHINA Seven Think Tanks Military 0.25 0.13 0.26 0.62 0.69 0.32 0.02 0.29 0.14 0.02 0.22
CHINA Seven Think Tanks Political 0.30 0.16 0.13 0.70 0.75 0.39 0.03 0.23 0.18 0.02 0.15
CHINA Seven Think Tanks Social 0.44 0.25 0.15 0.55 0.86 0.37 0.04 0.31 0.10 0.02 0.17
CHINA Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.30 0.16 0.12 0.70 0.80 0.38 0.03 0.24 0.17 0.02 0.16
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to China? Did 
any of the think tanks show consistency in describing China’s actions across time 
and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view China’s actions? 
 As Table 5-8 shows, relative to other think tanks, Brookings and Heritage 
assigned the most cooperative actions to China, while CFR and Carnegie assigned the 
most conflictual actions. Two think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven 
instances of talking about China. Brookings and Heritage assigned cooperative actions to 
China across the seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and 
topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in relation to China. As Table 
5-8 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the 
strategy of China was 100% cooperative. 
What was China’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy think 
tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to China?  
 As Figure 5-3 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of China were most similar to actions of Europe and least similar to actions 
of the Muslim World. From the total of forty-four instances, China was placed twenty-
eight times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 64% similarity (36% 
dissimilarity). China was not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, which 
shows 100% dissimilarity.  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of China were 
most similar to actions of Japan and Iran and least similar to actions of the Muslim 
World, Israel, Terrorists, Syria, and Iraq. From the total of eleven instances, China was 
placed seven times in the same quadrant as Japan and Iran, which shows 64% similarity 
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(36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, China was not placed in the same quadrant as the 
Muslim World, Israel, Terrorists, Syria, and Iraq, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of China were most similar to political actions of 
Europe and least similar to those of the Muslim World, Terrorists, and France. From the 
total of eleven instances, China was placed nine times in the same quadrant as Europe, 
which shows 82% similarity (18% dissimilarity). On the other hand, China was not 
placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, Terrorists, and France, which indicates 
100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of China were most similar to social actions of 
Europe and least similar to social actions of the Muslim World, Pakistan, France, and 
Afghanistan. From the total of eleven instances, China was placed ten times in the same 
quadrant as Europe, which shows 91% similarity (9% dissimilarity). On the other hand, 
social actions of China were not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, 
Pakistan, France, and Afghanistan, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Military Issues: Military actions of China were most similar to military actions of 
South Korea and France and least similar to military actions of Syria and the Muslim 
World. From the total of eleven instances, China was placed seven times in the same 
quadrant as South Korea and France, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). 
On the other hand, military actions of China were not placed in the same quadrant as 
Syria and the Muslim World, which indicates 100% dissimilarity. 
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Figure 5-3 Similarity of Actions of China to other Actors 
Europe 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Europe’s operational 
code, and did they agree in their assessment of Europe’s actions?  
Table 5-11 shows the operational code of Europe on fifty-seven levels of time and 
topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Europe, the overall perception of 
the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-10 presents the number 
of times Europe’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of the 
direction of strategy on each of the seven levels. As Table 5-10 shows, the direction of 
strategy of Europe was conflictual eleven times and cooperative forty-six times, which is 
among the highest allocations of cooperative actions for any of the twenty-two actors. 
The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that 
the American foreign policy think tanks had a high level of certainty about the direction 
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of strategy of Europe. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks 
had 61% agreement in describing the direction of strategy of Europe. This was the third 
highest level of confidence expressed for actors with a cooperative strategy. Among the 
twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Europe nineteenth 
based on its conflictual actions and third based on its cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-10 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Europe 
EUROPE
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
Brookings 7
Seven Think Tanks 8
RAND 7
CFR 1 6
Carnegie 2 5
Heritage 2 5
Cato 3 4
AEI 3 4
Grand Total 11 46
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Table 5-11 Operational Code of Europe from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
EUROPE AEI 2004 0.24 0.10 0.12 0.77 0.78 0.38 0.03 0.21 0.18 0.03 0.18
EUROPE AEI 2008 0.27 0.14 0.11 0.73 0.73 0.37 0.05 0.22 0.19 0.03 0.15
EUROPE AEI 2012 0.03 -0.08 0.12 0.94 0.86 0.28 0.04 0.20 0.14 0.02 0.33
EUROPE AEI Military 0.03 -0.01 0.11 0.92 0.73 0.27 0.01 0.24 0.21 0.01 0.26
EUROPE AEI Political 0.26 0.10 0.12 0.74 0.78 0.39 0.04 0.20 0.15 0.03 0.19
EUROPE AEI Social 0.18 0.05 0.11 0.82 0.82 0.34 0.06 0.19 0.16 0.03 0.22
EUROPE AEI Three Topics 0.24 0.08 0.12 0.76 0.80 0.38 0.04 0.20 0.16 0.02 0.21
EUROPE Brookings 2004 0.49 0.30 0.22 0.52 0.63 0.48 0.00 0.27 0.19 0.02 0.05
EUROPE Brookings 2008 0.45 0.22 0.19 0.55 0.66 0.45 0.04 0.24 0.12 0.01 0.16
EUROPE Brookings 2012 0.33 0.11 0.17 0.67 0.72 0.46 0.03 0.18 0.12 0.04 0.18
EUROPE Brookings Military 0.39 0.20 0.17 0.61 0.76 0.39 0.02 0.29 0.09 0.03 0.18
EUROPE Brookings Political 0.31 0.15 0.17 0.69 0.60 0.45 0.01 0.19 0.21 0.03 0.11
EUROPE Brookings Social 0.62 0.31 0.26 0.38 0.69 0.53 0.04 0.24 0.09 0.00 0.10
EUROPE Brookings Three Topics 0.37 0.17 0.16 0.63 0.64 0.46 0.03 0.20 0.17 0.02 0.12
EUROPE Carnegie 2004 -0.07 -0.01 0.12 0.72 0.73 0.24 0.02 0.21 0.30 0.08 0.16
EUROPE Carnegie 2008 0.60 0.33 0.24 0.40 0.73 0.51 0.02 0.27 0.10 0.01 0.09
EUROPE Carnegie 2012 0.31 0.17 0.17 0.57 0.70 0.41 0.03 0.22 0.18 0.04 0.13
EUROPE Carnegie Military 0.12 0.07 0.13 0.54 0.78 0.30 0.03 0.23 0.19 0.09 0.16
EUROPE Carnegie Political 0.40 0.21 0.17 0.60 0.60 0.47 0.03 0.21 0.19 0.02 0.09
EUROPE Carnegie Social 0.35 0.18 0.22 0.52 0.79 0.42 0.01 0.24 0.17 0.00 0.15
EUROPE Carnegie Three Topics 0.36 0.20 0.16 0.64 0.64 0.44 0.03 0.21 0.19 0.02 0.10
EUROPE Cato 2004 0.27 0.12 0.13 0.73 0.81 0.40 0.01 0.23 0.17 0.02 0.18
EUROPE Cato 2008 0.08 0.10 0.14 0.85 0.75 0.27 0.01 0.25 0.30 0.04 0.12
EUROPE Cato 2012 0.35 0.11 0.26 0.65 0.51 0.54 0.01 0.12 0.18 0.01 0.13
EUROPE Cato Military 0.29 0.07 0.23 0.71 0.63 0.50 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.17
EUROPE Cato Political 0.20 0.08 0.11 0.80 0.78 0.38 0.02 0.20 0.19 0.03 0.18
EUROPE Cato Social 0.20 0.19 0.25 0.70 0.61 0.35 0.00 0.25 0.34 0.00 0.06
EUROPE Cato Three Topics 0.24 0.11 0.12 0.76 0.74 0.39 0.02 0.21 0.20 0.03 0.16
EUROPE CFR 2004 0.40 0.23 0.32 0.60 0.33 0.55 0.00 0.15 0.28 0.01 0.01
EUROPE CFR 2008 0.32 0.04 0.35 0.63 0.64 0.53 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.05 0.20
EUROPE CFR 2012 0.43 0.29 0.17 0.57 0.73 0.33 0.05 0.34 0.13 0.01 0.15
EUROPE CFR Military 0.82 0.43 0.49 0.18 0.52 0.61 0.04 0.26 0.06 0.00 0.04
EUROPE CFR Political 0.33 0.13 0.19 0.67 0.67 0.46 0.01 0.19 0.16 0.02 0.15
EUROPE CFR Social 0.09 0.03 0.28 0.84 0.43 0.36 0.00 0.18 0.25 0.04 0.16
EUROPE CFR Three Topics 0.30 0.14 0.17 0.70 0.64 0.44 0.02 0.19 0.20 0.02 0.13
EUROPE Heritage 2004 0.38 0.21 0.20 0.62 0.76 0.41 0.03 0.26 0.17 0.01 0.14
EUROPE Heritage 2008 0.10 0.00 0.12 0.80 0.51 0.40 0.05 0.11 0.24 0.07 0.15
EUROPE Heritage 2012 0.45 0.11 0.40 0.55 0.60 0.60 0.01 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.18
EUROPE Heritage Military 0.10 -0.02 0.15 0.90 0.77 0.36 0.03 0.16 0.19 0.02 0.24
EUROPE Heritage Political 0.35 0.17 0.15 0.65 0.68 0.44 0.03 0.21 0.18 0.01 0.14
EUROPE Heritage Social 0.53 0.18 0.51 0.33 0.33 0.66 0.02 0.09 0.11 0.04 0.08
EUROPE Heritage Three Topics 0.26 0.10 0.14 0.74 0.70 0.42 0.03 0.19 0.18 0.02 0.16
EUROPE RAND 2004 0.53 0.39 0.21 0.47 0.79 0.37 0.02 0.38 0.16 0.01 0.08
EUROPE RAND 2008 0.53 0.24 0.24 0.47 0.67 0.53 0.02 0.22 0.09 0.03 0.12
EUROPE RAND 2012 0.67 0.39 0.25 0.33 0.82 0.48 0.03 0.33 0.07 0.01 0.09
EUROPE RAND Military 0.50 0.24 0.25 0.50 0.66 0.53 0.00 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.11
EUROPE RAND Political 0.60 0.38 0.19 0.40 0.79 0.44 0.04 0.33 0.12 0.01 0.07
EUROPE RAND Social 0.64 0.39 0.29 0.36 0.82 0.42 0.01 0.38 0.04 0.03 0.11
EUROPE RAND Three Topics 0.57 0.34 0.20 0.43 0.77 0.46 0.03 0.30 0.12 0.01 0.08
EUROPE Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.32 0.19 0.19 0.63 0.69 0.40 0.01 0.24 0.21 0.02 0.11
EUROPE Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.33 0.15 0.20 0.63 0.67 0.44 0.03 0.20 0.16 0.03 0.14
EUROPE Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.38 0.16 0.22 0.62 0.70 0.45 0.03 0.21 0.13 0.01 0.17
EUROPE Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.34 0.17 0.20 0.63 0.68 0.43 0.02 0.22 0.16 0.02 0.14
EUROPE Seven Think Tanks Military 0.32 0.14 0.22 0.62 0.69 0.42 0.02 0.22 0.15 0.03 0.17
EUROPE Seven Think Tanks Political 0.35 0.17 0.16 0.65 0.70 0.43 0.03 0.22 0.17 0.02 0.13
EUROPE Seven Think Tanks Social 0.37 0.19 0.27 0.57 0.64 0.44 0.02 0.23 0.17 0.02 0.13
EUROPE Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.33 0.16 0.15 0.67 0.70 0.43 0.03 0.21 0.17 0.02 0.14
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Europe? Did 
any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Europe’s actions across time 
and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Europe’s actions?  
As Table 5-10 shows, relative to other think tanks, AEI and Cato assigned the 
most conflictual actions to Europe, while Brookings and RAND assigned the most 
cooperative actions. Two think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances 
of talking about Europe. Brookings and RAND assigned cooperative actions to Europe 
across all seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might 
be a manifestation of an organizational identity in relation to Europe. As Table 5-10 
shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the 
strategy of Europe was 100% cooperative.  
What was Europe’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy think 
tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Europe?  
 As Figure 5-4 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of Europe were most similar to actions of China and least similar to those 
of the Muslim World. From the total of forty-four instances, Europe was placed twenty-
eight times in the same quadrant as China, which shows 64% similarity (36% 
dissimilarity). Europe was not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, which 
shows 100% dissimilarity.  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Europe were 
most similar to actions of the United Nations and South Korea and least similar to those 
of the Muslim World, Israel, Terrorists, and Iraq. From the total of eleven instances, 
Europe was placed nine times in the same quadrant as the United Nations and South 
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Korea, which shows 82% similarity (18% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Europe was 
not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, Israel, Terrorists, and Iraq, which 
indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of Europe were most similar to political actions 
of China and least similar to those of the Muslim World, Israel, Terrorists, and Syria. 
From the total of eleven instances, Europe was placed nine times in the same quadrant as 
China, which shows 82% similarity (18% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Europe was 
not placed in the same quadrant as Israel, the Muslim World, Terrorists, and Syria which 
indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of Europe were most similar to social actions of 
China and least similar to those of France, the Muslim World, and Afghanistan. From the 
total of eleven instances, Europe was placed ten times in the same quadrant as China, 
which shows 91% similarity (9% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of 
Europe were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of Afghanistan, the 
Muslim World, and France, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Military Issues: Military actions of Europe were most similar to military actions 
of France and least similar to those of the Muslim World, Israel, Terrorists, Britain, and 
Turkey. From the total of eleven instances, Europe was placed eight times in the same 
quadrant as France, which shows 73% similarity (27% dissimilarity). On the other hand, 
military actions of Europe were not placed in the same quadrant as those of the Muslim 
World, Israel, Terrorists, Britain, and Turkey, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
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Figure 5-4 Similarity of Actions of Europe to other Actors 
France 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive France’s operational 
code, and did they agree in their assessment of France’s actions?  
Table 5-13 shows the operational code of France on fifty-seven levels of time and 
topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to France, the overall perception of 
the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-12 presents the number 
of times France’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of 
direction of strategy on each of the seven levels. As Table 5-12 shows, France’s strategy 
was twenty-one times conflictual and thirty-six times cooperative. The difference 
between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American 
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foreign policy think tanks had a medium level of certainty about the direction of strategy 
of France. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 26% 
agreement in describing the direction of strategy of France. Among the twenty-two 
actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked France fourteenth based on its 
conflictual actions and ninth based on its cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-12 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to France 
FRANCE
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
RAND 7
Carnegie 1 6
Brookings 1 6
Heritage 2 5
Seven Think Tanks 2 6
Cato 5 2
CFR 5 2
AEI 5 2
Grand Total 21 36
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Table 5-13 Operational Code of France from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
FRANCE AEI 2004 0.19 -0.03 0.28 0.65 0.70 0.42 0.00 0.18 0.05 0.09 0.26
FRANCE AEI 2008 0.33 0.13 0.18 0.67 0.83 0.40 0.00 0.27 0.11 0.00 0.23
FRANCE AEI 2012 -0.05 -0.27 0.35 0.70 0.74 0.41 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.42
FRANCE AEI Military 0.50 0.06 0.45 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.25
FRANCE AEI Political 0.17 -0.02 0.20 0.83 0.77 0.45 0.00 0.14 0.17 0.00 0.25
FRANCE AEI Social -0.20 -0.21 0.24 0.58 0.71 0.11 0.07 0.22 0.07 0.11 0.42
FRANCE AEI Three Topics 0.15 -0.04 0.18 0.77 0.87 0.41 0.02 0.15 0.12 0.01 0.29
FRANCE Brookings 2004 0.61 0.22 0.41 0.40 0.45 0.64 0.06 0.11 0.07 0.01 0.11
FRANCE Brookings 2008 0.53 0.22 0.38 0.47 0.39 0.60 0.03 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.06
FRANCE Brookings 2012 0.16 0.19 0.25 0.84 0.81 0.26 0.01 0.32 0.29 0.02 0.11
FRANCE Brookings Military 0.43 0.27 0.23 0.57 0.70 0.36 0.07 0.28 0.12 0.07 0.10
FRANCE Brookings Political 0.33 0.10 0.20 0.67 0.55 0.51 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.05 0.14
FRANCE Brookings Social 0.67 0.33 0.80 0.33 0.33 0.67 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00
FRANCE Brookings Three Topics 0.31 0.12 0.16 0.69 0.60 0.46 0.03 0.17 0.18 0.03 0.13
FRANCE Carnegie 2004 0.21 -0.12 0.75 0.29 0.06 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.28
FRANCE Carnegie 2008 0.63 0.40 0.23 0.37 0.89 0.39 0.03 0.40 0.06 0.00 0.13
FRANCE Carnegie 2012 0.40 0.15 0.37 0.43 0.59 0.46 0.03 0.22 0.09 0.00 0.20
FRANCE Carnegie Military 0.13 -0.03 0.49 0.21 0.64 0.24 0.05 0.27 0.03 0.00 0.41
FRANCE Carnegie Political 0.56 0.23 0.41 0.44 0.52 0.59 0.03 0.16 0.11 0.00 0.11
FRANCE Carnegie Social 0.48 0.23 0.32 0.52 0.51 0.48 0.00 0.26 0.11 0.00 0.15
FRANCE Carnegie Three Topics 0.45 0.19 0.26 0.55 0.67 0.51 0.02 0.19 0.13 0.01 0.14
FRANCE Cato 2004 0.02 0.08 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.27 0.00 0.24 0.36 0.00 0.14
FRANCE Cato 2008 0.01 -0.04 0.39 0.49 0.46 0.29 0.00 0.22 0.09 0.27 0.14
FRANCE Cato 2012 0.00 0.11 0.36 0.78 0.45 0.17 0.00 0.33 0.17 0.33 0.00
FRANCE Cato Military 0.28 0.35 0.32 0.72 0.56 0.08 0.00 0.56 0.19 0.00 0.17
FRANCE Cato Political 0.26 0.04 0.36 0.52 0.45 0.50 0.00 0.13 0.06 0.22 0.09
FRANCE Cato Social -1.00 -0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00
FRANCE Cato Three Topics 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.84 0.72 0.33 0.00 0.26 0.18 0.13 0.10
FRANCE CFR 2004 0.18 -0.06 0.19 0.82 0.65 0.47 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.00 0.27
FRANCE CFR 2008 0.21 0.03 0.52 0.46 0.18 0.58 0.01 0.01 0.32 0.00 0.08
FRANCE CFR 2012 0.15 -0.04 0.12 0.71 0.90 0.26 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.10 0.32
FRANCE CFR Military 0.53 0.25 0.33 0.47 0.45 0.49 0.11 0.17 0.13 0.00 0.11
FRANCE CFR Political -0.18 -0.24 0.23 0.65 0.61 0.33 0.05 0.02 0.24 0.07 0.28
FRANCE CFR Social 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FRANCE CFR Three Topics 0.04 -0.08 0.15 0.90 0.67 0.36 0.08 0.08 0.20 0.03 0.25
FRANCE Heritage 2004 0.66 0.44 0.44 0.35 0.54 0.44 0.12 0.27 0.17 0.00 0.00
FRANCE Heritage 2008 0.35 0.20 0.37 0.58 0.56 0.44 0.00 0.23 0.21 0.03 0.09
FRANCE Heritage 2012 0.06 0.07 0.16 0.69 0.76 0.18 0.07 0.27 0.23 0.00 0.23
FRANCE Heritage Military 0.00 0.10 0.22 0.78 0.83 0.14 0.06 0.31 0.30 0.03 0.17
FRANCE Heritage Political 0.47 0.40 0.23 0.43 0.64 0.25 0.11 0.37 0.20 0.00 0.06
FRANCE Heritage Social 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FRANCE Heritage Three Topics 0.26 0.20 0.12 0.71 0.77 0.30 0.06 0.27 0.23 0.01 0.13
FRANCE RAND 2004 0.64 0.35 0.45 0.36 0.58 0.53 0.00 0.29 0.09 0.00 0.09
FRANCE RAND 2008 0.37 0.10 0.31 0.63 0.38 0.56 0.06 0.06 0.18 0.00 0.13
FRANCE RAND 2012 0.50 0.31 0.55 0.50 0.00 0.33 0.42 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00
FRANCE RAND Military 0.25 0.00 0.48 0.75 0.25 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.13
FRANCE RAND Political 0.59 0.41 0.46 0.41 0.36 0.24 0.37 0.18 0.16 0.00 0.05
FRANCE RAND Social 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FRANCE RAND Three Topics 0.43 0.23 0.21 0.57 0.44 0.44 0.11 0.17 0.20 0.00 0.09
FRANCE Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.36 0.13 0.44 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.03 0.17 0.15 0.02 0.16
FRANCE Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.35 0.15 0.34 0.52 0.53 0.46 0.02 0.19 0.15 0.06 0.12
FRANCE Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.17 0.07 0.27 0.70 0.65 0.29 0.10 0.19 0.17 0.06 0.19
FRANCE Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.29 0.12 0.35 0.55 0.55 0.41 0.05 0.18 0.15 0.04 0.16
FRANCE Seven Think Tanks Military 0.29 0.14 0.36 0.57 0.61 0.35 0.04 0.25 0.14 0.01 0.20
FRANCE Seven Think Tanks Political 0.31 0.13 0.30 0.57 0.56 0.41 0.08 0.16 0.16 0.05 0.14
FRANCE Seven Think Tanks Social 0.32 0.09 0.67 0.29 0.31 0.52 0.01 0.13 0.14 0.09 0.11
FRANCE Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.26 0.10 0.17 0.72 0.67 0.40 0.05 0.18 0.18 0.03 0.16
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to France? Did 
any of the think tanks show consistency in describing France’s actions across time 
and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view France’s actions?  
 As Table 5-12 shows, relative to other think tanks, AEI, CFR, and Cato assigned 
the most conflictual actions to France, while RAND assigned the most cooperative 
actions. One think tank showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking 
about France. RAND assigned cooperative actions to France across the seven instances. 
This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an 
organizational identity in relation to France. As Table 5-12 shows, and according to the 
collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of France was 75% 
cooperative.  
What was France’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy think 
tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to France?  
 As Figure 5-5 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of France were most similar to actions of the United Nations and least 
similar to actions of India, Terrorists, Syria, and North Korea. From the total of forty-four 
instances, France was placed twenty-one times in the same quadrant as the United 
Nations, which shows 48% similarity (52% dissimilarity). France was placed four times 
in the same quadrant as India, Terrorists, Syria, and North Korea, which shows 91% 
dissimilarity (9% similarity).  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of France were 
most similar to actions of the United Nations and least similar to those of India. From the 
total of eleven instances, France was placed seven times in the same quadrant as the 
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United Nations, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, 
France was not placed in the same quadrant as India, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of France were most similar to political actions 
of Turkey and least similar to those of Terrorists, North Korea, Afghanistan, and China. 
From the total of eleven instances, France was placed seven times in the same quadrant as 
Turkey, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, France was 
not placed in the same quadrant as Terrorists, North Korea, Afghanistan, and China, 
which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of France were most similar to those of the Muslim 
World and Afghanistan and least similar to social actions of Russia, China, the United 
States, Europe, and South Korea. From the total of eleven instances, France was placed 
six times in the same quadrant as the Muslim World and Afghanistan, which shows 55% 
similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of France were not 
placed in the same quadrant as those of Russia, China, the United States, Europe, and 
South Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Military Issues: Military actions of France were most similar to military actions of 
Europe and least similar to those of India, Terrorists, Syria, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Israel, the United States, the Muslim World, Turkey, and Germany. From 
the total of eleven instances, France was placed eight times in the same quadrant as 
Europe, which shows 73% similarity (27% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military 
actions of France was placed once in the same quadrant as India, Terrorists, Syria, North 
Korea, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan, Israel, the United States, the Muslim World, Turkey, and 
Germany, which indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).  
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Figure 5-5 Similarity of Actions of France to other Actors 
Germany 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Germany’s operational 
code, and did they agree in their assessment of Germany’s actions?  
Table 5-15 shows the operational code of Germany on fifty-seven levels of time 
and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Germany, the overall 
perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was neither cooperative nor 
conflictual. Table 5-14 presents the number of times Germany’s index of direction of 
strategy was above or below the average of direction of strategy on each of the seven 
levels. As Table 5-14 shows, the direction of strategy of Germany was conflictual 
twenty-nine times and cooperative twenty-eight times. The small difference between the 
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frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that American foreign policy 
think tanks had a very low level of certainty about the direction of strategy of Germany. 
As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 2% agreement in 
describing the direction of strategy of Germany. Among the twenty-two actors, the 
American foreign policy think tanks ranked Germany eighth based on its conflictual 
actions and fifteenth based on its cooperative actions. 
  
Table 5-14 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Germany 
 
GERMANY
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
Brookings 1 6
Cato 2 5
Carnegie 2 5
RAND 3 4
AEI 4 3
Seven Think Tanks 5 3
Heritage 5 2
CFR 7
Grand Total 29 28
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Table 5-15 Operational Code of Germany from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
  
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
GERMANY AEI 2004 0.40 0.33 0.20 0.60 0.75 0.24 0.15 0.32 0.16 0.08 0.06
GERMANY AEI 2008 -0.02 0.00 0.21 0.98 0.48 0.18 0.08 0.23 0.25 0.00 0.27
GERMANY AEI 2012 0.24 0.10 0.13 0.76 0.84 0.33 0.02 0.27 0.12 0.00 0.26
GERMANY AEI Military 0.00 0.05 0.12 1.00 0.63 0.19 0.13 0.19 0.25 0.13 0.13
GERMANY AEI Political 0.18 0.13 0.17 0.82 0.66 0.35 0.03 0.21 0.29 0.00 0.12
GERMANY AEI Social 0.44 0.31 0.33 0.56 0.56 0.11 0.17 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.28
GERMANY AEI Three Topics 0.13 0.06 0.08 0.82 0.84 0.30 0.05 0.21 0.21 0.02 0.21
GERMANY Brookings 2004 0.31 0.25 0.40 0.69 0.31 0.30 0.00 0.35 0.13 0.17 0.05
GERMANY Brookings 2008 0.65 0.53 0.47 0.35 0.45 0.31 0.00 0.51 0.13 0.00 0.05
GERMANY Brookings 2012 0.46 0.14 0.43 0.55 0.48 0.61 0.00 0.12 0.14 0.01 0.13
GERMANY Brookings Military 1.00 0.78 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
GERMANY Brookings Political 0.28 0.15 0.16 0.72 0.68 0.43 0.00 0.21 0.22 0.02 0.12
GERMANY Brookings Social 0.00 -0.17 0.40 1.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00
GERMANY Brookings Three Topics 0.24 0.13 0.14 0.77 0.67 0.40 0.00 0.22 0.22 0.05 0.12
GERMANY Carnegie 2004 0.57 0.18 0.39 0.43 0.85 0.58 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.22
GERMANY Carnegie 2008 0.08 0.16 0.43 0.42 0.69 0.08 0.00 0.46 0.13 0.14 0.20
GERMANY Carnegie 2012 0.22 0.11 0.32 0.54 0.74 0.31 0.01 0.29 0.12 0.05 0.21
GERMANY Carnegie Military -0.62 -0.57 0.28 0.39 0.89 0.16 0.04 0.00 0.12 0.25 0.44
GERMANY Carnegie Political 0.30 0.12 0.27 0.70 0.77 0.42 0.00 0.22 0.15 0.01 0.19
GERMANY Carnegie Social 0.64 0.55 0.51 0.31 0.59 0.22 0.00 0.60 0.08 0.00 0.10
GERMANY Carnegie Three Topics 0.29 0.13 0.20 0.71 0.77 0.40 0.01 0.25 0.15 0.02 0.19
GERMANY Cato 2004 0.02 -0.02 0.14 0.86 0.80 0.30 0.00 0.21 0.23 0.04 0.23
GERMANY Cato 2008 0.25 0.06 0.69 0.25 0.31 0.28 0.00 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.38
GERMANY Cato 2012 0.48 0.14 0.50 0.52 0.40 0.52 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.26
GERMANY Cato Military -0.33 -0.33 0.51 0.67 0.22 0.11 0.00 0.22 0.11 0.00 0.56
GERMANY Cato Political 0.43 0.03 0.38 0.57 0.70 0.60 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.29
GERMANY Cato Social 0.58 0.43 0.70 0.25 0.25 0.38 0.00 0.42 0.13 0.04 0.04
GERMANY Cato Three Topics 0.32 0.12 0.17 0.68 0.84 0.37 0.00 0.29 0.07 0.01 0.26
GERMANY CFR 2004 -0.08 -0.04 0.62 0.33 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.08 0.44 0.00 0.11
GERMANY CFR 2008 0.13 -0.16 0.59 0.38 0.38 0.46 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.38
GERMANY CFR 2012 0.14 -0.01 0.28 0.36 0.72 0.32 0.14 0.12 0.17 0.00 0.27
GERMANY CFR Military -0.33 -0.45 0.80 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.50
GERMANY CFR Political 0.05 0.00 0.21 0.61 0.87 0.30 0.00 0.23 0.19 0.06 0.23
GERMANY CFR Social 0.33 0.17 0.80 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.17 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00
GERMANY CFR Three Topics 0.19 0.00 0.17 0.81 0.76 0.40 0.02 0.17 0.12 0.03 0.26
GERMANY Heritage 2004 -0.08 -0.20 0.24 0.58 0.78 0.31 0.13 0.03 0.18 0.00 0.36
GERMANY Heritage 2008 0.62 0.39 0.60 0.38 0.25 0.48 0.00 0.33 0.14 0.00 0.05
GERMANY Heritage 2012 -0.37 -0.25 0.29 0.63 0.34 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.03 0.17
GERMANY Heritage Military -0.11 -0.15 0.62 0.22 0.33 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.00 0.17
GERMANY Heritage Political 0.00 -0.11 0.20 0.78 0.63 0.41 0.03 0.06 0.25 0.00 0.25
GERMANY Heritage Social 0.67 0.50 0.60 0.34 0.34 0.17 0.17 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.17
GERMANY Heritage Three Topics 0.02 -0.06 0.18 0.68 0.53 0.39 0.03 0.08 0.28 0.03 0.18
GERMANY RAND 2004 0.38 0.32 0.42 0.62 0.53 0.18 0.00 0.51 0.09 0.00 0.22
GERMANY RAND 2008 0.12 -0.06 0.37 0.38 0.65 0.31 0.04 0.22 0.03 0.05 0.36
GERMANY RAND 2012 -0.02 -0.13 0.21 0.71 0.73 0.34 0.00 0.15 0.18 0.01 0.33
GERMANY RAND Military 0.30 0.31 0.45 0.41 0.52 0.11 0.00 0.54 0.10 0.06 0.20
GERMANY RAND Political 0.35 0.13 0.18 0.65 0.78 0.43 0.02 0.23 0.11 0.00 0.22
GERMANY RAND Social -0.60 -0.67 0.62 0.40 0.40 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.70
GERMANY RAND Three Topics 0.27 0.07 0.14 0.73 0.81 0.38 0.02 0.23 0.09 0.02 0.25
GERMANY Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.20 0.11 0.34 0.59 0.62 0.32 0.04 0.24 0.19 0.04 0.17
GERMANY Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.25 0.12 0.48 0.45 0.46 0.30 0.02 0.30 0.09 0.04 0.25
GERMANY Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.15 0.00 0.28 0.60 0.61 0.39 0.03 0.16 0.18 0.01 0.24
GERMANY Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.20 0.08 0.37 0.55 0.56 0.34 0.03 0.23 0.15 0.03 0.22
GERMANY Seven Think Tanks Military 0.02 -0.03 0.58 0.35 0.38 0.25 0.02 0.25 0.16 0.05 0.28
GERMANY Seven Think Tanks Political 0.23 0.06 0.22 0.69 0.73 0.42 0.01 0.18 0.17 0.01 0.20
GERMANY Seven Think Tanks Social 0.36 0.23 0.58 0.34 0.33 0.28 0.08 0.32 0.11 0.04 0.18
GERMANY Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.21 0.07 0.16 0.74 0.74 0.38 0.02 0.21 0.16 0.03 0.21
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Germany? 
Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Germany’s actions across 
time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Germany’s actions?  
 As Table 5-14 shows, relative to other think tanks, CFR assigned the most 
conflictual actions to Germany, while Brookings assigned the most cooperative actions. 
One think tank showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about 
Germany. CFR assigned conflictual actions to Germany across the seven instances. This 
level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an 
organizational identity in relation to Germany. As Table 5-14 shows, and according to the 
collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Germany was 63% 
conflictual.  
What was Germany’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy think 
tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Germany?  
 As Figure 5-6 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of Germany were most similar to actions of the Muslim World and least 
similar to those of Syria and Terrorists. From the total of forty-four instances, Germany 
was placed sixteen times in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, which shows 36% 
similarity (64% dissimilarity). Germany was placed five times in the same quadrant as 
Syria and Terrorists, which shows 89% dissimilarity (11% similarity).  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Germany 
were most similar to actions of Pakistan and least similar to those of Syria. From the total 
of eleven instances, Germany was placed five times in the same quadrant as Pakistan, 
which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Germany was placed 
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only once in the same quadrant as Syria which indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% 
similarity).  
 Political Issues: Political actions of Germany were most similar to political 
actions of Europe and the United Nations and least similar to those of Syria and 
Terrorists. From the total of eleven instances, Germany was placed five times in the same 
quadrant as Europe and the United Nations, which shows 45% similarity (55% 
dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, Germany was not 
placed in the same quadrant as Syria and Terrorists, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of Germany were most similar to social actions of 
France, South Korea, and the Muslim World and least similar to social actions of India. 
From the total of eleven instances, Germany was placed five times in the same quadrant 
as France, South Korea, and the Muslim World, which shows 45% similarity (55% 
dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Germany were not placed in the same 
quadrant as social actions of India, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Military Issues: Military actions of Germany were most similar to military actions 
of the Muslim World and least similar to military actions of Terrorists. From the total of 
eleven instances, Germany was placed six times in the same quadrant as the Muslim 
World, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military 
actions of Germany were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of 
Terrorists, which indicates 100% dissimilarity. 
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Figure 5-6 Similarity of Actions of Germany to other Actors 
India 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive India’s operational code, 
and did they agree in their assessment of India’s actions?  
Table 5-17 shows the operational code of India on fifty-seven levels of time and 
topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to India, the overall perception of the 
American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-16 presents the number of 
times India’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction 
of strategy on each of the seven levels. As Table 5-16 shows, the direction of strategy of 
India was conflictual eighteen times and cooperative thirty-nine times. The difference 
between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American 
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foreign policy think tanks had a medium level of certainty about the direction of strategy 
of India. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 37% 
agreement in describing the direction of strategy of India. Among the twenty-two actors, 
the American foreign policy think tanks ranked India fifteenth based on its conflictual 
actions and eighths based on its cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-16 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to India 
INDIA
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
Brookings 7
Cato 1 6
Seven Think Tanks 1 7
RAND 2 5
Heritage 2 5
Carnegie 3 4
AEI 4 3
CFR 5 2
Grand Total 18 39
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Table 5-17 Operational Code of India from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
INDIA AEI 2004 0.37 0.30 0.09 0.64 0.85 0.26 0.11 0.32 0.21 0.00 0.11
INDIA AEI 2008 0.06 -0.13 0.22 0.84 0.93 0.41 0.01 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.35
INDIA AEI 2012 0.03 -0.10 0.16 0.76 0.91 0.34 0.03 0.15 0.14 0.01 0.34
INDIA AEI Military -0.22 -0.43 0.36 0.79 0.93 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.54
INDIA AEI Political 0.26 0.15 0.10 0.74 0.92 0.32 0.05 0.26 0.17 0.01 0.19
INDIA AEI Social 0.03 -0.14 0.17 0.78 0.84 0.39 0.03 0.10 0.17 0.00 0.33
INDIA AEI Three Topics 0.23 0.11 0.10 0.77 0.91 0.32 0.05 0.24 0.17 0.00 0.21
INDIA Brookings 2004 0.47 0.29 0.23 0.53 0.73 0.44 0.00 0.30 0.14 0.06 0.07
INDIA Brookings 2008 0.37 0.13 0.23 0.64 0.83 0.47 0.01 0.21 0.11 0.01 0.21
INDIA Brookings 2012 0.27 0.09 0.16 0.74 0.88 0.42 0.00 0.22 0.13 0.02 0.22
INDIA Brookings Military 0.18 0.01 0.24 0.82 0.76 0.44 0.00 0.15 0.18 0.00 0.22
INDIA Brookings Political 0.29 0.10 0.16 0.71 0.73 0.44 0.00 0.20 0.14 0.05 0.17
INDIA Brookings Social 0.73 0.46 0.28 0.28 0.96 0.46 0.00 0.40 0.04 0.02 0.08
INDIA Brookings Three Topics 0.27 0.10 0.14 0.73 0.81 0.42 0.00 0.22 0.14 0.04 0.19
INDIA Carnegie 2004 0.22 0.09 0.24 0.78 0.54 0.29 0.00 0.32 0.11 0.00 0.29
INDIA Carnegie 2008 0.28 0.15 0.11 0.66 0.83 0.27 0.16 0.21 0.16 0.00 0.20
INDIA Carnegie 2012 0.28 0.14 0.15 0.70 0.73 0.33 0.07 0.24 0.15 0.00 0.21
INDIA Carnegie Military 0.09 0.02 0.18 0.91 0.56 0.18 0.08 0.28 0.13 0.00 0.33
INDIA Carnegie Political 0.17 0.05 0.14 0.75 0.78 0.39 0.02 0.19 0.20 0.01 0.21
INDIA Carnegie Social 0.78 0.49 0.19 0.23 0.70 0.40 0.19 0.30 0.06 0.00 0.05
INDIA Carnegie Three Topics 0.24 0.11 0.12 0.76 0.87 0.36 0.03 0.23 0.17 0.00 0.21
INDIA Cato 2004 0.49 0.26 0.23 0.51 0.72 0.34 0.00 0.40 0.01 0.00 0.25
INDIA Cato 2008 0.55 0.30 0.31 0.45 0.77 0.41 0.07 0.30 0.06 0.00 0.17
INDIA Cato 2012 0.28 0.19 0.24 0.72 0.68 0.24 0.00 0.40 0.11 0.02 0.24
INDIA Cato Military 0.00 -0.21 0.25 1.00 0.75 0.25 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.50
INDIA Cato Political 0.37 0.21 0.21 0.63 0.66 0.35 0.00 0.33 0.12 0.01 0.19
INDIA Cato Social 0.85 0.61 0.41 0.15 0.69 0.34 0.00 0.58 0.00 0.00 0.08
INDIA Cato Three Topics 0.38 0.23 0.16 0.62 0.79 0.34 0.01 0.35 0.11 0.01 0.19
INDIA CFR 2004 -0.04 -0.23 0.24 0.96 0.91 0.42 0.00 0.06 0.13 0.00 0.39
INDIA CFR 2008 0.03 0.09 0.24 0.78 0.51 0.20 0.00 0.32 0.29 0.01 0.19
INDIA CFR 2012 0.42 0.41 0.34 0.58 0.68 0.18 0.00 0.53 0.15 0.03 0.10
INDIA CFR Military 0.29 0.21 0.52 0.62 0.52 0.26 0.00 0.38 0.14 0.00 0.21
INDIA CFR Political 0.03 0.01 0.14 0.82 0.82 0.29 0.00 0.22 0.26 0.01 0.21
INDIA CFR Social 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.70 0.45 0.11 0.00 0.54 0.11 0.06 0.18
INDIA CFR Three Topics 0.04 0.01 0.14 0.87 0.85 0.30 0.00 0.22 0.24 0.02 0.23
INDIA Heritage 2004 0.21 0.07 0.35 0.79 0.17 0.56 0.00 0.04 0.35 0.00 0.04
INDIA Heritage 2008 0.26 0.15 0.12 0.74 0.92 0.34 0.02 0.27 0.18 0.00 0.20
INDIA Heritage 2012 0.50 0.28 0.17 0.50 0.82 0.43 0.03 0.30 0.09 0.02 0.14
INDIA Heritage Military 0.29 0.19 0.15 0.72 0.86 0.36 0.00 0.29 0.22 0.00 0.14
INDIA Heritage Political 0.35 0.15 0.19 0.65 0.65 0.46 0.03 0.18 0.17 0.01 0.15
INDIA Heritage Social 0.33 0.19 0.26 0.67 0.58 0.43 0.01 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.12
INDIA Heritage Three Topics 0.35 0.17 0.19 0.65 0.68 0.45 0.02 0.20 0.18 0.01 0.14
INDIA RAND 2004 0.57 0.37 0.42 0.43 0.53 0.39 0.00 0.39 0.09 0.01 0.12
INDIA RAND 2008 0.25 0.13 0.16 0.75 0.82 0.34 0.02 0.27 0.17 0.00 0.21
INDIA RAND 2012 0.09 -0.06 0.42 0.42 0.70 0.41 0.00 0.14 0.19 0.00 0.27
INDIA RAND Military -0.11 -0.15 0.28 0.44 0.78 0.33 0.00 0.11 0.28 0.00 0.28
INDIA RAND Political 0.31 0.10 0.17 0.69 0.85 0.42 0.00 0.23 0.11 0.00 0.23
INDIA RAND Social 0.77 0.56 0.73 0.23 0.23 0.37 0.02 0.50 0.07 0.00 0.05
INDIA RAND Three Topics 0.24 0.07 0.15 0.76 0.87 0.39 0.01 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.24
INDIA Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.34 0.17 0.27 0.65 0.62 0.39 0.01 0.27 0.14 0.01 0.18
INDIA Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.26 0.12 0.20 0.69 0.80 0.35 0.04 0.24 0.15 0.00 0.22
INDIA Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.27 0.14 0.23 0.63 0.78 0.35 0.01 0.28 0.14 0.01 0.21
INDIA Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.29 0.14 0.23 0.66 0.74 0.36 0.02 0.26 0.15 0.01 0.20
INDIA Seven Think Tanks Military 0.08 -0.03 0.29 0.74 0.72 0.32 0.03 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.30
INDIA Seven Think Tanks Political 0.25 0.11 0.16 0.71 0.77 0.38 0.01 0.23 0.17 0.01 0.19
INDIA Seven Think Tanks Social 0.57 0.38 0.35 0.41 0.63 0.37 0.03 0.39 0.09 0.01 0.12
INDIA Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.25 0.11 0.14 0.74 0.83 0.37 0.02 0.24 0.16 0.01 0.20
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to India? Did 
any of the think tanks show consistency in describing India’s actions across time 
and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view India’s actions?  
 As Table 5-16 shows, relative to other think tanks, CFR assigned the most 
conflictual actions to India, while Brookings assigned the most cooperative actions to 
India. One think tank showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking 
about India. Brookings assigned cooperative actions to India across the seven instances. 
This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an 
organizational identity in regard to India. As Table 5-16 shows, and according to the 
collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of India was 88% 
cooperative.  
What was India’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy think 
tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to India?  
 As Figure 5-7 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of India were most similar to actions of the United States and Europe and 
least similar to actions of France. From the total of forty-four instances, India was placed 
seventeen times in the same quadrant as the United States and Europe, which shows 39% 
similarity (61% dissimilarity). India was placed four times in the same quadrant as 
France, which shows 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of India were 
most similar to actions of China and least similar to those of France. From the total of 
eleven instances, India was placed five times in the same quadrant as China, which shows 
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45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, India was not placed in the same 
quadrant as France, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of India were most similar to political actions of 
Europe and least similar to political actions of Turkey. From the total of eleven instances, 
India was placed five times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 45% similarity 
(55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, India was not placed in the same quadrant as 
Turkey, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of India were most similar to social actions of 
Europe and Taiwan and least similar to those of Iraq and Germany. From the total of 
eleven instances, India was placed five times in the same quadrant as Europe and Taiwan, 
which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of 
India were not placed in the same quadrant as those of Germany and Iraq, which indicates 
100% dissimilarity.  
 Military Issues: Military actions of India were most similar to military actions of 
the United States and Iran and least similar to military actions of the United Nations. 
From the total of eleven instances, India was placed seven times in the same quadrant as 
the United States and Iran, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other 
hand, military actions of India were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of 
the United Nations, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
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Figure 5-7 Similarity of Actions of India to other Actors 
Iran 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Iran’s operational code, 
and did they agree in their assessment of Iran’s actions?  
Table 5-19 shows the operational code of Iran on fifty-seven levels of time and 
topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Iran, the overall perception of the 
American foreign policy think tanks was neither cooperative nor conflictual. Table 5-18 
presents the number of times Iran’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the 
average of direction of strategy on each of the seven levels. As Table 5-18 shows, the 
direction of strategy of Iran was conflictual twenty-seven times and cooperative thirty 
times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts 
indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a very low level of certainty 
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about the direction of strategy of Iran. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign 
policy think tanks had 5% agreement in describing Iran’s strategy. Among the twenty-
two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Iran ninth based on its 
conflictual actions and thirteenth based on its cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-18 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Iran 
  
IRAN
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
Carnegie 7
CFR 1 6
RAND 2 5
Seven Think Tanks 3 5
AEI 4 3
Brookings 4 3
Cato 6 1
Heritage 7
Grand Total 27 30
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Table 5-19 Operational Code of Iran from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
IRAN AEI 2004 0.35 0.20 0.14 0.65 0.70 0.39 0.05 0.24 0.17 0.05 0.11
IRAN AEI 2008 0.04 -0.03 0.09 0.90 0.84 0.31 0.01 0.20 0.20 0.06 0.23
IRAN AEI 2012 0.22 0.12 0.09 0.78 0.86 0.32 0.04 0.25 0.18 0.02 0.20
IRAN AEI Military 0.08 0.05 0.09 0.89 0.81 0.28 0.01 0.25 0.21 0.08 0.18
IRAN AEI Political 0.16 0.04 0.08 0.84 0.78 0.35 0.04 0.19 0.18 0.04 0.20
IRAN AEI Social 0.39 0.23 0.16 0.55 0.80 0.38 0.05 0.27 0.16 0.01 0.14
IRAN AEI Three Topics 0.17 0.06 0.08 0.83 0.79 0.35 0.04 0.20 0.18 0.04 0.20
IRAN Brookings 2004 0.21 -0.06 0.24 0.75 0.73 0.46 0.03 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.32
IRAN Brookings 2008 0.27 0.16 0.12 0.73 0.77 0.34 0.03 0.27 0.19 0.01 0.17
IRAN Brookings 2012 0.25 0.14 0.16 0.74 0.80 0.31 0.01 0.31 0.15 0.01 0.22
IRAN Brookings Military 0.04 -0.09 0.18 0.88 0.83 0.32 0.01 0.18 0.13 0.00 0.35
IRAN Brookings Political 0.23 0.09 0.11 0.77 0.74 0.39 0.05 0.18 0.18 0.01 0.19
IRAN Brookings Social 0.50 0.28 0.27 0.50 0.72 0.37 0.01 0.37 0.04 0.00 0.20
IRAN Brookings Three Topics 0.19 0.05 0.12 0.81 0.79 0.39 0.03 0.18 0.18 0.01 0.21
IRAN Carnegie 2004 0.38 0.20 0.17 0.62 0.72 0.44 0.02 0.23 0.17 0.01 0.13
IRAN Carnegie 2008 0.34 0.18 0.14 0.66 0.77 0.41 0.02 0.24 0.17 0.02 0.14
IRAN Carnegie 2012 0.38 0.18 0.17 0.62 0.72 0.45 0.02 0.22 0.16 0.02 0.14
IRAN Carnegie Military 0.24 0.08 0.14 0.76 0.79 0.40 0.02 0.20 0.17 0.01 0.20
IRAN Carnegie Political 0.34 0.14 0.17 0.66 0.59 0.47 0.03 0.17 0.17 0.03 0.13
IRAN Carnegie Social 0.58 0.35 0.21 0.42 0.85 0.45 0.01 0.33 0.11 0.00 0.09
IRAN Carnegie Three Topics 0.36 0.16 0.16 0.64 0.65 0.46 0.02 0.19 0.17 0.02 0.13
IRAN Cato 2004 0.16 0.09 0.14 0.84 0.71 0.18 0.07 0.34 0.11 0.00 0.31
IRAN Cato 2008 -0.11 0.06 0.32 0.61 0.62 0.17 0.06 0.21 0.46 0.00 0.10
IRAN Cato 2012 0.27 0.06 0.16 0.66 0.74 0.37 0.11 0.15 0.10 0.02 0.25
IRAN Cato Military 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.84 0.75 0.24 0.10 0.19 0.29 0.00 0.18
IRAN Cato Political 0.12 0.02 0.14 0.88 0.77 0.24 0.06 0.27 0.10 0.01 0.33
IRAN Cato Social 0.00 0.13 0.63 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.13 0.13 0.50 0.00 0.00
IRAN Cato Three Topics 0.19 0.09 0.10 0.81 0.84 0.25 0.06 0.28 0.13 0.01 0.27
IRAN CFR 2004 0.46 0.19 0.28 0.54 0.58 0.54 0.03 0.17 0.13 0.03 0.12
IRAN CFR 2008 0.29 0.21 0.16 0.71 0.78 0.26 0.05 0.34 0.16 0.00 0.19
IRAN CFR 2012 0.44 0.26 0.15 0.56 0.90 0.35 0.08 0.30 0.11 0.02 0.15
IRAN CFR Military 0.48 0.28 0.15 0.52 0.92 0.38 0.04 0.32 0.09 0.00 0.17
IRAN CFR Political 0.17 0.03 0.11 0.83 0.73 0.38 0.03 0.17 0.19 0.03 0.19
IRAN CFR Social 0.67 0.45 0.41 0.33 0.58 0.38 0.08 0.38 0.08 0.00 0.08
IRAN CFR Three Topics 0.27 0.12 0.12 0.73 0.77 0.39 0.04 0.21 0.16 0.03 0.18
IRAN Heritage 2004 0.09 0.08 0.18 0.81 0.50 0.34 0.03 0.18 0.31 0.08 0.08
IRAN Heritage 2008 0.18 0.04 0.13 0.82 0.90 0.35 0.01 0.23 0.12 0.05 0.25
IRAN Heritage 2012 -0.12 -0.18 0.10 0.88 0.93 0.28 0.00 0.16 0.15 0.09 0.33
IRAN Heritage Military 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.94 0.77 0.26 0.00 0.27 0.21 0.11 0.15
IRAN Heritage Political 0.20 0.03 0.13 0.77 0.87 0.38 0.02 0.19 0.13 0.01 0.26
IRAN Heritage Social -0.16 -0.19 0.22 0.81 0.58 0.35 0.00 0.07 0.25 0.11 0.22
IRAN Heritage Three Topics 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.83 0.89 0.31 0.02 0.22 0.18 0.05 0.23
IRAN RAND 2004 -0.02 -0.11 0.34 0.52 0.59 0.23 0.04 0.23 0.12 0.01 0.38
IRAN RAND 2008 0.34 0.19 0.12 0.66 0.89 0.36 0.03 0.28 0.15 0.01 0.17
IRAN RAND 2012 0.27 0.13 0.11 0.74 0.84 0.38 0.01 0.25 0.15 0.04 0.17
IRAN RAND Military 0.25 0.16 0.11 0.75 0.80 0.30 0.04 0.29 0.17 0.01 0.20
IRAN RAND Political 0.31 0.15 0.12 0.69 0.80 0.40 0.03 0.23 0.16 0.02 0.17
IRAN RAND Social -0.06 -0.15 0.42 0.39 0.63 0.22 0.01 0.24 0.07 0.04 0.42
IRAN RAND Three Topics 0.28 0.14 0.11 0.72 0.86 0.37 0.03 0.25 0.16 0.02 0.18
IRAN Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.23 0.08 0.21 0.67 0.64 0.37 0.04 0.21 0.15 0.03 0.20
IRAN Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.19 0.12 0.15 0.73 0.79 0.31 0.03 0.25 0.21 0.02 0.18
IRAN Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.25 0.10 0.14 0.71 0.82 0.36 0.04 0.23 0.14 0.03 0.21
IRAN Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.22 0.10 0.17 0.70 0.75 0.35 0.03 0.23 0.17 0.03 0.20
IRAN Seven Think Tanks Military 0.17 0.09 0.13 0.80 0.81 0.31 0.03 0.24 0.18 0.03 0.20
IRAN Seven Think Tanks Political 0.22 0.07 0.12 0.78 0.75 0.37 0.04 0.20 0.16 0.02 0.21
IRAN Seven Think Tanks Social 0.29 0.16 0.32 0.45 0.65 0.35 0.04 0.26 0.16 0.02 0.17
IRAN Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.22 0.09 0.11 0.77 0.80 0.36 0.03 0.22 0.16 0.02 0.20
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Iran? Did 
any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Iran’s actions across time and 
topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Iran’s actions?  
 As Table 5-18 shows, relative to other think tanks, Heritage assigned the most 
conflictual actions to Iran, while Carnegie assigned the most cooperative actions. Two 
think tanks showed consistency in the seven instances of talking about Iran. Heritage 
assigned conflictual actions to Iran across the seven instances, and Carnegie assigned 
cooperative actions to Iran across the seven instances. This level of complete consistency 
across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to 
Iran. As Table 5-18 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven 
Think Tanks), the strategy of Iran was 63% cooperative.  
What was Iran’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy think 
tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Iran?  
 As Figure 5-8 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of Iran were most similar to actions of North Korea and Russia and least 
similar to actions of the Muslim World. From the total of forty-four instances, Iran was 
placed nineteen times in the same quadrant as North Korea and Russia, which shows 43% 
similarity (57% dissimilarity). Iran was placed four times in the same quadrant as the 
Muslim World, which shows 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Iran were 
most similar to actions of China and least similar to actions of the Muslim World and 
Britain. From the total of eleven instances, Iran was placed seven times in the same 
quadrant as China, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, 
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Iran was not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World and Britain, which 
indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of Iran were most similar to political actions of 
North Korea and least similar to those of Taiwan. From the total of eleven instances, Iran 
was placed six times in the same quadrant as North Korea, which shows 55% similarity 
(45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, political actions of Iran were not placed in the 
same quadrant as political actions of Taiwan, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of Iran were most similar to social actions of Russia 
and least similar to those of Israel and the Muslim World. From the total of eleven 
instances, Iran was placed five times in the same quadrant as Russia, which shows 45% 
similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Iran were not placed in 
the same quadrant as social actions of Israel and the Muslim World, which indicates 
100% dissimilarity.  
 Military Issues: Military actions of Iran were most similar to military actions of 
the United States and least similar to those of Britain. From the total of eleven instances, 
Iran was placed nine times in the same quadrant as the United States, which shows 82% 
similarity (18% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of Iran were not placed 
in the same quadrant as military actions of Britain, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
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Figure 5-8 Similarity of Actions of Iran to other Actors 
Iraq 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Iraq’s operational code, 
and did they agree in their assessment of Iraq’s actions?  
Table 5-21 shows the operational code of Iraq on fifty-seven levels of time and 
topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Iraq, the overall perception of the 
American foreign policy think tanks was conflictual. Table 5-20 presents the number of 
times Iraq’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction of 
strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Iraq’s strategy as 
conflictual thirty-five times and cooperative twenty-two times. The difference between 
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the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign 
policy think tanks had a low level of certainty about the direction of strategy of Iraq. As 
Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 23% agreement in 
describing Iraq’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy 
think tanks ranked Iraq seventh based on its conflictual actions and seventeenth based on 
its cooperative actions.  
  
Table 5-20 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Iraq 
  
IRAQ
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
RAND 7
Cato 3 4
Carnegie 4 3
Heritage 4 3
Seven Think Tanks 5 3
CFR 6 1
AEI 6 1
Brookings 7
Grand Total 35 22
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Table 5-21 Operational Code of Iraq from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
IRAQ AEI 2004 0.12 0.01 0.12 0.88 0.72 0.37 0.03 0.16 0.22 0.02 0.20
IRAQ AEI 2008 0.45 0.21 0.22 0.55 0.91 0.42 0.01 0.30 0.05 0.01 0.22
IRAQ AEI 2012 -0.02 -0.10 0.22 0.98 0.59 0.20 0.02 0.27 0.09 0.00 0.42
IRAQ AEI Military 0.08 -0.09 0.18 0.92 0.66 0.32 0.02 0.20 0.08 0.00 0.38
IRAQ AEI Political 0.18 0.02 0.12 0.80 0.82 0.38 0.03 0.18 0.16 0.02 0.24
IRAQ AEI Social 0.33 0.22 0.30 0.67 0.60 0.27 0.00 0.40 0.10 0.00 0.23
IRAQ AEI Three Topics 0.14 -0.01 0.13 0.83 0.87 0.36 0.03 0.19 0.14 0.01 0.28
IRAQ Brookings 2004 0.13 0.08 0.12 0.87 0.80 0.29 0.01 0.26 0.21 0.03 0.20
IRAQ Brookings 2008 -0.02 -0.11 0.14 0.86 0.82 0.32 0.01 0.16 0.19 0.01 0.31
IRAQ Brookings 2012 -0.18 -0.21 0.13 0.82 0.82 0.20 0.02 0.19 0.13 0.06 0.40
IRAQ Brookings Military -0.08 -0.10 0.12 0.89 0.76 0.20 0.01 0.25 0.16 0.01 0.37
IRAQ Brookings Political 0.03 -0.06 0.10 0.86 0.90 0.30 0.03 0.18 0.17 0.03 0.29
IRAQ Brookings Social 0.00 -0.06 0.19 0.78 0.68 0.32 0.00 0.18 0.21 0.07 0.23
IRAQ Brookings Three Topics -0.04 -0.10 0.10 0.88 0.91 0.26 0.02 0.20 0.17 0.03 0.33
IRAQ Carnegie 2004 0.00 -0.09 0.21 0.93 0.59 0.38 0.00 0.12 0.24 0.02 0.25
IRAQ Carnegie 2008 0.29 0.11 0.31 0.71 0.71 0.42 0.02 0.20 0.15 0.02 0.18
IRAQ Carnegie 2012 0.20 0.07 0.23 0.78 0.68 0.36 0.01 0.23 0.16 0.01 0.23
IRAQ Carnegie Military 0.01 -0.02 0.15 0.90 0.68 0.17 0.02 0.31 0.15 0.00 0.35
IRAQ Carnegie Political 0.15 0.04 0.11 0.85 0.86 0.31 0.02 0.24 0.16 0.02 0.25
IRAQ Carnegie Social 0.52 0.20 0.54 0.48 0.30 0.65 0.00 0.11 0.17 0.00 0.07
IRAQ Carnegie Three Topics 0.13 0.04 0.10 0.87 0.88 0.29 0.02 0.25 0.16 0.02 0.25
IRAQ Cato 2004 0.51 0.18 0.43 0.49 0.50 0.62 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.12
IRAQ Cato 2008 0.63 0.50 0.41 0.37 0.56 0.24 0.02 0.56 0.05 0.00 0.14
IRAQ Cato 2012 -0.40 -0.20 0.28 0.60 0.44 0.22 0.02 0.06 0.54 0.00 0.16
IRAQ Cato Military 0.23 0.14 0.32 0.55 0.49 0.36 0.02 0.24 0.24 0.00 0.15
IRAQ Cato Political 0.12 0.07 0.25 0.50 0.71 0.35 0.00 0.20 0.29 0.00 0.16
IRAQ Cato Social 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
IRAQ Cato Three Topics 0.11 0.05 0.17 0.69 0.65 0.32 0.02 0.21 0.25 0.00 0.20
IRAQ CFR 2004 0.29 0.07 0.18 0.71 0.85 0.40 0.04 0.21 0.06 0.04 0.26
IRAQ CFR 2008 0.01 -0.03 0.15 0.85 0.78 0.23 0.01 0.26 0.17 0.03 0.30
IRAQ CFR 2012 -0.16 -0.16 0.31 0.60 0.67 0.17 0.05 0.21 0.19 0.01 0.38
IRAQ CFR Military -0.08 -0.08 0.09 0.81 0.85 0.17 0.07 0.22 0.19 0.04 0.32
IRAQ CFR Political 0.20 0.06 0.11 0.80 0.87 0.36 0.03 0.21 0.14 0.04 0.22
IRAQ CFR Social -0.11 -0.20 0.55 0.44 0.39 0.22 0.00 0.22 0.08 0.00 0.47
IRAQ CFR Three Topics 0.19 0.07 0.10 0.81 0.95 0.32 0.03 0.24 0.15 0.03 0.23
IRAQ Heritage 2004 0.10 0.03 0.09 0.82 0.92 0.30 0.01 0.24 0.15 0.08 0.22
IRAQ Heritage 2008 0.43 0.32 0.32 0.57 0.72 0.23 0.05 0.43 0.09 0.03 0.17
IRAQ Heritage 2012 -0.04 -0.16 0.18 0.85 0.74 0.26 0.00 0.22 0.05 0.05 0.41
IRAQ Heritage Military 0.23 0.13 0.09 0.77 0.97 0.29 0.03 0.29 0.11 0.08 0.19
IRAQ Heritage Political 0.00 -0.13 0.18 0.80 0.75 0.29 0.02 0.19 0.09 0.03 0.39
IRAQ Heritage Social 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
IRAQ Heritage Three Topics 0.08 -0.03 0.09 0.86 0.89 0.29 0.02 0.22 0.12 0.06 0.28
IRAQ RAND 2004 0.46 0.30 0.14 0.54 0.91 0.33 0.04 0.37 0.09 0.01 0.17
IRAQ RAND 2008 0.34 0.18 0.12 0.66 0.93 0.34 0.05 0.28 0.12 0.02 0.19
IRAQ RAND 2012 0.33 0.27 0.36 0.68 0.61 0.25 0.00 0.42 0.16 0.00 0.18
IRAQ RAND Military 0.23 0.18 0.12 0.77 0.86 0.23 0.03 0.36 0.17 0.01 0.21
IRAQ RAND Political 0.24 0.08 0.13 0.76 0.87 0.38 0.02 0.22 0.14 0.02 0.22
IRAQ RAND Social 0.77 0.61 0.46 0.23 0.61 0.25 0.04 0.59 0.04 0.00 0.08
IRAQ RAND Three Topics 0.26 0.12 0.12 0.74 0.91 0.35 0.02 0.26 0.14 0.01 0.21
IRAQ Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.24 0.08 0.19 0.74 0.75 0.39 0.02 0.21 0.16 0.02 0.20
IRAQ Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.30 0.17 0.24 0.65 0.77 0.31 0.02 0.31 0.12 0.02 0.22
IRAQ Seven Think Tanks 2012 -0.01 -0.05 0.23 0.75 0.66 0.22 0.02 0.25 0.17 0.02 0.32
IRAQ Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.18 0.07 0.22 0.71 0.73 0.31 0.02 0.26 0.15 0.02 0.24
IRAQ Seven Think Tanks Military 0.09 0.02 0.15 0.80 0.75 0.25 0.03 0.27 0.16 0.02 0.28
IRAQ Seven Think Tanks Political 0.13 0.01 0.14 0.77 0.83 0.34 0.02 0.20 0.16 0.02 0.25
IRAQ Seven Think Tanks Social 0.42 0.26 0.51 0.43 0.43 0.34 0.01 0.36 0.10 0.01 0.18
IRAQ Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.12 0.02 0.11 0.81 0.87 0.31 0.02 0.22 0.16 0.02 0.25
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Iraq? Did 
any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Iraq’s actions across time and 
topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Iraq’s actions?  
 As Table 5-20 shows, relative to other think tanks, Brookings assigned the most 
conflictual actions to Iraq, while RAND assigned the most cooperative actions. Two 
think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about Iraq. 
RAND assigned cooperative actions to Iraq in all seven instances, while Brookings 
assigned conflictual actions in all the instances. This level of complete consistency across 
time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in relation to Iraq. 
As Table 5-20 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think 
Tanks), the strategy of Iraq was 63% conflictual. 
What was Iraq’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy think 
tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Iraq?  
 As Figure 5-9 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of Iraq were most similar to actions of North Korea and least similar to 
actions of Taiwan. From the total of forty-four instances, Iraq was placed sixteen times in 
the same quadrant as North Korea, which shows 36% similarity (64% dissimilarity). Iraq 
was placed four times in the same quadrant as Taiwan, which shows 91% dissimilarity 
(9% similarity).  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Iraq were 
most similar to actions of the Muslim World and least similar to actions of Taiwan, South 
Korea, China, the United Nations, Europe, and the United States. From the total of eleven 
instances, Iraq was placed seven times in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, which 
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shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Iraq was not placed in the 
same quadrant as Taiwan, South Korea, China, the United Nations, Europe, and the 
United States, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of Iraq were most similar to political actions of 
Iran and the Muslim World and least similar to those of the United States and South 
Korea. From the total of eleven instances, Iraq was placed five times in the same 
quadrant as Iran and the Muslim World, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). 
On the other hand, Iraq was not placed in the same quadrant as the United States and 
South Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of Iraq were most similar to social actions of North 
Korea and Germany and least similar to social actions of India. From the total of eleven 
instances, Iraq was placed four times in the same quadrant as Germany and North Korea, 
which shows 36% similarity (64% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Iraq 
were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of India, which indicates 100% 
dissimilarity.  
 Military Issues: Military actions of Iraq were most similar to military actions of 
the United States and Iran and least similar to those of Britain, Turkey and Taiwan. From 
the total of eleven instances, Iraq was placed seven times in the same quadrant as the 
United States and Iran, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other 
hand, military actions of Iraq were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of 
Britain, Turkey, and Taiwan, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
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Figure 5-9 Similarity of Actions of Iraq to other Actors 
Israel 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Israel’s operational code, 
and did they agree in their assessment of Israel’s actions?  
Table 5-23 shows the operational code of Israel on fifty-seven levels of time and 
topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Israel, the overall perception of the 
American foreign policy think tanks was conflictual. Table 5-22 presents the number of 
times Israel’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction 
of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Israel’s strategy as 
conflictual forty-four times and cooperative thirteen times. The difference between the 
frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign 
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policy think tanks had a high level of certainty about the direction of strategy of Israel. 
As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 54% agreement 
in describing Israel’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign 
policy think tanks ranked Israel third based on its conflictual actions and twentieth based 
on its cooperative actions.  
  
Table 5-22 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Israel 
 
ISRAEL
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
Heritage 4 3
Cato 5 2
Brookings 5 2
AEI 5 2
CFR 6 1
RAND 6 1
Carnegie 6 1
Seven Think Tanks 7 1
Grand Total 44 13
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Table 5-23 Operational Code of Israel from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
ISRAEL AEI 2004 0.20 0.17 0.44 0.53 0.55 0.08 0.28 0.25 0.16 0.02 0.23
ISRAEL AEI 2008 -0.27 -0.35 0.25 0.74 0.78 0.25 0.01 0.12 0.11 0.04 0.50
ISRAEL AEI 2012 0.27 0.03 0.36 0.60 0.50 0.55 0.00 0.09 0.17 0.04 0.16
ISRAEL AEI Military -0.04 0.02 0.30 0.74 0.53 0.15 0.00 0.33 0.23 0.04 0.25
ISRAEL AEI Political -0.19 -0.23 0.17 0.66 0.78 0.25 0.01 0.14 0.17 0.04 0.39
ISRAEL AEI Social 0.67 0.22 0.80 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.17
ISRAEL AEI Three Topics -0.17 -0.22 0.14 0.75 0.78 0.26 0.03 0.14 0.18 0.04 0.37
ISRAEL Brookings 2004 -0.03 0.01 0.18 0.81 0.61 0.27 0.00 0.22 0.32 0.00 0.20
ISRAEL Brookings 2008 0.28 0.19 0.33 0.70 0.59 0.25 0.03 0.35 0.11 0.06 0.19
ISRAEL Brookings 2012 0.12 0.06 0.22 0.78 0.77 0.33 0.02 0.21 0.23 0.04 0.18
ISRAEL Brookings Military -0.03 -0.11 0.18 0.77 0.83 0.28 0.00 0.21 0.11 0.09 0.31
ISRAEL Brookings Political 0.17 0.05 0.15 0.83 0.58 0.41 0.04 0.13 0.25 0.01 0.16
ISRAEL Brookings Social 0.40 0.60 0.71 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.30 0.00 0.00
ISRAEL Brookings Three Topics 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.91 0.75 0.35 0.03 0.16 0.21 0.03 0.21
ISRAEL Carnegie 2004 0.29 0.24 0.41 0.71 0.32 0.20 0.00 0.45 0.10 0.05 0.22
ISRAEL Carnegie 2008 -0.15 -0.26 0.37 0.65 0.52 0.32 0.01 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.41
ISRAEL Carnegie 2012 -0.05 -0.08 0.31 0.69 0.51 0.26 0.00 0.22 0.20 0.03 0.29
ISRAEL Carnegie Military -0.15 -0.12 0.25 0.75 0.38 0.20 0.00 0.22 0.23 0.04 0.30
ISRAEL Carnegie Political 0.05 -0.05 0.11 0.95 0.74 0.37 0.01 0.15 0.21 0.04 0.22
ISRAEL Carnegie Social -0.17 -0.11 0.75 0.17 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.33 0.17 0.00 0.42
ISRAEL Carnegie Three Topics 0.08 -0.03 0.12 0.90 0.76 0.37 0.01 0.16 0.21 0.03 0.22
ISRAEL Cato 2008 0.31 -0.07 0.50 0.64 0.47 0.66 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.23
ISRAEL Cato 2012 0.07 -0.11 0.33 0.73 0.39 0.39 0.00 0.14 0.13 0.00 0.33
ISRAEL Cato Military 0.75 0.25 0.78 0.25 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00
ISRAEL Cato Political -0.05 -0.22 0.23 0.95 0.55 0.35 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.40
ISRAEL Cato Three Topics -0.14 -0.30 0.24 0.87 0.74 0.35 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.04 0.45
ISRAEL CFR 2004 -0.18 -0.18 0.14 0.78 0.76 0.29 0.03 0.09 0.30 0.00 0.29
ISRAEL CFR 2008 -0.48 -0.32 0.37 0.53 0.65 0.18 0.01 0.08 0.41 0.03 0.30
ISRAEL CFR 2012 0.19 0.01 0.32 0.69 0.72 0.44 0.01 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.23
ISRAEL CFR Military -0.47 -0.37 0.18 0.53 0.84 0.15 0.00 0.11 0.28 0.05 0.40
ISRAEL CFR Political -0.01 -0.08 0.10 0.96 0.85 0.32 0.03 0.15 0.22 0.01 0.28
ISRAEL CFR Social 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00
ISRAEL CFR Three Topics -0.08 -0.14 0.10 0.91 0.90 0.30 0.02 0.14 0.21 0.02 0.31
ISRAEL Heritage 2004 -1.00 -0.78 0.47 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.67
ISRAEL Heritage 2008 0.32 0.19 0.40 0.43 0.66 0.30 0.00 0.37 0.07 0.06 0.21
ISRAEL Heritage 2012 -0.18 -0.21 0.08 0.78 0.62 0.28 0.07 0.07 0.18 0.17 0.24
ISRAEL Heritage Military 0.20 -0.02 0.25 0.42 0.72 0.41 0.04 0.15 0.04 0.16 0.21
ISRAEL Heritage Political -0.44 -0.41 0.23 0.52 0.71 0.21 0.02 0.05 0.24 0.06 0.42
ISRAEL Heritage Social 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ISRAEL Heritage Three Topics -0.45 -0.40 0.20 0.56 0.75 0.19 0.02 0.07 0.22 0.08 0.41
ISRAEL RAND 2004 -0.08 -0.08 0.27 0.67 0.56 0.14 0.00 0.32 0.14 0.00 0.40
ISRAEL RAND 2008 0.08 0.06 0.38 0.58 0.54 0.19 0.00 0.35 0.16 0.01 0.29
ISRAEL RAND 2012 0.14 -0.01 0.15 0.81 0.82 0.31 0.01 0.25 0.09 0.01 0.34
ISRAEL RAND Military -0.30 -0.28 0.23 0.70 0.55 0.18 0.00 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.43
ISRAEL RAND Political -0.02 -0.13 0.21 0.78 0.66 0.25 0.00 0.24 0.07 0.01 0.43
ISRAEL RAND Social 0.75 0.75 0.63 0.25 0.50 0.13 0.00 0.75 0.13 0.00 0.00
ISRAEL RAND Three Topics -0.05 -0.13 0.15 0.82 0.75 0.23 0.01 0.23 0.12 0.01 0.39
ISRAEL Seven Think Tanks 2004 -0.05 -0.04 0.32 0.62 0.56 0.17 0.06 0.25 0.20 0.01 0.31
ISRAEL Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.00 -0.08 0.37 0.61 0.61 0.29 0.01 0.20 0.16 0.04 0.31
ISRAEL Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.05 -0.06 0.23 0.72 0.65 0.37 0.01 0.14 0.19 0.04 0.24
ISRAEL Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.00 -0.06 0.31 0.65 0.61 0.28 0.02 0.19 0.18 0.03 0.28
ISRAEL Seven Think Tanks Military -0.06 -0.11 0.29 0.62 0.57 0.29 0.00 0.18 0.19 0.05 0.29
ISRAEL Seven Think Tanks Political -0.07 -0.15 0.17 0.80 0.71 0.31 0.02 0.14 0.18 0.03 0.33
ISRAEL Seven Think Tanks Social 0.37 0.31 0.79 0.22 0.25 0.23 0.08 0.38 0.18 0.00 0.13
ISRAEL Seven Think Tanks Three Topics -0.10 -0.17 0.15 0.81 0.78 0.29 0.02 0.14 0.18 0.04 0.33
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Israel? Did 
any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Israel’s actions across time 
and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Israel’s actions?  
 As Table 5-22 shows, relative to other think tanks, Carnegie, RAND, and CFR 
assigned the most conflictual actions to Israel, while Heritage assigned the most 
cooperative actions. Significantly, Table 5-22 shows that the frequency of cooperative 
actions of Israel never exceeded the frequency of its conflictual actions. In other words, 
all American foreign policy think tanks believed that Israel was more conflictual than 
cooperative. As Table 5-22 indicates, no think tank showed complete consistency in the 
seven instances of talking about Israel. As Table 5-22 shows, and according to the 
collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Israel was 88% 
conflictual.  
What was Israel’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy think 
tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Israel?  
 As Figure 5-10 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of Israel were most similar to actions of Terrorists and least similar to 
actions of South Korea. From the total of forty-four instances, Israel was placed twenty 
times in the same quadrant as Terrorists, which shows 45% similarity (55% 
dissimilarity). Israel was not placed in the same quadrant as South Korea, which shows 
100% dissimilarity.  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Israel were 
most similar to actions of Terrorists and least similar to actions of South Korea, Europe, 
the United States, China, Japan, and Taiwan. From the total of eleven instances, Israel 
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was placed six times in the same quadrant as Terrorists, which shows 55% similarity 
(45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Israel was not placed in the same quadrant as 
South Korea, Europe, the United States, China, Japan, and Taiwan, which indicates 100% 
dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of Israel were most similar to political actions of 
Syria and least similar to those of South Korea, the United States, Europe, Japan, the 
United Nations, and Britain. From the total of eleven instances, Israel was placed eight 
times in the same quadrant as Syria, which shows 73% similarity (27% dissimilarity). On 
the other hand, Israel was not placed in the same quadrant as South Korea, the United 
States, Europe, Japan, the United Nations, and Britain, which indicates 100% 
dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of Israel were most similar to social actions of 
Afghanistan, the United Nations, and France and least similar to social actions of South 
Korea, the United States, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. From the total of eleven 
instances, Israel was placed four times in the same quadrant as Afghanistan, the United 
Nations, and France, which shows 36% similarity (64% dissimilarity). On the other hand, 
social actions of Israel were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of South 
Korea, the United States, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, which indicates 100% 
dissimilarity.  
 Military Issues: Military actions of Israel were most similar to those of Terrorists 
and least similar to military actions of South Korea and Europe. From the total of eleven 
instances, Israel was placed seven times in the same quadrant as Terrorists, which shows 
64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of Israel were not 
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placed in the same quadrant as those of South Korea and Europe, which indicates 100% 
dissimilarity.  
 
Figure 5-10 Similarity of Actions of Israel to other Actors 
Japan 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Japan’s operational code, 
and did they agree in their assessment of Japan’s actions?  
Table 5-25 shows the operational code of Japan on fifty-seven levels of time and 
topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Japan, the overall perception of the 
American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-24 presents the number of 
times Japan’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction 
of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Japan’s strategy as 
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conflictual sixteen times and cooperative forty-one times. The difference between the 
frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign 
policy think tanks had a medium level of certainty about the direction of strategy of 
Japan. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 44% 
agreement in describing the direction of Japan’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, 
the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Japan sixteenth based on its conflictual 
actions and sixth based on its cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-24 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Japan 
JAPAN
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
Heritage 7
Seven Think Tanks 8
RAND 7
Cato 1 6
Carnegie 2 5
Brookings 3 4
CFR 4 3
AEI 6 1
Grand Total 16 41
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Table 5-25 Operational Code of Japan from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
JAPAN AEI 2004 0.33 0.12 0.22 0.67 0.69 0.38 0.00 0.29 0.07 0.00 0.27
JAPAN AEI 2008 -0.15 -0.02 0.18 0.86 0.73 0.21 0.01 0.20 0.42 0.00 0.16
JAPAN AEI 2012 0.14 0.06 0.09 0.82 0.96 0.25 0.05 0.27 0.15 0.03 0.26
JAPAN AEI Military -0.11 -0.04 0.21 0.72 0.72 0.10 0.03 0.31 0.23 0.00 0.33
JAPAN AEI Political 0.17 0.03 0.14 0.81 0.85 0.37 0.02 0.19 0.16 0.01 0.24
JAPAN AEI Social 0.21 0.18 0.18 0.79 0.71 0.33 0.01 0.27 0.27 0.02 0.10
JAPAN AEI Three Topics 0.16 0.06 0.12 0.81 0.88 0.32 0.02 0.24 0.18 0.01 0.23
JAPAN Brookings 2004 0.31 0.22 0.23 0.69 0.67 0.30 0.13 0.23 0.22 0.00 0.12
JAPAN Brookings 2008 0.06 0.04 0.16 0.62 0.82 0.31 0.00 0.23 0.25 0.03 0.18
JAPAN Brookings 2012 0.27 0.08 0.16 0.73 0.80 0.41 0.02 0.20 0.14 0.01 0.22
JAPAN Brookings Military -0.16 -0.17 0.17 0.74 0.92 0.25 0.00 0.17 0.24 0.00 0.34
JAPAN Brookings Political 0.42 0.24 0.16 0.58 0.83 0.42 0.01 0.28 0.14 0.02 0.13
JAPAN Brookings Social 0.24 0.19 0.26 0.76 0.48 0.29 0.17 0.17 0.28 0.02 0.07
JAPAN Brookings Three Topics 0.36 0.19 0.14 0.64 0.82 0.40 0.02 0.26 0.15 0.01 0.15
JAPAN Carnegie 2004 0.38 0.29 0.25 0.62 0.62 0.18 0.08 0.43 0.08 0.00 0.23
JAPAN Carnegie 2008 0.23 0.13 0.26 0.56 0.52 0.43 0.00 0.18 0.27 0.05 0.07
JAPAN Carnegie 2012 0.40 0.26 0.22 0.53 0.62 0.34 0.06 0.30 0.16 0.02 0.13
JAPAN Carnegie Military 0.24 0.20 0.25 0.76 0.48 0.24 0.00 0.38 0.19 0.00 0.19
JAPAN Carnegie Political 0.11 0.06 0.15 0.60 0.62 0.31 0.08 0.17 0.25 0.05 0.14
JAPAN Carnegie Social 0.91 0.57 0.36 0.09 0.66 0.47 0.11 0.37 0.02 0.00 0.02
JAPAN Carnegie Three Topics 0.34 0.21 0.13 0.66 0.72 0.34 0.05 0.28 0.17 0.02 0.15
JAPAN Cato 2004 0.70 0.46 0.50 0.30 0.43 0.40 0.08 0.38 0.08 0.00 0.08
JAPAN Cato 2008 0.86 0.56 0.64 0.14 0.47 0.48 0.00 0.45 0.04 0.00 0.04
JAPAN Cato 2012 0.08 -0.05 0.16 0.86 0.51 0.41 0.08 0.06 0.26 0.00 0.20
JAPAN Cato Military 0.78 0.47 0.75 0.22 0.07 0.52 0.04 0.33 0.07 0.00 0.04
JAPAN Cato Political 0.47 0.25 0.48 0.47 0.40 0.43 0.06 0.24 0.14 0.00 0.13
JAPAN Cato Social 1.00 0.67 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
JAPAN Cato Three Topics 0.34 0.22 0.16 0.66 0.75 0.33 0.06 0.29 0.17 0.00 0.16
JAPAN CFR 2004 0.08 0.03 0.56 0.42 0.38 0.12 0.00 0.42 0.02 0.05 0.39
JAPAN CFR 2008 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.78 0.78 0.25 0.00 0.37 0.24 0.00 0.15
JAPAN CFR 2012 0.29 0.09 0.21 0.71 0.59 0.48 0.04 0.13 0.19 0.00 0.17
JAPAN CFR Military 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.67 0.33 0.17 0.00 0.50 0.17 0.00 0.17
JAPAN CFR Political 0.29 0.16 0.16 0.71 0.72 0.37 0.00 0.28 0.14 0.04 0.17
JAPAN CFR Social -0.02 -0.13 0.51 0.36 0.43 0.27 0.05 0.17 0.13 0.00 0.38
JAPAN CFR Three Topics 0.19 0.09 0.12 0.81 0.85 0.31 0.01 0.28 0.15 0.03 0.23
JAPAN Heritage 2004 0.42 0.35 0.36 0.59 0.65 0.25 0.00 0.46 0.12 0.06 0.12
JAPAN Heritage 2008 0.66 0.53 0.37 0.34 0.68 0.25 0.06 0.52 0.08 0.02 0.07
JAPAN Heritage 2012 0.47 0.29 0.24 0.54 0.72 0.45 0.00 0.29 0.18 0.01 0.07
JAPAN Heritage Military 0.63 0.53 0.48 0.37 0.57 0.25 0.00 0.57 0.07 0.07 0.05
JAPAN Heritage Political 0.28 0.11 0.16 0.72 0.75 0.42 0.01 0.20 0.16 0.03 0.17
JAPAN Heritage Social 0.73 0.68 0.50 0.27 0.60 0.18 0.06 0.63 0.13 0.00 0.00
JAPAN Heritage Three Topics 0.41 0.23 0.15 0.59 0.80 0.42 0.01 0.28 0.14 0.03 0.12
JAPAN RAND 2004 0.41 0.30 0.20 0.59 0.77 0.25 0.03 0.43 0.10 0.01 0.19
JAPAN RAND 2008 0.26 0.20 0.17 0.74 0.70 0.29 0.02 0.32 0.20 0.00 0.17
JAPAN RAND 2012 0.40 0.20 0.17 0.61 0.83 0.44 0.00 0.25 0.14 0.00 0.16
JAPAN RAND Military 0.27 0.20 0.21 0.73 0.58 0.33 0.00 0.31 0.21 0.00 0.15
JAPAN RAND Political 0.36 0.22 0.13 0.64 0.95 0.34 0.03 0.31 0.14 0.00 0.18
JAPAN RAND Social 0.48 0.34 0.26 0.52 0.65 0.32 0.00 0.42 0.10 0.00 0.16
JAPAN RAND Three Topics 0.31 0.18 0.12 0.69 0.88 0.32 0.03 0.30 0.13 0.01 0.20
JAPAN Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.36 0.24 0.32 0.56 0.61 0.26 0.04 0.38 0.10 0.02 0.20
JAPAN Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.31 0.24 0.28 0.58 0.67 0.32 0.01 0.32 0.21 0.01 0.12
JAPAN Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.33 0.16 0.17 0.66 0.74 0.41 0.04 0.22 0.16 0.01 0.16
JAPAN Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.33 0.21 0.26 0.60 0.67 0.33 0.03 0.31 0.16 0.01 0.16
JAPAN Seven Think Tanks Military 0.28 0.22 0.37 0.60 0.53 0.26 0.01 0.37 0.17 0.01 0.18
JAPAN Seven Think Tanks Political 0.30 0.15 0.20 0.65 0.73 0.38 0.03 0.24 0.16 0.02 0.17
JAPAN Seven Think Tanks Social 0.46 0.32 0.35 0.44 0.61 0.32 0.06 0.35 0.15 0.01 0.12
JAPAN Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.30 0.17 0.14 0.69 0.81 0.35 0.03 0.27 0.16 0.02 0.18
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Japan? Did 
any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Japan’s actions across time 
and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Japan’s actions?  
 As Table 5-24 shows, relative to other think tanks, AEI assigned the most 
conflictual actions to Japan, while Heritage and RAND assigned the most cooperative 
actions. Two think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking 
about Japan. Heritage and RAND assigned cooperative actions to Japan across the seven 
instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a 
manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to Japan. As Table 5-24 shows, and 
according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Japan 
was 100% cooperative.  
What was Japan’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy think 
tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Japan?  
 As Figure 5-11 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of Japan were most similar to actions of China and least similar to actions 
of Terrorists. From the total of forty-four instances, Japan was placed twenty-three times 
in the same quadrant as China, which shows 52% similarity (48% dissimilarity). Japan 
was placed three times in the same quadrant as Terrorists, which shows 93% dissimilarity 
(7% similarity).  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Japan were 
most similar to actions of China and Taiwan and least similar to actions of Terrorists, 
Israel and the United States. From the total of eleven instances, Japan was placed seven 
times in the same quadrant as China and Taiwan, which shows 64% similarity (36% 
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dissimilarity). On the other hand, Japan was not placed in the same quadrant as 
Terrorists, Israel, and the United States, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of Japan were most similar to political actions of 
China, Europe, the United Nations, and Afghanistan and least similar to those of 
Terrorists, Israel, and Syria. From the total of eleven instances, Japan was placed six 
times in the same quadrant as China, Europe, the United Nations, and Afghanistan, which 
shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Japan was not placed in the 
same quadrant as Terrorists, Israel, and Syria, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of Japan were most similar to social actions of the 
United States and least similar to social actions of France and Pakistan. From the total of 
eleven instances, Japan was placed seven times in the same quadrant as the United States, 
which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of 
Japan were placed once in the same quadrant as social actions of France and Pakistan, 
which indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).  
 Military Issues: Military actions of Japan were most similar to military actions of 
the United Nations and least similar to military actions of the United States, North Korea, 
Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Terrorists. From the total of eleven instances, Japan was placed 
six times in the same quadrant as the United Nations, which shows 55% similarity (45% 
dissimilarity). On the other hand, Japan was placed only once in the same quadrant as the 
United States, North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Terrorists, which indicates 91% 
dissimilarity (9% similarity).  
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Figure 5-11 Similarity of Actions of Japan to other Actors 
Muslim World 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive the Muslim World’s 
operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of the Muslim World’s 
actions?  
Table 5-27 shows the operational code of the Muslim World on fifty-seven levels 
of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to the Muslim World, the 
overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was conflictual. Table 5-26 
presents the number of times the Muslim World’s index of direction of strategy was 
above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think 
tanks described the Muslim World’s strategy as conflictual forty-five times and 
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cooperative twelve times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and 
cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a high level 
of certainty about the direction of strategy of the Muslim World. As Table 5-4 shows, the 
seven American foreign policy think tanks had 58% agreement in describing the Muslim 
World’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks 
ranked the Muslim World second based on its conflictual actions and twenty-first based 
on its cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-26 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to the Muslim World 
MUSLIM WORLD
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
CFR 3 4
Cato 5 2
Carnegie 5 2
Heritage 6 1
Seven Think Tanks 6 2
RAND 6 1
Brookings 7
AEI 7
Grand Total 45 12
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Table 5-27 Operational Code of the Muslim World from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
ISLAM AEI 2004 -0.39 -0.43 0.42 0.61 0.48 0.24 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.02 0.51
ISLAM AEI 2008 0.06 -0.03 0.19 0.69 0.77 0.30 0.01 0.22 0.17 0.01 0.29
ISLAM AEI 2012 0.08 -0.09 0.41 0.42 0.69 0.32 0.02 0.21 0.06 0.02 0.39
ISLAM AEI Military -0.75 -0.67 0.63 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.75
ISLAM AEI Political 0.04 -0.05 0.12 0.90 0.79 0.36 0.01 0.15 0.21 0.03 0.24
ISLAM AEI Social 0.20 -0.04 0.58 0.13 0.60 0.37 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.40
ISLAM AEI Three Topics 0.06 -0.05 0.11 0.88 0.88 0.34 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.02 0.27
ISLAM Brookings 2004 -0.27 -0.20 0.42 0.57 0.60 0.07 0.00 0.30 0.12 0.11 0.40
ISLAM Brookings 2008 0.15 0.08 0.55 0.35 0.47 0.41 0.02 0.15 0.30 0.01 0.11
ISLAM Brookings 2012 -0.17 -0.18 0.27 0.80 0.51 0.18 0.01 0.22 0.16 0.01 0.41
ISLAM Brookings Military -0.25 -0.47 0.84 0.08 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.58
ISLAM Brookings Political 0.06 0.03 0.10 0.82 0.81 0.26 0.03 0.25 0.20 0.02 0.25
ISLAM Brookings Social -0.22 0.04 0.62 0.56 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.33 0.11 0.17
ISLAM Brookings Three Topics 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.82 0.90 0.24 0.02 0.26 0.20 0.05 0.23
ISLAM Carnegie 2004 0.26 0.07 0.43 0.58 0.42 0.53 0.01 0.09 0.25 0.01 0.12
ISLAM Carnegie 2008 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.79 0.87 0.26 0.03 0.32 0.25 0.02 0.13
ISLAM Carnegie 2012 0.15 0.05 0.25 0.74 0.74 0.36 0.02 0.19 0.23 0.02 0.19
ISLAM Carnegie Military -0.04 0.03 0.39 0.82 0.67 0.28 0.00 0.20 0.39 0.00 0.13
ISLAM Carnegie Political 0.05 -0.05 0.11 0.89 0.85 0.34 0.02 0.16 0.19 0.02 0.26
ISLAM Carnegie Social 0.46 0.22 0.42 0.39 0.61 0.48 0.04 0.21 0.13 0.02 0.12
ISLAM Carnegie Three Topics 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.86 0.84 0.34 0.03 0.18 0.19 0.03 0.24
ISLAM Cato 2004 0.50 0.17 0.25 0.50 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.25
ISLAM Cato 2008 -0.03 -0.11 0.19 0.75 0.71 0.29 0.00 0.19 0.17 0.00 0.34
ISLAM Cato 2012 -0.14 -0.11 0.26 0.86 0.09 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.10 0.04
ISLAM Cato Military -0.43 -0.43 0.27 0.57 0.57 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.14 0.00 0.57
ISLAM Cato Political 0.24 0.10 0.24 0.69 0.56 0.46 0.00 0.16 0.22 0.04 0.12
ISLAM Cato Three Topics 0.11 -0.02 0.20 0.78 0.69 0.41 0.00 0.15 0.19 0.03 0.23
ISLAM CFR 2004 0.41 0.14 0.40 0.59 0.66 0.30 0.26 0.15 0.01 0.01 0.26
ISLAM CFR 2008 0.51 0.21 0.42 0.49 0.64 0.57 0.00 0.19 0.11 0.01 0.13
ISLAM CFR 2012 0.06 0.07 0.35 0.56 0.67 0.16 0.00 0.37 0.16 0.02 0.29
ISLAM CFR Military 0.38 0.19 0.25 0.49 0.82 0.34 0.00 0.34 0.07 0.00 0.24
ISLAM CFR Political -0.09 -0.20 0.17 0.85 0.89 0.34 0.00 0.12 0.16 0.03 0.36
ISLAM CFR Social 1.00 0.67 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00
ISLAM CFR Three Topics 0.01 -0.11 0.14 0.85 0.90 0.34 0.02 0.15 0.15 0.03 0.31
ISLAM Heritage 2004 -0.06 -0.24 0.48 0.39 0.27 0.36 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.41
ISLAM Heritage 2008 0.35 0.07 0.40 0.65 0.54 0.55 0.02 0.10 0.16 0.00 0.17
ISLAM Heritage 2012 -0.52 -0.55 0.51 0.49 0.44 0.14 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.68
ISLAM Heritage Military -0.50 -0.67 0.70 0.50 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75
ISLAM Heritage Political -0.05 -0.12 0.23 0.63 0.54 0.29 0.04 0.15 0.19 0.00 0.33
ISLAM Heritage Social 0.00 -0.34 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50
ISLAM Heritage Three Topics -0.02 -0.11 0.21 0.73 0.52 0.31 0.04 0.15 0.19 0.00 0.32
ISLAM RAND 2004 0.00 -0.06 0.24 0.83 0.51 0.41 0.00 0.09 0.30 0.05 0.17
ISLAM RAND 2008 0.12 0.00 0.16 0.78 0.85 0.31 0.02 0.23 0.14 0.00 0.30
ISLAM RAND 2012 0.15 -0.02 0.37 0.65 0.53 0.36 0.03 0.19 0.12 0.01 0.30
ISLAM RAND Military -0.28 -0.16 0.30 0.72 0.42 0.17 0.02 0.17 0.35 0.00 0.29
ISLAM RAND Political -0.02 -0.13 0.15 0.96 0.78 0.32 0.02 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.34
ISLAM RAND Social 0.63 0.25 0.47 0.38 0.50 0.65 0.00 0.17 0.06 0.04 0.09
ISLAM RAND Three Topics 0.04 -0.06 0.11 0.96 0.82 0.30 0.02 0.20 0.16 0.02 0.30
ISLAM Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.05 -0.08 0.38 0.59 0.54 0.33 0.05 0.14 0.15 0.03 0.29
ISLAM Seven Think Tanks 2012 -0.08 -0.14 0.33 0.65 0.59 0.26 0.01 0.19 0.15 0.02 0.37
ISLAM Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.20 0.07 0.30 0.64 0.70 0.38 0.01 0.20 0.19 0.01 0.21
ISLAM Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.06 -0.05 0.34 0.63 0.61 0.32 0.03 0.18 0.16 0.02 0.29
ISLAM Seven Think Tanks Military -0.21 -0.25 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.24 0.00 0.15 0.17 0.00 0.43
ISLAM Seven Think Tanks Political 0.03 -0.06 0.16 0.82 0.74 0.34 0.02 0.16 0.19 0.02 0.27
ISLAM Seven Think Tanks Social 0.36 0.16 0.66 0.26 0.34 0.38 0.07 0.24 0.09 0.03 0.19
ISLAM Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.05 -0.05 0.14 0.84 0.79 0.33 0.02 0.18 0.18 0.03 0.27
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to the Muslim 
World? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing the Muslim 
World’s actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks 
view the Muslim World’s actions?  
 As Table 5-26 shows, relative to other think tanks, AEI and Brookings assigned 
the most conflictual actions to the Muslim World, while CFR assigned the most 
cooperative actions to the Muslim World. Two think tanks showed complete consistency 
in the seven instances of talking about the Muslim World. AEI and Brookings assigned 
conflictual actions to the Muslim World across the seven instances. This level of 
complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational 
identity in regard to the Muslim World. As Table 5-26 shows, and according to the 
collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of the Muslim World 
was 75% conflictual.  
What was the Muslim World’s relative position in the world of American foreign 
policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to the Muslim 
World?  
 As Figure 5-12 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of the Muslim World were most similar to actions of Afghanistan and least 
similar to actions of Europe, the United States, and China. From the total of forty-four 
instances, the Muslim World was placed seventeen times in the same quadrant as 
Afghanistan, which shows 39% similarity (61% dissimilarity). The Muslim world was 
not placed in the same quadrant as Europe, the United States, and China, which shows 
100% dissimilarity.  
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 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of the Muslim 
World were most similar to actions of Iraq and least similar to those of Europe, the 
United States, China, South Korea, Russia, Iran, Taiwan, and the United Nations. From 
the total of eleven instances, the Muslim World was placed seven times in the same 
quadrant as Iraq, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, the 
Muslim World was not placed in the same quadrant as Europe, the United States, China, 
South Korea, Russia, Iran, Taiwan, and the United Nations, which indicates 100% 
dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of the Muslim World were most similar to 
political actions of Terrorists, North Korea, and Iraq and least similar to those of Europe, 
the United States, China, and South Korea. From the total of eleven instances, the 
Muslim World was placed five times in the same quadrant as Terrorists, North Korea, 
and Iraq, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, the Muslim 
World was not placed in the same quadrant as Europe, the United States, China, and 
South Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of the Muslim World were most similar to social 
actions of Afghanistan, the United Nations, and France and least similar to those of 
Europe, the United States, China, Syria, Iran, and Russia. From the total of eleven 
instances, the Muslim World was placed six times in the same quadrant as Afghanistan, 
the United Nations, and France, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the 
other hand, social actions of the Muslim World were not placed in the same quadrant as 
social actions of Europe, the United States, China, Syria, Iran, and Russia, which 
indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
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 Military Issues: Military actions of the Muslim World were most similar to 
military actions of Germany and Britain and least similar to those of Europe, the United 
States, China, South Korea, and North Korea. From the total of eleven instances, the 
Muslim World was placed six times in the same quadrant as Britain and Germany, which 
shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of the 
Muslim World were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of Europe, the 
United States, China, South Korea, and North Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 
Figure 5-12 Similarity of Actions of the Muslim World to other Actors 
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North Korea 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive North Korea’s 
operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of North Korea’s actions?  
Table 5-29 shows the operational code of North Korea on fifty-seven levels of 
time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to North Korea, the overall 
perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was conflictual. Table 5-28 
presents the number of times North Korea’s index of direction of strategy was above or 
below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks 
described North Korea’s strategy as conflictual thirty-five times and cooperative twenty-
two times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts 
indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a low level of certainty about 
the direction of strategy of North Korea. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign 
policy think tanks had 23% agreement in describing North Korea’s strategy. Among the 
twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked North Korea sixth 
based on its conflictual actions and sixteenth based on its cooperative actions. 
 
Table 5-28 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to North Korea 
NORTH KOREA
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
Carnegie 7
RAND 2 5
Brookings 3 4
CFR 4 3
AEI 5 2
Heritage 6 1
Cato 7
Seven Think Tanks 8
Grand Total 35 22
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Table 5-29 Operational Code of North Korea from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
  
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
NORTH KOREA AEI 2004 0.15 0.12 0.12 0.80 0.76 0.22 0.05 0.31 0.17 0.06 0.20
NORTH KOREA AEI 2008 0.30 0.10 0.19 0.70 0.76 0.44 0.02 0.19 0.15 0.01 0.20
NORTH KOREA AEI 2012 -0.09 -0.20 0.34 0.59 0.64 0.28 0.03 0.15 0.12 0.01 0.42
NORTH KOREA AEI Military 0.07 0.03 0.10 0.87 0.87 0.23 0.06 0.24 0.18 0.06 0.23
NORTH KOREA AEI Political 0.27 0.08 0.13 0.73 0.81 0.41 0.04 0.19 0.14 0.01 0.21
NORTH KOREA AEI Social -0.03 -0.15 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.27 0.00 0.22 0.08 0.00 0.43
NORTH KOREA AEI Three Topics 0.17 0.06 0.09 0.83 0.86 0.34 0.03 0.21 0.17 0.03 0.21
NORTH KOREA Brookings 2004 0.24 0.11 0.13 0.74 0.80 0.36 0.06 0.21 0.18 0.01 0.19
NORTH KOREA Brookings 2008 0.43 0.20 0.22 0.57 0.61 0.50 0.03 0.20 0.17 0.01 0.11
NORTH KOREA Brookings 2012 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.94 0.78 0.23 0.04 0.26 0.28 0.06 0.13
NORTH KOREA Brookings Military 0.02 -0.04 0.09 0.95 0.64 0.34 0.04 0.13 0.24 0.06 0.19
NORTH KOREA Brookings Political 0.22 0.13 0.10 0.78 0.83 0.33 0.03 0.25 0.20 0.02 0.16
NORTH KOREA Brookings Social 0.50 0.33 0.36 0.50 0.68 0.41 0.06 0.28 0.20 0.00 0.06
NORTH KOREA Brookings Three Topics 0.23 0.12 0.10 0.77 0.76 0.36 0.03 0.22 0.20 0.03 0.16
NORTH KOREA Carnegie 2004 0.51 0.17 0.39 0.49 0.67 0.58 0.00 0.18 0.07 0.00 0.18
NORTH KOREA Carnegie 2008 0.35 0.16 0.11 0.65 0.74 0.30 0.13 0.25 0.05 0.07 0.20
NORTH KOREA Carnegie 2012 0.39 0.20 0.28 0.61 0.66 0.34 0.04 0.31 0.06 0.05 0.20
NORTH KOREA Carnegie Military 0.23 0.12 0.14 0.77 0.64 0.24 0.08 0.30 0.04 0.13 0.22
NORTH KOREA Carnegie Political 0.24 0.07 0.13 0.76 0.89 0.36 0.04 0.21 0.12 0.03 0.23
NORTH KOREA Carnegie Social 0.78 0.48 0.73 0.22 0.22 0.44 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.11
NORTH KOREA Carnegie Three Topics 0.30 0.13 0.12 0.70 0.89 0.33 0.04 0.28 0.08 0.04 0.23
NORTH KOREA Cato 2004 0.03 -0.21 0.25 0.83 0.49 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.17 0.25
NORTH KOREA Cato 2008 0.13 0.02 0.23 0.82 0.61 0.19 0.05 0.33 0.06 0.01 0.37
NORTH KOREA Cato 2012 -0.14 -0.08 0.11 0.87 0.89 0.23 0.00 0.20 0.30 0.03 0.24
NORTH KOREA Cato Military -0.19 -0.24 0.17 0.81 0.79 0.20 0.06 0.15 0.14 0.05 0.42
NORTH KOREA Cato Political 0.10 -0.06 0.18 0.85 0.73 0.40 0.01 0.14 0.12 0.07 0.26
NORTH KOREA Cato Social 0.10 0.19 0.32 0.77 0.43 0.07 0.00 0.48 0.22 0.00 0.24
NORTH KOREA Cato Three Topics -0.02 -0.12 0.12 0.89 0.77 0.33 0.02 0.14 0.16 0.06 0.29
NORTH KOREA CFR 2004 -0.26 -0.15 0.19 0.74 0.57 0.00 0.09 0.28 0.20 0.00 0.43
NORTH KOREA CFR 2008 0.06 -0.08 0.27 0.64 0.72 0.34 0.01 0.18 0.12 0.03 0.33
NORTH KOREA CFR 2012 0.34 0.01 0.31 0.58 0.64 0.54 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.03 0.26
NORTH KOREA CFR Military -0.42 -0.47 0.37 0.58 0.58 0.18 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.03 0.60
NORTH KOREA CFR Political 0.28 0.08 0.23 0.72 0.62 0.36 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.02 0.24
NORTH KOREA CFR Social 0.52 0.31 0.25 0.49 0.69 0.49 0.00 0.27 0.17 0.00 0.07
NORTH KOREA CFR Three Topics 0.08 -0.06 0.19 0.74 0.73 0.31 0.05 0.19 0.11 0.03 0.32
NORTH KOREA Heritage 2004 0.23 0.13 0.14 0.78 0.57 0.39 0.03 0.19 0.23 0.06 0.10
NORTH KOREA Heritage 2008 0.06 -0.05 0.11 0.90 0.71 0.37 0.01 0.15 0.17 0.10 0.21
NORTH KOREA Heritage 2012 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.89 0.57 0.27 0.07 0.18 0.33 0.00 0.15
NORTH KOREA Heritage Military 0.13 0.04 0.07 0.87 0.78 0.29 0.06 0.22 0.15 0.06 0.22
NORTH KOREA Heritage Political 0.07 0.02 0.16 0.84 0.55 0.38 0.01 0.14 0.30 0.03 0.13
NORTH KOREA Heritage Social 0.13 0.07 0.19 0.81 0.47 0.37 0.05 0.14 0.28 0.06 0.09
NORTH KOREA Heritage Three Topics 0.11 0.05 0.10 0.89 0.69 0.34 0.03 0.19 0.24 0.05 0.16
NORTH KOREA RAND 2004 0.45 0.15 0.30 0.48 0.65 0.54 0.04 0.15 0.10 0.00 0.17
NORTH KOREA RAND 2008 0.32 0.12 0.18 0.68 0.79 0.44 0.01 0.21 0.14 0.01 0.19
NORTH KOREA RAND 2012 0.18 0.04 0.17 0.83 0.76 0.28 0.01 0.30 0.08 0.00 0.33
NORTH KOREA RAND Military 0.04 -0.09 0.16 0.87 0.68 0.36 0.05 0.11 0.20 0.00 0.29
NORTH KOREA RAND Political 0.44 0.18 0.22 0.56 0.86 0.46 0.01 0.25 0.07 0.01 0.20
NORTH KOREA RAND Social 0.42 0.19 0.30 0.58 0.54 0.42 0.00 0.29 0.07 0.00 0.22
NORTH KOREA RAND Three Topics 0.37 0.14 0.18 0.63 0.83 0.44 0.01 0.23 0.10 0.00 0.21
NORTH KOREA Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.22 0.07 0.21 0.68 0.66 0.37 0.04 0.20 0.15 0.03 0.20
NORTH KOREA Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.24 0.07 0.19 0.71 0.71 0.37 0.04 0.21 0.12 0.03 0.23
NORTH KOREA Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.10 0.03 0.22 0.77 0.69 0.28 0.02 0.24 0.17 0.03 0.25
NORTH KOREA Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.18 0.06 0.21 0.72 0.69 0.34 0.03 0.22 0.15 0.03 0.23
NORTH KOREA Seven Think Tanks Military -0.01 -0.09 0.16 0.82 0.71 0.27 0.05 0.18 0.15 0.05 0.30
NORTH KOREA Seven Think Tanks Political 0.23 0.07 0.16 0.75 0.76 0.39 0.03 0.20 0.15 0.03 0.20
NORTH KOREA Seven Think Tanks Social 0.35 0.20 0.39 0.52 0.47 0.36 0.02 0.30 0.14 0.01 0.17
NORTH KOREA Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.18 0.05 0.13 0.78 0.79 0.35 0.03 0.21 0.15 0.03 0.23
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to North 
Korea? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing North Korea’s 
actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view North 
Korea’s actions?  
 As Table 5-28 shows, relative to other think tanks, Cato assigned the most 
conflictual actions to North Korea, while Carnegie assigned the most cooperative actions. 
Two think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about 
North Korea. Carnegie assigned cooperative actions to North Korea in all seven 
instances, while Cato assigned conflictual actions in every instance. This level of 
complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational 
identity in regard to North Korea. As Table 5-28 shows, and according to the collectivity 
of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of North Korea was 100% 
conflictual.  
What was North Korea’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy 
think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to North Korea?  
 As Figure 5-13 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of North Korea were most similar to actions of Iran and Terrorists and least 
similar to actions of the United Nations. From the total of forty-four instances, North 
Korea was placed nineteen times in the same quadrant as Iran and Terrorists, which 
shows 43% similarity (57% dissimilarity). North Korea was placed three times in the 
same quadrant as the United Nations, which shows 93% dissimilarity (7% similarity).  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of North Korea 
were most similar to actions of Terrorists and Afghanistan and least similar to actions of 
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the United States and South Korea. From the total of eleven instances, North Korea was 
placed six times in the same quadrant as Terrorists and Afghanistan, which shows 55% 
similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, North Korea was not placed in the 
same quadrant as the United States and South Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of North Korea were most similar to political 
actions of Iran and Pakistan and least similar to those of the United Nations, Turkey, and 
France. From the total of eleven instances, North Korea was placed six times in the same 
quadrant as Iran and Pakistan, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the 
other hand, from the eleven possible instances, North Korea was not placed in the same 
quadrant as the United Nations, Turkey, and France, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of North Korea were most similar to social actions of 
the United States and least similar to those of Pakistan and Israel. From the total of 
eleven instances, North Korea was placed six times in the same quadrant as the United 
States, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions 
of North Korea were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of Israel and 
Pakistan, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Military Issues: Military actions of North Korea were most similar to military 
actions of the United States and least similar to military actions of the Muslim World. 
From the total of eleven instances, North Korea was placed eight times in the same 
quadrant as the United States, which shows 73% similarity (27% dissimilarity). On the 
other hand, military actions of North Korea were not placed in the same quadrant as those 
of the Muslim World, which indicates 100% dissimilarity. 
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Figure 5-13 Similarity of Actions of North Korea to other Actors 
Pakistan 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Pakistan’s operational 
code, and did they agree in their assessment of Pakistan’s actions?  
Table 5-31 shows the operational code of Pakistan on fifty-seven levels of time 
and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Pakistan, the overall perception 
of the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-30 presents the 
number of times Pakistan’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average 
of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Pakistan’s 
strategy as conflictual twenty-two times and cooperative thirty-five times. The difference 
between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American 
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foreign policy think tanks had a low level of certainty about the direction of strategy of 
Pakistan. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 23% 
agreement in describing Pakistan’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American 
foreign policy think tanks ranked Pakistan thirteenth based on its conflictual actions and 
tenth based on its cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-30 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Pakistan 
  
PAKISTAN
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
RAND 7
Cato 1 6
AEI 2 5
Carnegie 2 5
Seven Think Tanks 3 5
Brookings 3 4
CFR 5 2
Heritage 6 1
Grand Total 22 35
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Table 5-31 Operational Code of Pakistan from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
  
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
PAKISTAN AEI 2004 1.00 0.84 0.70 0.00 0.50 0.25 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.00
PAKISTAN AEI 2008 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.92 0.84 0.26 0.00 0.28 0.24 0.00 0.22
PAKISTAN AEI 2012 0.37 0.08 0.38 0.64 0.61 0.49 0.00 0.20 0.07 0.00 0.25
PAKISTAN AEI Military 0.00 -0.05 0.20 1.00 0.63 0.19 0.00 0.32 0.13 0.00 0.38
PAKISTAN AEI Political 0.50 0.40 0.42 0.50 0.60 0.25 0.00 0.50 0.11 0.00 0.14
PAKISTAN AEI Social 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PAKISTAN AEI Three Topics 0.40 0.25 0.21 0.60 0.96 0.36 0.00 0.34 0.13 0.00 0.17
PAKISTAN Brookings 2004 0.24 0.07 0.16 0.76 0.85 0.37 0.00 0.25 0.09 0.04 0.25
PAKISTAN Brookings 2008 0.23 0.01 0.33 0.57 0.68 0.44 0.02 0.15 0.11 0.02 0.25
PAKISTAN Brookings 2012 0.34 0.12 0.14 0.66 0.93 0.35 0.05 0.27 0.03 0.03 0.27
PAKISTAN Brookings Military -0.03 -0.08 0.13 0.77 0.88 0.25 0.00 0.24 0.16 0.04 0.32
PAKISTAN Brookings Political 0.21 0.03 0.12 0.79 0.95 0.35 0.02 0.23 0.08 0.05 0.28
PAKISTAN Brookings Social 0.67 0.28 0.44 0.33 0.56 0.55 0.06 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.17
PAKISTAN Brookings Three Topics 0.24 0.04 0.14 0.76 0.88 0.39 0.02 0.21 0.08 0.04 0.26
PAKISTAN Carnegie 2004 0.50 0.20 0.23 0.50 0.54 0.48 0.14 0.13 0.11 0.00 0.14
PAKISTAN Carnegie 2008 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.85 0.79 0.25 0.09 0.21 0.17 0.01 0.27
PAKISTAN Carnegie 2012 0.30 0.13 0.16 0.68 0.72 0.36 0.09 0.21 0.13 0.01 0.21
PAKISTAN Carnegie Military 0.39 0.13 0.25 0.54 0.57 0.47 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.01 0.17
PAKISTAN Carnegie Political 0.18 0.05 0.11 0.82 0.80 0.38 0.03 0.19 0.18 0.01 0.22
PAKISTAN Carnegie Social 0.49 0.32 0.20 0.52 0.70 0.14 0.21 0.39 0.00 0.00 0.26
PAKISTAN Carnegie Three Topics 0.21 0.07 0.11 0.79 0.80 0.38 0.04 0.19 0.17 0.01 0.21
PAKISTAN Cato 2004 0.71 0.24 0.46 0.29 0.57 0.71 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.14
PAKISTAN Cato 2008 0.29 0.12 0.33 0.71 0.69 0.42 0.00 0.23 0.15 0.03 0.18
PAKISTAN Cato 2012 0.44 0.33 0.56 0.44 0.44 0.15 0.27 0.30 0.11 0.00 0.17
PAKISTAN Cato Military 0.59 0.60 0.56 0.42 0.42 0.09 0.00 0.71 0.09 0.04 0.09
PAKISTAN Cato Political 0.18 -0.01 0.24 0.71 0.77 0.44 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.26
PAKISTAN Cato Social 1.00 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
PAKISTAN Cato Three Topics 0.21 0.03 0.21 0.74 0.83 0.41 0.02 0.17 0.14 0.01 0.24
PAKISTAN CFR 2004 0.42 0.34 0.38 0.58 0.51 0.31 0.00 0.40 0.18 0.00 0.11
PAKISTAN CFR 2008 0.12 0.10 0.22 0.82 0.59 0.14 0.04 0.39 0.12 0.00 0.32
PAKISTAN CFR 2012 -0.68 -0.68 0.52 0.32 0.48 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.10 0.03 0.71
PAKISTAN CFR Military -0.37 -0.40 0.42 0.63 0.56 0.16 0.00 0.16 0.12 0.00 0.56
PAKISTAN CFR Political 0.03 -0.04 0.13 0.75 0.75 0.29 0.05 0.17 0.20 0.02 0.26
PAKISTAN CFR Social 0.75 0.75 0.78 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.88 0.00 0.00 0.13
PAKISTAN CFR Three Topics -0.11 -0.16 0.25 0.64 0.63 0.25 0.03 0.17 0.18 0.01 0.37
PAKISTAN Heritage 2004 -0.11 -0.04 0.82 0.22 0.00 0.44 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00
PAKISTAN Heritage 2008 0.22 0.21 0.28 0.73 0.65 0.18 0.00 0.43 0.16 0.01 0.23
PAKISTAN Heritage 2012 -0.01 0.01 0.35 0.51 0.57 0.31 0.04 0.14 0.35 0.01 0.14
PAKISTAN Heritage Military 0.11 -0.02 0.19 0.78 0.47 0.31 0.04 0.21 0.14 0.00 0.31
PAKISTAN Heritage Political 0.50 0.19 0.40 0.50 0.62 0.56 0.01 0.18 0.10 0.02 0.14
PAKISTAN Heritage Social -0.43 0.05 0.90 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.71 0.00 0.00
PAKISTAN Heritage Three Topics 0.02 0.02 0.23 0.76 0.59 0.33 0.01 0.16 0.33 0.02 0.15
PAKISTAN RAND 2004 0.57 0.36 0.44 0.43 0.51 0.40 0.00 0.38 0.09 0.01 0.12
PAKISTAN RAND 2008 0.35 0.19 0.20 0.51 0.77 0.42 0.01 0.25 0.17 0.00 0.16
PAKISTAN RAND 2012 0.53 0.29 0.47 0.48 0.70 0.50 0.00 0.27 0.14 0.00 0.10
PAKISTAN RAND Military 0.14 0.14 0.31 0.68 0.81 0.28 0.00 0.29 0.28 0.00 0.14
PAKISTAN RAND Political 0.43 0.17 0.20 0.57 0.80 0.47 0.01 0.23 0.10 0.00 0.18
PAKISTAN RAND Social 0.92 0.61 0.76 0.08 0.25 0.50 0.00 0.46 0.04 0.00 0.00
PAKISTAN RAND Three Topics 0.44 0.18 0.20 0.56 0.77 0.50 0.01 0.22 0.12 0.00 0.16
PAKISTAN Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.43 0.26 0.43 0.45 0.51 0.41 0.02 0.29 0.16 0.01 0.12
PAKISTAN Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.20 0.10 0.24 0.72 0.71 0.30 0.02 0.28 0.15 0.01 0.23
PAKISTAN Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.22 0.07 0.36 0.53 0.65 0.33 0.06 0.22 0.13 0.01 0.24
PAKISTAN Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.28 0.14 0.33 0.58 0.63 0.34 0.04 0.26 0.15 0.01 0.20
PAKISTAN Seven Think Tanks Military 0.10 0.03 0.29 0.68 0.64 0.26 0.02 0.27 0.15 0.01 0.28
PAKISTAN Seven Think Tanks Political 0.29 0.11 0.23 0.66 0.76 0.39 0.02 0.24 0.13 0.01 0.21
PAKISTAN Seven Think Tanks Social 0.56 0.39 0.70 0.19 0.26 0.34 0.10 0.34 0.14 0.00 0.08
PAKISTAN Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.20 0.06 0.19 0.69 0.78 0.37 0.02 0.21 0.16 0.01 0.22
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Pakistan? 
Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Pakistan’s actions across 
time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Pakistan’s actions?  
 As Table 5-30 shows, relative to other think tanks, Heritage assigned the most 
conflictual actions to Pakistan, while RAND assigned the most cooperative actions. One 
think tank showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about Pakistan. 
RAND assigned cooperative actions to Pakistan across the seven instances. This level of 
complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational 
identity in regard to Pakistan. As Table 5-30 shows, and according to the collectivity of 
the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Pakistan was 63% conflictual.  
What was Pakistan’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy think 
tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Pakistan?  
 As Figure 5-14 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of Pakistan were most similar to actions of Afghanistan and least similar to 
those of Japan and Russia. From the total of forty-four instances, Pakistan was placed 
seventeen times in the same quadrant as Afghanistan, which shows 39% similarity (61% 
dissimilarity). Pakistan was placed five times in the same quadrant as Japan and Russia, 
which shows 89% dissimilarity (11% similarity).  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Pakistan 
were most similar to those of Afghanistan and least similar to actions of Taiwan and 
Russia. From the total of eleven instances, Pakistan was placed six times in the same 
quadrant as Afghanistan, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other 
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hand, Pakistan was not placed in the same quadrant as Taiwan and Russia, which 
indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of Pakistan were most similar to political actions 
of North Korea and least similar to those of the United Nations, Russia, and Germany. 
From the total of eleven instances, Pakistan was placed six times in the same quadrant as 
North Korea, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, 
Pakistan was placed just once in the same quadrant as the United Nations, Russia, and 
Germany, which indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).  
 Social Issues: Social actions of Pakistan were most similar to social actions of 
Syria and least similar to those of Russia, China, the United States, and North Korea. 
From the total of eleven instances, Pakistan was placed five times in the same quadrant as 
Syria, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions 
of Pakistan were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of Russia, China, the 
United States, and North Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Military Issues: Military actions of Pakistan were most similar to military actions 
of Iraq and least similar to those of Japan, the United Nations, China, Germany, Britain, 
Turkey, Syria, and the Muslim World. From the total of eleven instances, Pakistan was 
placed six times in the same quadrant as Iraq, which shows 55% similarity (45% 
dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of Pakistan were placed just once in the 
same quadrant as military actions of Japan, the United Nations, China, Germany, Britain, 
Turkey, Syria, and the Muslim World, which indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).  
 188 
 
 
Figure 5-14 Similarity of Actions of Pakistan to other Actors 
Russia 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Russia’s operational 
code, and did they agree in their assessment of Russia’s actions?  
Table 5-33 shows the operational code of Russia on fifty-seven levels of time and 
topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Russia, the overall perception of 
the American foreign policy think tanks was neither cooperative nor conflictual. Table   
5-32 presents the number of times Russia’s index of direction of strategy was above or 
below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks 
described Russia’s strategy as conflictual twenty-five times and cooperative thirty-two 
times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts 
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indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a low level of certainty about 
the direction of strategy of Russia. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign 
policy think tanks had 12% agreement in describing Russia’s strategy. Among the 
twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Russia twelfth based 
on its conflictual actions and eleventh based on its cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-32 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Russia 
  
RUSSIA
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
Brookings 7
Carnegie 7
CFR 7
Seven Think Tanks 3 5
Cato 5 2
RAND 5 2
Heritage 5 2
AEI 7
Grand Total 25 32
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Table 5-33 Operational Code of Russia from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
RUSSIA AEI 2004 0.16 0.07 0.17 0.69 0.75 0.30 0.02 0.27 0.16 0.01 0.25
RUSSIA AEI 2008 0.09 -0.04 0.11 0.92 0.87 0.34 0.02 0.19 0.15 0.03 0.28
RUSSIA AEI 2012 0.15 0.05 0.13 0.85 0.61 0.41 0.01 0.16 0.24 0.05 0.14
RUSSIA AEI Military 0.02 -0.03 0.16 0.78 0.68 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.18 0.02 0.30
RUSSIA AEI Political 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.88 0.68 0.41 0.02 0.14 0.20 0.03 0.20
RUSSIA AEI Social 0.26 0.13 0.13 0.74 0.85 0.35 0.02 0.26 0.15 0.03 0.19
RUSSIA AEI Three Topics 0.12 0.01 0.11 0.88 0.75 0.38 0.01 0.17 0.19 0.03 0.21
RUSSIA Brookings 2004 0.37 0.24 0.14 0.63 0.73 0.33 0.04 0.32 0.13 0.03 0.15
RUSSIA Brookings 2008 0.34 0.16 0.14 0.66 0.81 0.41 0.04 0.23 0.15 0.01 0.18
RUSSIA Brookings 2012 0.33 0.15 0.13 0.67 0.78 0.41 0.04 0.23 0.14 0.04 0.16
RUSSIA Brookings Military 0.30 0.17 0.17 0.70 0.74 0.32 0.02 0.31 0.14 0.01 0.21
RUSSIA Brookings Political 0.34 0.15 0.14 0.66 0.73 0.43 0.02 0.21 0.14 0.04 0.15
RUSSIA Brookings Social 0.44 0.26 0.11 0.56 0.85 0.35 0.08 0.29 0.11 0.03 0.14
RUSSIA Brookings Three Topics 0.31 0.15 0.12 0.69 0.75 0.40 0.03 0.22 0.16 0.03 0.16
RUSSIA Carnegie 2004 0.34 0.18 0.12 0.66 0.83 0.37 0.04 0.25 0.15 0.01 0.18
RUSSIA Carnegie 2008 0.26 0.12 0.11 0.74 0.76 0.39 0.04 0.21 0.18 0.02 0.17
RUSSIA Carnegie 2012 0.30 0.14 0.12 0.71 0.81 0.37 0.04 0.23 0.16 0.02 0.18
RUSSIA Carnegie Military 0.13 0.04 0.09 0.87 0.84 0.30 0.04 0.22 0.17 0.02 0.24
RUSSIA Carnegie Political 0.32 0.14 0.12 0.68 0.74 0.41 0.04 0.21 0.16 0.02 0.16
RUSSIA Carnegie Social 0.43 0.24 0.14 0.57 0.89 0.39 0.04 0.29 0.13 0.01 0.16
RUSSIA Carnegie Three Topics 0.30 0.14 0.12 0.70 0.78 0.40 0.04 0.22 0.16 0.01 0.17
RUSSIA Cato 2004 0.12 -0.02 0.30 0.39 0.62 0.36 0.05 0.15 0.17 0.03 0.25
RUSSIA Cato 2008 0.04 0.00 0.16 0.54 0.78 0.28 0.00 0.24 0.17 0.12 0.20
RUSSIA Cato 2012 0.32 0.18 0.18 0.68 0.80 0.41 0.00 0.26 0.20 0.00 0.15
RUSSIA Cato Military 0.54 0.31 0.28 0.34 0.87 0.45 0.00 0.32 0.06 0.06 0.11
RUSSIA Cato Political 0.00 -0.08 0.14 0.72 0.62 0.35 0.04 0.10 0.23 0.07 0.20
RUSSIA Cato Social 0.00 -0.02 0.34 0.33 0.71 0.24 0.00 0.26 0.22 0.00 0.28
RUSSIA Cato Three Topics 0.09 0.00 0.10 0.74 0.73 0.35 0.03 0.17 0.19 0.06 0.20
RUSSIA CFR 2004 0.58 0.27 0.43 0.42 0.59 0.56 0.00 0.23 0.09 0.00 0.12
RUSSIA CFR 2008 0.32 0.13 0.20 0.68 0.70 0.47 0.00 0.20 0.17 0.02 0.15
RUSSIA CFR 2012 0.21 0.06 0.16 0.78 0.74 0.36 0.00 0.25 0.10 0.07 0.22
RUSSIA CFR Military 0.43 0.13 0.42 0.57 0.65 0.55 0.00 0.17 0.07 0.04 0.18
RUSSIA CFR Political 0.25 0.12 0.15 0.74 0.67 0.39 0.00 0.23 0.18 0.04 0.15
RUSSIA CFR Social 0.54 0.26 0.29 0.47 0.64 0.47 0.00 0.30 0.05 0.00 0.19
RUSSIA CFR Three Topics 0.25 0.11 0.14 0.75 0.77 0.41 0.00 0.22 0.17 0.04 0.16
RUSSIA Heritage 2004 0.11 -0.02 0.16 0.83 0.81 0.34 0.02 0.19 0.14 0.06 0.25
RUSSIA Heritage 2008 0.21 0.08 0.10 0.80 0.82 0.36 0.04 0.21 0.17 0.03 0.20
RUSSIA Heritage 2012 0.23 0.10 0.12 0.77 0.85 0.34 0.01 0.27 0.12 0.05 0.22
RUSSIA Heritage Military 0.29 0.23 0.12 0.71 0.82 0.30 0.02 0.33 0.19 0.03 0.13
RUSSIA Heritage Political 0.21 0.07 0.11 0.79 0.79 0.38 0.03 0.20 0.18 0.02 0.19
RUSSIA Heritage Social 0.04 -0.15 0.18 0.87 0.86 0.35 0.01 0.15 0.03 0.09 0.36
RUSSIA Heritage Three Topics 0.18 0.06 0.10 0.82 0.84 0.36 0.03 0.21 0.17 0.03 0.21
RUSSIA RAND 2004 0.38 0.16 0.16 0.62 0.87 0.43 0.02 0.24 0.11 0.01 0.19
RUSSIA RAND 2008 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.76 0.83 0.24 0.01 0.31 0.22 0.01 0.21
RUSSIA RAND 2012 0.16 0.03 0.15 0.84 0.75 0.38 0.01 0.19 0.16 0.04 0.22
RUSSIA RAND Military 0.18 0.08 0.15 0.65 0.77 0.37 0.02 0.21 0.21 0.03 0.18
RUSSIA RAND Political 0.19 0.08 0.11 0.81 0.82 0.35 0.01 0.23 0.18 0.03 0.19
RUSSIA RAND Social 0.31 0.14 0.22 0.69 0.80 0.34 0.00 0.31 0.10 0.00 0.25
RUSSIA RAND Three Topics 0.20 0.08 0.11 0.80 0.88 0.35 0.01 0.24 0.17 0.02 0.21
RUSSIA Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.28 0.12 0.20 0.61 0.75 0.38 0.03 0.23 0.14 0.02 0.20
RUSSIA Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.20 0.08 0.14 0.73 0.79 0.35 0.02 0.23 0.17 0.03 0.20
RUSSIA Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.24 0.10 0.14 0.76 0.77 0.38 0.01 0.23 0.16 0.04 0.19
RUSSIA Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.24 0.10 0.16 0.70 0.77 0.37 0.02 0.23 0.15 0.03 0.20
RUSSIA Seven Think Tanks Military 0.27 0.13 0.20 0.66 0.77 0.36 0.01 0.26 0.14 0.03 0.19
RUSSIA Seven Think Tanks Political 0.20 0.07 0.13 0.75 0.72 0.39 0.02 0.19 0.18 0.03 0.18
RUSSIA Seven Think Tanks Social 0.28 0.12 0.20 0.61 0.81 0.35 0.02 0.26 0.12 0.02 0.22
RUSSIA Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.21 0.08 0.12 0.77 0.79 0.38 0.02 0.21 0.17 0.03 0.19
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Russia? Did 
any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Russia’s actions across time 
and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Russia’s actions?  
 As Table 5-32 shows, relative to other think tanks, AEI assigned the most 
conflictual actions to Russia, while Brookings, Carnegie, and CFR assigned the most 
cooperative actions. Four think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances 
of talking about Russia. Brookings, Carnegie, and CFR assigned cooperative actions to 
Russia across the seven instances. On the other hand, AEI assigned conflictual actions to 
Russia across the same seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time 
and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to Russia. As 
Table 5-32 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think 
Tanks), the strategy of Russia was 63% cooperative.  
What was Russia’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy think 
tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Russia?  
 As Figure 5-15 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of Russia were most similar to actions of the United States and China and 
least similar to actions of the Muslim World. From the total of forty-four instances, 
Russia was placed 20 times in the same quadrant as the United States and China, which 
shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). Russia was placed twice in the same quadrant 
as the Muslim World, which shows 95% dissimilarity (5% similarity).  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Russia were 
most similar to actions of China and least similar to those of the Muslim World, Pakistan, 
and Syria. From the total of eleven instances, Russia was placed five times in the same 
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quadrant as China, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, 
Russia was not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, Pakistan, and Syria, 
which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of Russia were most similar to political actions 
of the United Nations and least similar to those of South Korea. From the total of eleven 
instances, Russia was placed five times in the same quadrant as the United Nations, 
which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven 
possible instances, Russia was not placed in the same quadrant as South Korea, which 
indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of Russia were most similar to social actions of the 
United States and least similar to those of the Muslim World, Pakistan, Israel, and 
France. From the total of eleven instances, Russia was placed eight times in the same 
quadrant as the United States, which shows 73% similarity (27% dissimilarity). On the 
other hand, from the eleven possible instances, social actions of Russia were not placed in 
the same quadrant as social actions of the Muslim World, Pakistan, Israel, and France, 
which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Military Issues: Military actions of Russia were most similar to military actions of 
Iran and least similar to those of Terrorists and Britain. From the total of eleven 
instances, Russia was placed seven times in the same quadrant as Iran, which shows 64% 
similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, 
military actions of Russia were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of 
Terrorists and Britain, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
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Figure 5-15 Similarity of Actions of Russia to other Actors 
South Korea 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive South Korea’s 
operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of South Korea’s actions?  
Table 5-35 shows the operational code of South Korea on fifty-seven levels of 
time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to South Korea, the overall 
perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-34 
presents the number of times South Korea’s index of direction of strategy was above or 
below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks 
described South Korea’s strategy as conflictual nine times and cooperative forty-eight 
times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts 
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indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a high level of certainty about 
the direction of strategy of South Korea. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign 
policy think tanks had 68% agreement in describing South Korea’s strategy. Among the 
twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked South Korea twenty-
first based on its conflictual actions and second based on its cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-34 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to South Korea 
  
SOUTH KOREA
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
CFR 7
RAND 7
Carnegie 1 6
Brookings 1 6
Seven Think Tanks 1 7
Heritage 1 6
AEI 2 5
Cato 3 4
Grand Total 9 48
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Table 5-35 Operational Code of South Korea from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
SOUTH KOREA AEI 2004 0.53 0.16 0.45 0.47 0.00 0.71 0.06 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.00
SOUTH KOREA AEI 2008 0.18 -0.02 0.20 0.82 0.88 0.25 0.24 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.34
SOUTH KOREA AEI 2012 0.36 0.20 0.16 0.64 0.58 0.36 0.10 0.21 0.18 0.00 0.15
SOUTH KOREA AEI Military 0.25 0.04 0.33 0.75 0.50 0.25 0.38 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.25
SOUTH KOREA AEI Political 0.41 0.16 0.27 0.59 0.54 0.49 0.03 0.19 0.10 0.04 0.15
SOUTH KOREA AEI Three Topics 0.31 0.10 0.18 0.69 0.58 0.43 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.04 0.17
SOUTH KOREA Brookings 2004 0.25 0.13 0.21 0.75 0.64 0.43 0.00 0.19 0.23 0.02 0.13
SOUTH KOREA Brookings 2008 0.17 0.03 0.29 0.83 0.62 0.26 0.00 0.33 0.05 0.00 0.36
SOUTH KOREA Brookings 2012 0.69 0.48 0.38 0.31 0.47 0.25 0.32 0.28 0.08 0.00 0.08
SOUTH KOREA Brookings Military 0.23 0.02 0.26 0.77 0.77 0.38 0.00 0.23 0.07 0.00 0.32
SOUTH KOREA Brookings Political 0.43 0.26 0.15 0.57 0.78 0.36 0.04 0.31 0.13 0.01 0.14
SOUTH KOREA Brookings Social 0.44 0.33 0.62 0.56 0.00 0.17 0.33 0.22 0.17 0.00 0.11
SOUTH KOREA Brookings Three Topics 0.38 0.22 0.14 0.62 0.75 0.34 0.05 0.30 0.13 0.01 0.18
SOUTH KOREA Carnegie 2004 0.56 0.42 0.41 0.44 0.72 0.42 0.00 0.36 0.22 0.00 0.00
SOUTH KOREA Carnegie 2008 1.00 0.45 0.74 0.00 0.34 0.84 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
SOUTH KOREA Carnegie 2012 0.58 0.36 0.42 0.42 0.60 0.50 0.01 0.29 0.14 0.06 0.01
SOUTH KOREA Carnegie Military 0.00 0.25 0.40 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.25 0.25 0.00
SOUTH KOREA Carnegie Political 0.87 0.38 0.61 0.13 0.33 0.77 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.00 0.02
SOUTH KOREA Carnegie Social 0.50 0.33 0.25 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.00
SOUTH KOREA Carnegie Three Topics 0.70 0.41 0.30 0.30 0.63 0.55 0.01 0.29 0.11 0.02 0.02
SOUTH KOREA Cato 2004 0.53 0.18 0.38 0.47 0.93 0.53 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.23
SOUTH KOREA Cato 2008 0.49 0.30 0.46 0.51 0.54 0.41 0.00 0.34 0.11 0.00 0.14
SOUTH KOREA Cato 2012 0.22 0.22 0.31 0.71 0.57 0.21 0.02 0.38 0.20 0.04 0.16
SOUTH KOREA Cato Military 0.48 0.41 0.34 0.48 0.68 0.28 0.02 0.44 0.17 0.02 0.07
SOUTH KOREA Cato Political 0.04 -0.03 0.12 0.87 0.87 0.28 0.00 0.24 0.18 0.03 0.28
SOUTH KOREA Cato Social 0.67 0.33 0.80 0.33 0.33 0.50 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.17
SOUTH KOREA Cato Three Topics 0.30 0.13 0.18 0.70 0.82 0.39 0.01 0.26 0.12 0.02 0.21
SOUTH KOREA CFR 2004 0.54 0.22 0.51 0.46 0.00 0.66 0.11 0.00 0.23 0.00 0.00
SOUTH KOREA CFR 2008 0.62 0.28 0.27 0.38 0.68 0.47 0.14 0.20 0.00 0.05 0.14
SOUTH KOREA CFR 2012 0.64 0.42 0.22 0.37 0.82 0.40 0.02 0.40 0.08 0.01 0.10
SOUTH KOREA CFR Military 0.78 0.33 0.62 0.22 0.34 0.67 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.11
SOUTH KOREA CFR Political 0.64 0.39 0.30 0.36 0.54 0.49 0.08 0.25 0.15 0.01 0.02
SOUTH KOREA CFR Social 0.47 0.24 0.22 0.54 0.74 0.37 0.17 0.20 0.10 0.00 0.17
SOUTH KOREA CFR Three Topics 0.54 0.29 0.22 0.46 0.52 0.48 0.08 0.20 0.12 0.05 0.06
SOUTH KOREA Heritage 2004 0.57 0.20 0.38 0.44 0.73 0.60 0.00 0.18 0.04 0.00 0.18
SOUTH KOREA Heritage 2008 0.49 0.20 0.45 0.51 0.52 0.38 0.28 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.17
SOUTH KOREA Heritage 2012 0.41 0.35 0.12 0.59 0.72 0.28 0.12 0.31 0.24 0.00 0.05
SOUTH KOREA Heritage Military 0.13 -0.14 0.30 0.87 0.87 0.47 0.03 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.37
SOUTH KOREA Heritage Political 0.54 0.36 0.23 0.46 0.69 0.42 0.06 0.29 0.18 0.00 0.05
SOUTH KOREA Heritage Social 1.00 0.62 0.74 0.00 0.34 0.34 0.50 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
SOUTH KOREA Heritage Three Topics 0.48 0.25 0.20 0.52 0.60 0.47 0.06 0.20 0.17 0.00 0.09
SOUTH KOREA RAND 2004 0.21 -0.02 0.26 0.63 0.82 0.43 0.00 0.18 0.08 0.00 0.32
SOUTH KOREA RAND 2008 0.54 0.37 0.34 0.47 0.52 0.32 0.00 0.45 0.06 0.03 0.15
SOUTH KOREA RAND 2012 0.43 0.15 0.24 0.58 0.63 0.54 0.02 0.16 0.13 0.01 0.16
SOUTH KOREA RAND Military 0.44 0.25 0.20 0.56 0.75 0.38 0.02 0.32 0.11 0.01 0.16
SOUTH KOREA RAND Political 0.39 0.12 0.23 0.61 0.67 0.53 0.00 0.17 0.11 0.02 0.17
SOUTH KOREA RAND Social 0.30 0.10 0.47 0.48 0.41 0.32 0.00 0.33 0.03 0.00 0.32
SOUTH KOREA RAND Three Topics 0.43 0.18 0.20 0.57 0.79 0.48 0.01 0.22 0.09 0.01 0.17
SOUTH KOREA Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.44 0.17 0.35 0.53 0.60 0.52 0.02 0.17 0.13 0.01 0.14
SOUTH KOREA Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.46 0.22 0.38 0.54 0.59 0.39 0.09 0.25 0.06 0.01 0.20
SOUTH KOREA Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.45 0.30 0.25 0.54 0.63 0.35 0.09 0.29 0.14 0.03 0.10
SOUTH KOREA Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.45 0.23 0.32 0.54 0.61 0.42 0.07 0.24 0.11 0.02 0.14
SOUTH KOREA Seven Think Tanks Military 0.33 0.16 0.33 0.66 0.71 0.35 0.05 0.26 0.11 0.03 0.19
SOUTH KOREA Seven Think Tanks Political 0.50 0.25 0.28 0.49 0.62 0.49 0.04 0.23 0.13 0.02 0.11
SOUTH KOREA Seven Think Tanks Social 0.55 0.31 0.56 0.41 0.35 0.35 0.17 0.26 0.08 0.00 0.15
SOUTH KOREA Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.45 0.23 0.20 0.55 0.67 0.45 0.04 0.23 0.13 0.02 0.13
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to South 
Korea? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing South Korea’s 
actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view South 
Korea’s actions?  
 As Table 5-34 shows, relative to other think tanks, Cato assigned the most 
conflictual actions to South Korea, while CFR and RAND assigned the most cooperative 
actions. Two think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking 
about South Korea. CFR and RAND assigned cooperative actions to South Korea across 
the seven instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a 
manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to South Korea. As Table 5-34 
shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the 
strategy of South Korea was 88% cooperative. 
What was South Korea’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy 
think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to South Korea?  
 As Figure 5-16 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of South Korea were most similar to actions of Europe and least similar to 
actions of Israel. From the total of forty-four instances, South Korea was placed nineteen 
times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 43% similarity (57% dissimilarity). 
South Korea was not placed in the same quadrant as Israel, which shows 100% 
dissimilarity.  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of South Korea 
were most similar to actions of Europe and least similar to actions of Israel, the Muslim 
World, Terrorists, North Korea, and Iraq. From the total of eleven instances, South Korea 
 197 
 
was placed nine times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 82% similarity (18% 
dissimilarity). On the other hand, South Korea was not placed in the same quadrant as 
Israel, the Muslim World, Terrorists, North Korea, and Iraq, which indicates 100% 
dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of South Korea were most similar to political 
actions of Taiwan and France and least similar to those of Israel, the Muslim World, 
Terrorists, Iraq, Syria, and Russia. From the total of eleven instances, South Korea was 
placed five times in the same quadrant as Taiwan and France, which shows 45% 
similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, South Korea was not placed in the 
same quadrant as Israel, the Muslim World, Terrorists, Iraq, Syria, and Russia, which 
indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of South Korea were most similar to social actions of 
Turkey and Germany, and least similar to social actions of Israel, Afghanistan, and 
France. From the total of eleven instances, South Korea was placed five times in the same 
quadrant as Turkey and Germany, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On 
the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, social actions of South Korea were not 
placed in the same quadrant as social actions of Israel, Afghanistan, and France, which 
indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Military Issues: Military actions of South Korea were most similar to military 
actions of China and least similar to military actions of Israel, the Muslim World, 
Terrorists, Britain, and Turkey. From the total of eleven instances, South Korea was 
placed seven times in the same quadrant as China, which shows 64% similarity (36% 
dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of South Korea were not placed in the 
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same quadrant as military actions of Israel, the Muslim World, Terrorists, Britain, and 
Turkey, which indicates 100% dissimilarity. 
 
Figure 5-16 Similarity of Actions of South Korea to other Actors 
Syria 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Syria’s operational code, 
and did they agree in their assessment of Syria’s actions?  
Table 5-37 shows the operational code of Syria on fifty-seven levels of time and 
topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Syria, the overall perception of the 
American foreign policy think tanks was conflictual. Table 5-36 presents the number of 
times Syria’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average of direction 
of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Syria’s strategy as 
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conflictual forty times and cooperative seventeen times. The difference between the 
frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign 
policy think tanks had a medium level of certainty about the direction of strategy of 
Syria. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 40% 
agreement in describing Syria’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American 
foreign policy think tanks ranked Syria fifth based on its conflictual actions and 
eighteenth based on its cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-36 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Syria 
SYRIA
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
AEI 4 3
RAND 4 3
CFR 4 3
Brookings 4 3
Carnegie 5 2
Seven Think Tanks 6 2
Heritage 6 1
Cato 7
Grand Total 40 17
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Table 5-37 Operational Code of Syria from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
SYRIA AEI 2004 0.20 0.10 0.48 0.50 0.62 0.23 0.00 0.37 0.05 0.05 0.30
SYRIA AEI 2008 0.86 0.54 0.37 0.14 0.68 0.51 0.03 0.40 0.05 0.00 0.03
SYRIA AEI 2012 -0.18 -0.29 0.18 0.82 0.94 0.31 0.00 0.10 0.13 0.04 0.42
SYRIA AEI Military 0.64 0.50 0.57 0.31 0.53 0.24 0.00 0.58 0.01 0.01 0.15
SYRIA AEI Political 0.00 -0.17 0.25 0.50 0.79 0.39 0.02 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.34
SYRIA AEI Social 1.00 0.67 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
SYRIA AEI Three Topics 0.19 -0.01 0.20 0.70 0.81 0.42 0.01 0.17 0.11 0.03 0.26
SYRIA Brookings 2004 0.24 -0.05 0.44 0.57 0.60 0.53 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.00 0.28
SYRIA Brookings 2008 0.34 0.12 0.25 0.67 0.92 0.43 0.01 0.23 0.11 0.00 0.23
SYRIA Brookings 2012 0.06 0.00 0.13 0.67 0.85 0.21 0.07 0.25 0.14 0.05 0.29
SYRIA Brookings Military -0.17 -0.33 0.28 0.84 0.84 0.32 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.09 0.48
SYRIA Brookings Political 0.00 -0.11 0.15 0.80 0.87 0.32 0.01 0.17 0.16 0.00 0.34
SYRIA Brookings Social 0.82 0.51 0.48 0.18 0.63 0.52 0.07 0.31 0.09 0.00 0.00
SYRIA Brookings Three Topics 0.06 -0.06 0.13 0.81 0.89 0.32 0.02 0.18 0.16 0.01 0.30
SYRIA Carnegie 2004 -0.57 -0.48 0.36 0.43 0.89 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.44
SYRIA Carnegie 2008 0.24 0.11 0.17 0.76 0.72 0.41 0.02 0.20 0.21 0.01 0.16
SYRIA Carnegie 2012 0.02 -0.05 0.20 0.67 0.83 0.32 0.02 0.16 0.21 0.02 0.26
SYRIA Carnegie Military 0.21 -0.03 0.27 0.79 0.77 0.47 0.02 0.11 0.10 0.02 0.27
SYRIA Carnegie Political -0.28 -0.20 0.20 0.61 0.84 0.22 0.02 0.12 0.33 0.01 0.30
SYRIA Carnegie Social 0.40 0.27 0.15 0.60 0.91 0.32 0.04 0.34 0.11 0.04 0.15
SYRIA Carnegie Three Topics -0.12 -0.14 0.16 0.65 0.84 0.29 0.02 0.13 0.26 0.01 0.29
SYRIA Cato 2004 -0.50 -0.50 0.70 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.75
SYRIA Cato 2008 0.00 0.00 0.40 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50
SYRIA Cato 2012 -0.13 -0.03 0.09 0.87 0.67 0.14 0.09 0.21 0.30 0.09 0.18
SYRIA Cato Military -0.14 -0.05 0.07 0.86 0.86 0.00 0.14 0.29 0.14 0.14 0.29
SYRIA Cato Political -0.03 0.03 0.27 0.98 0.21 0.13 0.03 0.33 0.21 0.03 0.28
SYRIA Cato Social -1.00 -1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
SYRIA Cato Three Topics -0.07 -0.03 0.29 0.93 0.24 0.06 0.02 0.39 0.11 0.02 0.40
SYRIA CFR 2004 0.49 0.39 0.24 0.51 0.88 0.25 0.10 0.40 0.10 0.08 0.08
SYRIA CFR 2008 -0.39 -0.37 0.41 0.61 0.61 0.17 0.00 0.14 0.19 0.00 0.50
SYRIA CFR 2012 0.21 0.10 0.39 0.52 0.66 0.25 0.04 0.32 0.11 0.00 0.29
SYRIA CFR Military -0.30 -0.32 0.52 0.26 0.63 0.07 0.11 0.17 0.07 0.06 0.52
SYRIA CFR Political 0.06 0.03 0.14 0.83 0.85 0.27 0.03 0.23 0.23 0.02 0.22
SYRIA CFR Social 1.00 0.78 0.74 0.00 0.34 0.34 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
SYRIA CFR Three Topics 0.10 0.04 0.09 0.90 0.96 0.25 0.05 0.25 0.17 0.02 0.25
SYRIA Heritage 2004 0.10 -0.16 0.58 0.40 0.47 0.44 0.00 0.12 0.05 0.00 0.40
SYRIA Heritage 2008 0.21 0.14 0.38 0.67 0.68 0.26 0.00 0.35 0.15 0.00 0.24
SYRIA Heritage 2012 0.02 -0.05 0.11 0.88 0.92 0.22 0.11 0.18 0.14 0.04 0.31
SYRIA Heritage Military -0.05 -0.08 0.72 0.29 0.29 0.05 0.10 0.33 0.05 0.00 0.48
SYRIA Heritage Political 0.13 0.05 0.11 0.87 0.91 0.32 0.00 0.25 0.19 0.02 0.23
SYRIA Heritage Social 0.38 -0.05 0.65 0.38 0.50 0.69 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.25
SYRIA Heritage Three Topics 0.10 -0.02 0.12 0.90 0.91 0.32 0.02 0.21 0.13 0.02 0.30
SYRIA RAND 2004 0.26 0.15 0.31 0.74 0.27 0.52 0.00 0.12 0.35 0.00 0.02
SYRIA RAND 2008 0.42 0.12 0.37 0.58 0.59 0.49 0.00 0.22 0.05 0.00 0.24
SYRIA RAND 2012 -0.24 -0.27 0.20 0.76 0.75 0.27 0.02 0.09 0.23 0.03 0.37
SYRIA RAND Military -0.03 -0.04 0.27 0.81 0.47 0.29 0.00 0.19 0.28 0.00 0.24
SYRIA RAND Political 0.10 -0.03 0.21 0.69 0.67 0.37 0.01 0.17 0.17 0.02 0.26
SYRIA RAND Social 0.50 0.08 0.63 0.50 0.25 0.75 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.13
SYRIA RAND Three Topics 0.09 -0.03 0.18 0.69 0.74 0.37 0.01 0.17 0.18 0.02 0.26
SYRIA Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.08 -0.04 0.43 0.52 0.57 0.33 0.02 0.20 0.14 0.02 0.30
SYRIA Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.28 0.12 0.33 0.60 0.65 0.36 0.01 0.28 0.11 0.00 0.24
SYRIA Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.01 -0.05 0.18 0.74 0.81 0.25 0.05 0.20 0.16 0.04 0.30
SYRIA Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.13 0.01 0.31 0.62 0.68 0.31 0.03 0.23 0.14 0.02 0.28
SYRIA Seven Think Tanks Military 0.05 -0.03 0.43 0.55 0.59 0.22 0.05 0.26 0.09 0.03 0.35
SYRIA Seven Think Tanks Political 0.00 -0.06 0.19 0.74 0.76 0.30 0.02 0.19 0.20 0.02 0.28
SYRIA Seven Think Tanks Social 0.54 0.26 0.55 0.27 0.53 0.48 0.02 0.27 0.07 0.01 0.16
SYRIA Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.05 -0.04 0.17 0.80 0.77 0.29 0.02 0.21 0.16 0.02 0.29
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Syria? Did 
any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Syria’s actions across time 
and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Syria’s actions?  
 As Table 5-36 shows, relative to other think tanks, Cato assigned the most 
conflictual actions to Syria. Also, the same table shows that no think tank assigned 
predominantly cooperative actions to Syria. One think tank, Cato, showed complete 
consistency in the seven instances of talking about Syria. It assigned conflictual actions in 
every instance. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a 
manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to Syria. As Table 5-36 shows, and 
according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Syria 
was 75% conflictual.  
What was Syria’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy think 
tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Syria?  
 As Figure 5-17 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of Syria were most similar to actions of Terrorists and Israel and least 
similar to actions of China and the United Nations. From the total of forty-four instances, 
Syria was placed eighteen times in the same quadrant as Terrorists and Israel, which 
shows 41% similarity (59% dissimilarity). Syria was placed three times in the same 
quadrant as the United Nations and China, which shows 93% dissimilarity (7% 
similarity).  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Syria were 
most similar to actions of Terrorists and least similar to actions of China and Russia. 
From the total of eleven instances, Syria was placed six times in the same quadrant as 
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Terrorists, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Syria was 
not placed in the same quadrant as China and Russia, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of Syria were most similar to political actions of 
Terrorists and Israel and least similar to political actions of the United Nations, Germany, 
Japan, Britain, South Korea, Europe, the United States, and Taiwan. From the total of 
eleven instances, Syria was placed eight times in the same quadrant as Terrorists and 
Israel, which shows 73% similarity (27% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Syria was not 
placed in the same quadrant as the United Nations, Germany, Japan, Britain, South 
Korea, Europe, the United States, and Taiwan, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of Syria were most similar to social actions of India 
and Pakistan and least similar to those of Britain and the Muslim World. From the total of 
eleven instances, Syria was placed five times in the same quadrant as India and Pakistan, 
which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of 
Syria were not placed in the same quadrant as social actions of Britain and the Muslim 
World, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Military Issues: Military actions of Syria were most similar to military actions of 
Turkey and least similar to those of China. From the total of eleven instances, Syria was 
placed six times in the same quadrant as Turkey, which shows 55% similarity (45% 
dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of Syria were not placed in the same 
quadrant as military actions of China, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
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Figure 5-17 Similarity of Actions of Syria to other Actors 
Taiwan 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Taiwan’s operational 
code, and did they agree in their assessment of Taiwan’s actions?  
Table 5-39 shows the operational code of Taiwan on fifty-seven levels of time 
and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Taiwan, the overall perception 
of the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table 5-38 presents the 
number of times Taiwan’s index of direction of strategy was above or below the average 
of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks described Taiwan’s 
strategy as conflictual sixteen times and cooperative forty-one times. The difference 
between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American 
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foreign policy think tanks had a medium level of certainty about the direction of strategy 
of Taiwan. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 44% 
agreement in describing Taiwan’s strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American 
foreign policy think tanks ranked Taiwan seventeenth based on its conflictual actions and 
seventh based on its cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-38 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Taiwan 
  
TAIWAN
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
Seven Think Tanks 8
Carnegie 7
Cato 2 5
CFR 2 5
RAND 2 5
Brookings 2 5
AEI 3 4
Heritage 5 2
Grand Total 16 41
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Table 5-39 Operational Code of Taiwan from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
TAIWAN AEI 2004 -0.11 0.06 0.47 0.44 0.33 0.28 0.00 0.17 0.50 0.06 0.00
TAIWAN AEI 2008 0.62 0.42 0.47 0.38 0.63 0.35 0.00 0.46 0.05 0.00 0.14
TAIWAN AEI 2012 0.19 0.11 0.12 0.81 0.94 0.30 0.00 0.30 0.17 0.00 0.23
TAIWAN AEI Military 0.00 0.34 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00
TAIWAN AEI Political 0.52 0.35 0.20 0.48 0.82 0.39 0.00 0.37 0.13 0.00 0.11
TAIWAN AEI Social 0.17 -0.06 0.29 0.84 0.84 0.46 0.00 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.29
TAIWAN AEI Three Topics 0.28 0.19 0.15 0.72 0.74 0.35 0.00 0.29 0.19 0.06 0.12
TAIWAN Brookings 2004 0.63 0.44 0.18 0.37 0.79 0.28 0.13 0.41 0.03 0.06 0.10
TAIWAN Brookings 2008 0.09 0.11 0.25 0.41 0.94 0.23 0.03 0.29 0.27 0.00 0.19
TAIWAN Brookings 2012 0.73 0.49 0.34 0.28 0.63 0.44 0.01 0.42 0.08 0.02 0.04
TAIWAN Brookings Military 0.68 0.46 0.33 0.32 0.66 0.41 0.00 0.42 0.07 0.05 0.05
TAIWAN Brookings Political 0.46 0.33 0.15 0.54 0.91 0.32 0.06 0.35 0.13 0.03 0.11
TAIWAN Brookings Social 0.33 0.28 0.40 0.00 0.70 0.18 0.11 0.37 0.17 0.00 0.17
TAIWAN Brookings Three Topics 0.46 0.31 0.15 0.55 0.88 0.35 0.04 0.33 0.14 0.03 0.11
TAIWAN Carnegie 2004 0.27 0.17 0.22 0.73 0.63 0.26 0.00 0.38 0.10 0.02 0.24
TAIWAN Carnegie 2008 0.40 0.18 0.43 0.60 0.45 0.55 0.00 0.15 0.23 0.00 0.08
TAIWAN Carnegie 2012 0.41 0.20 0.36 0.59 0.45 0.42 0.02 0.26 0.11 0.02 0.16
TAIWAN Carnegie Military 0.47 0.16 0.52 0.53 0.27 0.49 0.00 0.24 0.02 0.02 0.22
TAIWAN Carnegie Political 0.26 0.22 0.15 0.74 0.66 0.29 0.04 0.30 0.24 0.04 0.10
TAIWAN Carnegie Social 0.50 0.17 0.70 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.25
TAIWAN Carnegie Three Topics 0.44 0.25 0.18 0.56 0.71 0.44 0.02 0.26 0.16 0.03 0.10
TAIWAN Cato 2004 0.09 -0.15 0.27 0.75 0.87 0.38 0.04 0.12 0.06 0.00 0.40
TAIWAN Cato 2008 0.35 0.24 0.24 0.56 0.69 0.34 0.00 0.33 0.17 0.00 0.16
TAIWAN Cato 2012 0.69 0.33 0.43 0.31 0.31 0.69 0.00 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.00
TAIWAN Cato Military 0.00 -0.12 0.34 0.67 0.67 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.34
TAIWAN Cato Political 0.31 0.16 0.23 0.58 0.56 0.37 0.02 0.26 0.16 0.00 0.19
TAIWAN Cato Social 0.50 0.12 0.44 0.50 0.84 0.59 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.25
TAIWAN Cato Three Topics 0.40 0.18 0.23 0.60 0.72 0.44 0.03 0.22 0.14 0.00 0.17
TAIWAN CFR 2004 0.72 0.45 0.30 0.29 0.69 0.52 0.00 0.35 0.07 0.07 0.00
TAIWAN CFR 2008 -0.17 0.00 0.53 0.50 0.17 0.33 0.00 0.08 0.58 0.00 0.00
TAIWAN CFR 2012 0.53 0.49 0.58 0.47 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.00 0.23
TAIWAN CFR Military -1.00 -0.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
TAIWAN CFR Political 0.44 0.27 0.36 0.56 0.38 0.37 0.00 0.36 0.11 0.00 0.17
TAIWAN CFR Social 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TAIWAN CFR Three Topics 0.40 0.29 0.27 0.60 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.32 0.19 0.05 0.07
TAIWAN Heritage 2004 0.06 -0.07 0.24 0.78 0.62 0.26 0.01 0.27 0.06 0.00 0.41
TAIWAN Heritage 2008 0.43 0.37 0.22 0.57 0.57 0.32 0.06 0.34 0.27 0.00 0.02
TAIWAN Heritage 2012 -0.40 0.07 0.61 0.60 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.70 0.00 0.00
TAIWAN Heritage Military 0.28 0.32 0.31 0.72 0.81 0.17 0.00 0.47 0.23 0.00 0.13
TAIWAN Heritage Political -0.18 -0.03 0.44 0.52 0.39 0.26 0.04 0.11 0.50 0.00 0.09
TAIWAN Heritage Social -0.33 -0.33 0.47 0.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.67
TAIWAN Heritage Three Topics 0.13 0.17 0.23 0.74 0.79 0.23 0.03 0.30 0.31 0.00 0.12
TAIWAN RAND 2004 0.30 0.22 0.24 0.53 0.59 0.39 0.02 0.24 0.27 0.03 0.06
TAIWAN RAND 2008 0.27 0.22 0.17 0.66 0.71 0.27 0.02 0.34 0.20 0.04 0.14
TAIWAN RAND 2012 0.05 0.08 0.32 0.95 0.95 0.21 0.00 0.31 0.26 0.00 0.21
TAIWAN RAND Military -0.16 0.06 0.33 0.84 0.62 0.18 0.00 0.24 0.51 0.00 0.07
TAIWAN RAND Political 0.28 0.04 0.22 0.72 0.80 0.45 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.05 0.24
TAIWAN RAND Social 0.61 0.50 0.28 0.40 0.69 0.27 0.02 0.52 0.11 0.02 0.08
TAIWAN RAND Three Topics 0.28 0.24 0.13 0.72 0.81 0.29 0.02 0.34 0.22 0.03 0.11
TAIWAN Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.26 0.14 0.26 0.58 0.65 0.32 0.03 0.27 0.15 0.03 0.19
TAIWAN Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.29 0.22 0.32 0.52 0.62 0.34 0.02 0.30 0.24 0.01 0.11
TAIWAN Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.35 0.27 0.40 0.55 0.55 0.31 0.01 0.35 0.19 0.01 0.13
TAIWAN Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.30 0.21 0.33 0.55 0.61 0.32 0.02 0.30 0.19 0.02 0.14
TAIWAN Seven Think Tanks Military 0.16 0.18 0.48 0.51 0.49 0.26 0.00 0.32 0.28 0.01 0.12
TAIWAN Seven Think Tanks Political 0.30 0.19 0.25 0.59 0.65 0.35 0.03 0.27 0.19 0.02 0.14
TAIWAN Seven Think Tanks Social 0.40 0.23 0.47 0.39 0.53 0.32 0.03 0.35 0.07 0.00 0.22
TAIWAN Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.34 0.23 0.19 0.64 0.72 0.35 0.02 0.30 0.19 0.03 0.11
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Taiwan? Did 
any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Taiwan’s actions across time 
and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Taiwan’s actions?  
 As Table 5-38 shows, relative to other think tanks, Heritage assigned the most 
conflictual actions to Taiwan, while Carnegie assigned the most cooperative actions. One 
think tank showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking about Taiwan. 
Carnegie assigned cooperative actions to Taiwan across the seven instances. This level of 
complete consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational 
identity in regard to Taiwan. As Table 5-38 shows, and according to the collectivity of 
the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of Taiwan was 100% cooperative.  
What was Taiwan’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy think 
tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Taiwan?  
As Figure 5-18 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think tanks, 
actions of Taiwan were most similar to actions of Japan and least similar to actions of 
Iraq. From the total of forty-four instances, Taiwan was placed fifteen times in the same 
quadrant as Japan, which shows 34% similarity (66% dissimilarity). Taiwan was placed 
four times in the same quadrant as Iraq, which shows 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Taiwan were 
most similar to actions of Japan and least similar to actions of Iraq, the Muslim World, 
Terrorists, Israel, and Pakistan. From the total of eleven instances, Taiwan was placed 
seven times in the same quadrant as Japan, which shows 64% similarity (36% 
dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, Taiwan was not 
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placed in the same quadrant as Iraq, the Muslim World, Terrorists, Israel, and Pakistan, 
which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of Taiwan were most similar to political actions 
of South Korea and least similar to those of Terrorists, Syria, and Iran. From the total of 
eleven instances, Taiwan was placed five times in the same quadrant as South Korea, 
which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, Taiwan was not 
placed in the same quadrant as Terrorists, Syria, and Iran, which indicates 100% 
dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of Taiwan were most similar to social actions of 
India and least similar to social actions of Iraq, the Muslim World, North Korea, 
Afghanistan, Germany, France, and the United Nations. From the total of eleven 
instances, Taiwan was placed five times in the same quadrant as India, which shows 45% 
similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social actions of Taiwan were placed 
only once in the same quadrant as social actions of Iraq, the Muslim World, North Korea, 
Afghanistan, Germany, France, and the United Nations, which indicates 91% 
dissimilarity (9% similarity).  
 Military Issues: Military actions of Taiwan were most similar to military actions 
of France and least similar to those of Iraq and Afghanistan. From the total of eleven 
instances, Taiwan was placed five times in the same quadrant as France, which shows 
45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of Taiwan were 
not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of Iraq and Afghanistan, which 
indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
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Figure 5-18 Similarity of Actions of Taiwan to other Actors 
Terrorists 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Terrorists’ operational 
code, and did they agree in their assessment of Terrorists’ actions?  
Table 5-41 shows the operational code of Terrorists on fifty-seven levels of time 
and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Terrorists, the overall 
perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was very conflictual. Table 5-40 
presents the number of times Terrorists’ index of direction of strategy was above or 
below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks 
described Terrorists’ strategy as conflictual fifty-seven times. The difference between the 
frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts indicates that the American foreign 
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policy think tanks had ultimate certainty about the direction of strategy of Terrorists. As 
Table 5-4 shows, the seven American foreign policy think tanks had 100% agreement in 
describing Terrorists’ strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign 
policy think tanks ranked Terrorists first based on its conflictual actions and twenty-
second based on its cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-40 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Terrorists 
TERRORISTS
CONFLICTUAL
Cato 7
CFR 7
Brookings 7
Heritage 7
AEI 7
RAND 7
Carnegie 7
Seven Think Tanks 8
Grand Total 57
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Table 5-41 Operational Code of Terrorists from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
TERRORIST AEI 2004 -0.01 -0.14 0.17 0.83 0.88 0.33 0.01 0.17 0.11 0.01 0.38
TERRORIST AEI 2008 -0.39 -0.32 0.23 0.61 0.73 0.15 0.02 0.13 0.26 0.02 0.42
TERRORIST AEI 2012 -0.17 -0.27 0.22 0.73 0.74 0.25 0.01 0.16 0.11 0.01 0.47
TERRORIST AEI Military -0.30 -0.36 0.25 0.70 0.68 0.20 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.52
TERRORIST AEI Political -0.13 -0.21 0.13 0.87 0.89 0.27 0.01 0.16 0.15 0.02 0.40
TERRORIST AEI Social -0.16 -0.17 0.30 0.49 0.71 0.24 0.00 0.18 0.22 0.00 0.35
TERRORIST AEI Three Topics -0.16 -0.23 0.14 0.84 0.85 0.25 0.02 0.16 0.15 0.02 0.42
TERRORIST Brookings 2004 -0.07 -0.20 0.32 0.68 0.55 0.40 0.00 0.07 0.20 0.00 0.34
TERRORIST Brookings 2008 -0.03 -0.06 0.10 0.93 0.99 0.26 0.01 0.22 0.22 0.01 0.29
TERRORIST Brookings 2012 -0.01 -0.15 0.15 0.93 0.89 0.32 0.02 0.16 0.10 0.04 0.37
TERRORIST Brookings Military -0.06 -0.12 0.18 0.86 0.72 0.36 0.00 0.11 0.25 0.03 0.25
TERRORIST Brookings Political -0.20 -0.24 0.16 0.77 0.85 0.23 0.02 0.15 0.18 0.02 0.41
TERRORIST Brookings Social 0.17 -0.07 0.31 0.83 0.72 0.44 0.00 0.14 0.08 0.00 0.33
TERRORIST Brookings Three Topics -0.05 -0.12 0.11 0.93 0.94 0.28 0.01 0.18 0.17 0.02 0.34
TERRORIST Carnegie 2004 -0.37 -0.42 0.45 0.63 0.42 0.14 0.00 0.18 0.06 0.01 0.61
TERRORIST Carnegie 2008 -0.09 -0.13 0.10 0.90 0.92 0.26 0.01 0.19 0.19 0.03 0.32
TERRORIST Carnegie 2012 -0.12 -0.20 0.23 0.79 0.77 0.25 0.01 0.18 0.13 0.02 0.42
TERRORIST Carnegie Military -0.38 -0.43 0.41 0.61 0.62 0.18 0.02 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.57
TERRORIST Carnegie Political -0.09 -0.18 0.14 0.86 0.93 0.29 0.01 0.16 0.15 0.02 0.38
TERRORIST Carnegie Social 0.03 -0.03 0.22 0.78 0.59 0.22 0.00 0.29 0.12 0.02 0.34
TERRORIST Carnegie Three Topics -0.05 -0.16 0.13 0.91 0.93 0.30 0.01 0.17 0.14 0.02 0.37
TERRORIST Cato 2004 -0.53 -0.52 0.39 0.47 0.54 0.11 0.00 0.13 0.10 0.06 0.60
TERRORIST Cato 2008 -0.44 -0.38 0.24 0.57 0.83 0.14 0.05 0.10 0.24 0.00 0.48
TERRORIST Cato 2012 -0.14 -0.15 0.21 0.76 0.79 0.27 0.02 0.14 0.27 0.00 0.30
TERRORIST Cato Military -0.15 -0.20 0.16 0.75 0.89 0.20 0.06 0.17 0.12 0.07 0.39
TERRORIST Cato Political -0.29 -0.24 0.23 0.71 0.65 0.20 0.00 0.15 0.27 0.00 0.38
TERRORIST Cato Social -1.00 -0.84 0.70 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.75
TERRORIST Cato Three Topics -0.32 -0.34 0.20 0.68 0.75 0.20 0.02 0.12 0.16 0.01 0.48
TERRORIST CFR 2004 -0.40 -0.36 0.21 0.60 0.92 0.20 0.00 0.11 0.26 0.01 0.44
TERRORIST CFR 2008 -0.03 -0.16 0.18 0.96 0.73 0.28 0.02 0.19 0.09 0.01 0.42
TERRORIST CFR 2012 -0.14 -0.26 0.21 0.86 0.80 0.25 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.01 0.47
TERRORIST CFR Military -0.08 -0.17 0.16 0.92 0.75 0.22 0.06 0.19 0.11 0.00 0.44
TERRORIST CFR Political -0.08 -0.17 0.13 0.90 0.88 0.29 0.01 0.15 0.16 0.01 0.37
TERRORIST CFR Social -0.44 -0.47 0.37 0.56 0.72 0.19 0.00 0.08 0.17 0.00 0.56
TERRORIST CFR Three Topics -0.15 -0.22 0.13 0.85 0.91 0.26 0.02 0.14 0.15 0.03 0.40
TERRORIST Heritage 2004 -0.42 -0.46 0.39 0.58 0.58 0.18 0.00 0.12 0.10 0.01 0.60
TERRORIST Heritage 2008 -0.41 -0.45 0.28 0.60 0.76 0.22 0.01 0.07 0.14 0.01 0.55
TERRORIST Heritage 2012 0.10 -0.12 0.39 0.60 0.53 0.41 0.01 0.13 0.08 0.01 0.36
TERRORIST Heritage Military -0.23 -0.32 0.21 0.77 0.86 0.27 0.01 0.10 0.14 0.00 0.47
TERRORIST Heritage Political -0.25 -0.29 0.17 0.75 0.72 0.20 0.01 0.17 0.13 0.03 0.47
TERRORIST Heritage Social -0.26 -0.48 0.85 0.07 0.15 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.59
TERRORIST Heritage Three Topics -0.22 -0.28 0.17 0.78 0.76 0.23 0.01 0.15 0.13 0.02 0.47
TERRORIST RAND 2004 -0.05 -0.11 0.14 0.93 0.73 0.22 0.01 0.25 0.12 0.01 0.39
TERRORIST RAND 2008 0.02 -0.06 0.11 0.95 0.87 0.27 0.01 0.23 0.14 0.02 0.33
TERRORIST RAND 2012 0.02 -0.03 0.16 0.82 0.70 0.23 0.02 0.26 0.17 0.01 0.31
TERRORIST RAND Military -0.05 -0.12 0.13 0.91 0.75 0.22 0.02 0.24 0.12 0.01 0.39
TERRORIST RAND Political -0.09 -0.16 0.13 0.91 0.80 0.23 0.02 0.21 0.13 0.02 0.39
TERRORIST RAND Social 0.17 0.14 0.15 0.83 0.73 0.26 0.00 0.32 0.21 0.00 0.20
TERRORIST RAND Three Topics -0.05 -0.12 0.12 0.95 0.79 0.24 0.02 0.22 0.12 0.02 0.38
TERRORIST Seven Think Tanks 2004 -0.26 -0.32 0.29 0.67 0.66 0.22 0.00 0.15 0.14 0.02 0.48
TERRORIST Seven Think Tanks 2008 -0.19 -0.22 0.18 0.79 0.83 0.22 0.02 0.16 0.18 0.01 0.40
TERRORIST Seven Think Tanks 2012 -0.03 -0.15 0.21 0.79 0.77 0.30 0.02 0.17 0.13 0.01 0.37
TERRORIST Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections -0.16 -0.23 0.23 0.75 0.75 0.25 0.01 0.16 0.15 0.01 0.42
TERRORIST Seven Think Tanks Military -0.18 -0.25 0.21 0.79 0.75 0.24 0.03 0.15 0.14 0.02 0.43
TERRORIST Seven Think Tanks Political -0.16 -0.21 0.16 0.82 0.82 0.24 0.01 0.17 0.16 0.02 0.40
TERRORIST Seven Think Tanks Social -0.17 -0.25 0.40 0.53 0.59 0.26 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.43
TERRORIST Seven Think Tanks Three Topics -0.14 -0.21 0.14 0.85 0.85 0.25 0.02 0.16 0.15 0.02 0.41
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Terrorists? 
Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Terrorists’ actions across 
time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Terrorists’ actions?  
 As Table 5-40 shows, all the think tanks and also the collectivity of the think 
tanks assigned conflictual actions to Terrorists. All the think tanks exhibited complete 
consistency in the seven instances of talking about Terrorists. This level of complete 
consistency across time and topic might be a manifestation of a national collective 
identity in regard to Terrorists.  
What was Terrorists’ relative position in the world of American foreign policy think 
tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Terrorists?  
 As Figure 5-19 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of Terrorists were most similar to actions of Israel and least similar to 
actions of Europe and South Korea. From the total of forty-four instances, Terrorists were 
placed twenty times in the same quadrant as Israel, which shows 45% similarity (55% 
dissimilarity). On the other hand, Terrorists were placed once in the same quadrant as 
Europe and South Korea, which indicates 98% dissimilarity (2% similarity).  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Terrorists 
were most similar to actions of Israel, North Kora, and Syria and least similar to actions 
of Europe, South Korea, China, Japan, Taiwan, the United Nations, and the United States. 
From the total of eleven instances, Terrorists were placed six times in the same quadrant 
as Israel, North Kora, and Syria, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the 
other hand, Terrorists were not placed in the same quadrant as Europe, South Korea, 
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China, Japan, Taiwan, the United Nations, and the United States, which indicates 100% 
dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of Terrorists were most similar to political 
actions of Syria and least similar to those of Europe, South Korea, China, Japan, France, 
Taiwan, the United Nations, Germany, the United States, and Britain. From the total of 
eleven instances, Terrorists were placed eight times in the same quadrant as Syria, which 
shows 73% similarity (27% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible 
instances, Terrorists were not placed in the same quadrant as Europe, South Korea, 
China, Japan, France, Taiwan, the United Nations, Germany, the United States and 
Britain, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of Terrorists were most similar to social actions of 
Russia and Britain and least similar to social actions of Europe, South Korea, China, 
India, Turkey, Pakistan, the Muslim World, Afghanistan, Syria, and Israel. From the total 
of eleven instances, Terrorists were placed five times in the same quadrant as Russia and 
Britain, which shows 45% similarity (55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, social 
actions of Terrorists were placed once in the same quadrant as those of Europe, South 
Korea, China, India, Turkey, Pakistan, the Muslim World, Afghanistan, Syria, and Israel, 
which shows 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).  
 Military Issues: Military actions of Terrorists were most similar to military 
actions of Israel, North Korea, and Afghanistan and least similar to military actions of 
Europe, South Korea, Germany, and Russia. From the total of eleven instances, Terrorists 
were placed seven times in the same quadrant as Israel, North Korea, and Afghanistan, 
which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of 
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Terrorists were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of Europe, South 
Korea, Germany, and Russia, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 
 
Figure 5-19 Similarity of Actions of Terrorists to other Actors 
Turkey 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive Turkey’s operational 
code, and did they agree in their assessment of Turkey’s actions?  
Table 5-43 shows the operational code of Turkey on fifty-seven levels of time and 
topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to Turkey, the overall perception of 
the American foreign policy think tanks was neither cooperative nor conflictual. Table   
5-42 presents the number of times Turkey’s index of direction of strategy was above or 
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below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think tanks 
described Turkey’s strategy as conflictual twenty-six times and cooperative thirty-one 
times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative counts 
indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a very low level of certainty 
about the direction of strategy of Turkey. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven American 
foreign policy think tanks had 9% agreement in describing Turkey’s strategy. Among the 
twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked Turkey eleventh based 
on its conflictual actions and twelfth based on its cooperative actions. 
 
Table 5-42 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to Turkey 
 
TURKEY
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
Carnegie 7
Seven Think Tanks 2 6
Heritage 3 4
Brookings 3 4
RAND 3 4
Cato 5 2
CFR 5 2
AEI 5 2
Grand Total 26 31
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Table 5-43 Operational Code of Turkey from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
TURKEY AEI 2004 -0.45 -0.35 0.24 0.54 0.72 0.16 0.01 0.11 0.31 0.04 0.38
TURKEY AEI 2008 0.38 0.25 0.46 0.62 0.57 0.29 0.00 0.40 0.09 0.00 0.22
TURKEY AEI 2012 0.22 0.08 0.13 0.78 0.81 0.35 0.04 0.23 0.15 0.01 0.23
TURKEY AEI Military -0.36 -0.31 0.21 0.65 0.90 0.24 0.00 0.09 0.32 0.00 0.37
TURKEY AEI Political 0.09 -0.01 0.13 0.91 0.76 0.37 0.01 0.17 0.21 0.04 0.21
TURKEY AEI Social 0.13 0.11 0.56 0.20 0.43 0.10 0.03 0.43 0.08 0.00 0.35
TURKEY AEI Three Topics 0.08 0.00 0.11 0.83 0.82 0.35 0.01 0.19 0.21 0.02 0.23
TURKEY Brookings 2004 -0.31 -0.04 0.43 0.56 0.53 0.15 0.02 0.18 0.57 0.00 0.09
TURKEY Brookings 2008 0.62 0.50 0.24 0.38 0.81 0.28 0.06 0.48 0.12 0.00 0.07
TURKEY Brookings 2012 0.36 0.22 0.16 0.47 0.80 0.37 0.04 0.27 0.16 0.02 0.13
TURKEY Brookings Military -0.13 0.05 0.34 0.58 0.68 0.16 0.00 0.27 0.43 0.03 0.11
TURKEY Brookings Political 0.50 0.33 0.16 0.50 0.86 0.38 0.05 0.32 0.14 0.00 0.11
TURKEY Brookings Social 0.15 0.27 0.50 0.18 0.48 0.17 0.07 0.34 0.38 0.00 0.05
TURKEY Brookings Three Topics 0.37 0.25 0.13 0.63 0.83 0.35 0.04 0.29 0.18 0.01 0.12
TURKEY Carnegie 2004 1.00 0.62 0.22 0.00 0.57 0.43 0.29 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
TURKEY Carnegie 2008 0.34 0.20 0.16 0.66 0.65 0.41 0.05 0.22 0.21 0.02 0.11
TURKEY Carnegie 2012 0.47 0.30 0.17 0.53 0.68 0.38 0.08 0.28 0.15 0.01 0.10
TURKEY Carnegie Military 0.29 0.15 0.23 0.72 0.54 0.47 0.00 0.18 0.26 0.00 0.10
TURKEY Carnegie Political 0.58 0.37 0.16 0.42 0.75 0.39 0.11 0.30 0.12 0.02 0.08
TURKEY Carnegie Social 0.37 0.26 0.15 0.63 0.63 0.26 0.09 0.35 0.12 0.03 0.18
TURKEY Carnegie Three Topics 0.55 0.35 0.15 0.45 0.74 0.39 0.11 0.29 0.12 0.01 0.09
TURKEY Cato 2004 0.44 0.15 0.62 0.56 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00
TURKEY Cato 2008 0.10 0.19 0.20 0.90 0.65 0.10 0.00 0.45 0.23 0.00 0.23
TURKEY Cato 2012 -0.02 -0.08 0.19 0.98 0.63 0.38 0.00 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.21
TURKEY Cato Military 0.00 -0.03 0.26 1.00 0.50 0.40 0.00 0.11 0.36 0.00 0.15
TURKEY Cato Political 0.33 0.15 0.52 0.67 0.22 0.50 0.00 0.17 0.22 0.00 0.11
TURKEY Cato Three Topics 0.15 0.06 0.25 0.80 0.50 0.41 0.00 0.17 0.27 0.00 0.15
TURKEY CFR 2004 0.15 -0.10 0.45 0.49 0.58 0.54 0.00 0.04 0.17 0.00 0.25
TURKEY CFR 2008 0.05 0.20 0.58 0.45 0.30 0.19 0.00 0.34 0.41 0.00 0.07
TURKEY CFR 2012 0.40 0.36 0.21 0.60 0.66 0.19 0.05 0.47 0.14 0.00 0.15
TURKEY CFR Military 0.14 0.14 0.74 0.19 0.29 0.43 0.00 0.14 0.43 0.00 0.00
TURKEY CFR Political 0.04 -0.01 0.23 0.67 0.55 0.27 0.03 0.22 0.21 0.00 0.27
TURKEY CFR Social 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
TURKEY CFR Three Topics 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.83 0.81 0.28 0.02 0.26 0.22 0.00 0.22
TURKEY Heritage 2004 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.50
TURKEY Heritage 2008 0.41 0.25 0.26 0.59 0.62 0.37 0.00 0.34 0.08 0.08 0.13
TURKEY Heritage 2012 0.51 0.48 0.36 0.49 0.51 0.25 0.03 0.48 0.22 0.00 0.03
TURKEY Heritage Military 0.01 -0.11 0.55 0.32 0.32 0.35 0.00 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.33
TURKEY Heritage Political 0.55 0.49 0.41 0.45 0.54 0.22 0.02 0.53 0.12 0.02 0.09
TURKEY Heritage Social 0.60 0.64 0.67 0.40 0.20 0.00 0.00 0.80 0.00 0.10 0.10
TURKEY Heritage Three Topics 0.26 0.17 0.23 0.74 0.51 0.26 0.01 0.36 0.12 0.02 0.23
TURKEY RAND 2004 0.11 -0.04 0.26 0.89 0.67 0.45 0.00 0.11 0.22 0.00 0.23
TURKEY RAND 2008 0.12 0.06 0.11 0.88 0.78 0.33 0.01 0.23 0.23 0.02 0.20
TURKEY RAND 2012 0.57 0.44 0.40 0.43 0.47 0.36 0.00 0.43 0.16 0.00 0.06
TURKEY RAND Military 0.33 0.10 0.27 0.67 0.74 0.50 0.00 0.18 0.14 0.00 0.19
TURKEY RAND Political 0.17 0.12 0.16 0.83 0.61 0.38 0.01 0.20 0.30 0.01 0.11
TURKEY RAND Social 0.57 0.53 0.56 0.43 0.43 0.15 0.00 0.65 0.07 0.00 0.15
TURKEY RAND Three Topics 0.15 0.06 0.14 0.85 0.71 0.39 0.00 0.19 0.25 0.01 0.17
TURKEY Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.05 -0.01 0.43 0.51 0.45 0.33 0.03 0.17 0.25 0.01 0.22
TURKEY Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.30 0.24 0.29 0.62 0.63 0.29 0.02 0.34 0.20 0.02 0.14
TURKEY Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.35 0.26 0.23 0.62 0.67 0.32 0.02 0.33 0.18 0.01 0.13
TURKEY Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.24 0.17 0.31 0.59 0.59 0.31 0.02 0.29 0.21 0.01 0.16
TURKEY Seven Think Tanks Military 0.05 0.01 0.39 0.56 0.55 0.36 0.00 0.17 0.30 0.00 0.17
TURKEY Seven Think Tanks Political 0.32 0.20 0.25 0.63 0.61 0.36 0.03 0.27 0.19 0.01 0.14
TURKEY Seven Think Tanks Social 0.38 0.38 0.53 0.31 0.41 0.12 0.04 0.53 0.13 0.02 0.16
TURKEY Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.24 0.14 0.16 0.73 0.70 0.34 0.03 0.25 0.20 0.01 0.17
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to Turkey? Did 
any of the think tanks show consistency in describing Turkey’s actions across time 
and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view Turkey’s actions?  
 As Table 5-42 shows, relative to other think tanks, AEI, CFR, and Cato assigned 
the most conflictual actions to Turkey, while Carnegie assigned the most cooperative 
actions. One think tank showed complete consistency in the seven instances of talking 
about Turkey. Carnegie assigned cooperative actions to Turkey across the seven 
instances. This level of complete consistency across time and topic might be a 
manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to Turkey. As Table 5-42 shows, and 
according to the collectivity of the think tanks (Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of 
Turkey was 75% cooperative.  
What was Turkey’s relative position in the world of American foreign policy think 
tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to Turkey?  
 As Figure 5-20 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks actions of Turkey were most similar to actions of Japan and least similar to actions 
of North Korea. From the total of forty-four instances, actions of Turkey were placed 
sixteen times in the same quadrant as actions of Japan, which shows 36% similarity (64% 
dissimilarity). Turkey was placed four times in the same quadrant as North Korea, which 
shows 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of Turkey were 
most similar to actions of Japan and least similar to actions of North Korea, Iran, 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan. From the total of eleven instances, Turkey was placed 
six times in the same quadrant as Japan, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). 
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On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, Turkey was placed once in the 
same quadrant as North Korea, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan, which indicates 
91% dissimilarity (9% similarity). 
 Political Issues: Political actions of Turkey were most similar to political actions 
of France and least similar to those of North Korea and India. From the total of eleven 
instances, Turkey was placed seven times in the same quadrant as France, which shows 
64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible 
instances, Turkey was not placed in the same quadrant as North Korea and India, which 
indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of Turkey were most similar to social actions of 
South Korea and least similar to social actions of North Korea, India, Iran, Afghanistan, 
Israel, Terrorists, Russia, Britain, and France. From the total of eleven instances, Turkey 
was placed five times in the same quadrant as South Korea, which shows 45% similarity 
(55% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, social actions 
of Turkey was placed only once in the same quadrant as social actions of North Korea, 
India, Iran, Afghanistan, Israel, Terrorists, Russia, Britain, and France, which indicates 
91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).  
 Military Issues: Military actions of Turkey were most similar to military actions 
of Syria and least similar to those of Iraq, Europe, and South Korea. From the total of 
eleven instances, Turkey was placed six times in the same quadrant as Syria, which 
shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible 
instances, military actions of Turkey were not placed in the same quadrant as military 
actions of Iraq, Europe, and South Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
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Figure 5-20 Similarity of Actions of Turkey to other Actors 
United Nations 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive the United Nations’ 
operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of the United Nations’ 
actions?  
Table 5-45 shows the operational code of the United Nations on fifty-seven levels 
of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to the United Nations, the 
overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table     
5-44 presents the number of times the United Nations’ index of direction of strategy was 
above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think 
tanks described the United Nations’ strategy as conflictual fifteen times and cooperative 
forty-two times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative 
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counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a medium level of 
certainty about the direction of strategy of the United Nations. As Table 5-4 shows, the 
seven American foreign policy think tanks had 47% agreement in describing the United 
Nations’ strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks 
ranked the United Nations eighteenth based on its conflictual actions and fifth based on 
its cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-44 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to the United Nations 
  
UNITED NATIONS
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
Cato 7
Brookings 7
RAND 7
Seven Think Tanks 1 7
CFR 2 5
Carnegie 2 5
Heritage 3 4
AEI 7
Grand Total 15 42
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Table 5-45 Operational Code of the United Nations from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
UNITED NATIONS AEI 2004 0.14 0.03 0.14 0.86 0.68 0.35 0.00 0.22 0.17 0.03 0.23
UNITED NATIONS AEI 2008 -0.20 -0.09 0.35 0.68 0.53 0.28 0.00 0.13 0.43 0.03 0.14
UNITED NATIONS AEI 2012 -0.16 -0.13 0.19 0.50 0.92 0.18 0.05 0.19 0.25 0.00 0.33
UNITED NATIONS AEI Military -0.14 -0.16 0.27 0.47 0.72 0.28 0.00 0.15 0.25 0.00 0.32
UNITED NATIONS AEI Political 0.10 0.03 0.10 0.87 0.80 0.30 0.03 0.23 0.18 0.04 0.23
UNITED NATIONS AEI Social -1.00 -0.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
UNITED NATIONS AEI Three Topics 0.08 0.02 0.10 0.92 0.78 0.33 0.02 0.19 0.23 0.03 0.20
UNITED NATIONS Brookings 2004 0.49 0.35 0.42 0.52 0.28 0.38 0.01 0.35 0.13 0.09 0.04
UNITED NATIONS Brookings 2008 0.69 0.49 0.50 0.31 0.38 0.37 0.02 0.45 0.08 0.00 0.07
UNITED NATIONS Brookings 2012 0.32 0.13 0.18 0.69 0.62 0.35 0.02 0.29 0.07 0.02 0.25
UNITED NATIONS Brookings Military 0.17 -0.03 0.26 0.83 0.30 0.44 0.00 0.15 0.07 0.15 0.20
UNITED NATIONS Brookings Political 0.40 0.18 0.18 0.60 0.58 0.48 0.03 0.18 0.16 0.03 0.11
UNITED NATIONS Brookings Social 0.83 0.78 0.75 0.17 0.17 0.08 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.08
UNITED NATIONS Brookings Three Topics 0.42 0.18 0.20 0.59 0.64 0.49 0.02 0.19 0.13 0.03 0.13
UNITED NATIONS Carnegie 2004 0.03 0.12 0.18 0.97 0.60 0.12 0.22 0.18 0.35 0.00 0.14
UNITED NATIONS Carnegie 2008 0.83 0.31 0.66 0.17 0.23 0.83 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.03
UNITED NATIONS Carnegie 2012 0.38 0.15 0.34 0.62 0.60 0.46 0.07 0.16 0.16 0.00 0.16
UNITED NATIONS Carnegie Military 0.37 0.10 0.56 0.63 0.30 0.48 0.17 0.04 0.17 0.00 0.15
UNITED NATIONS Carnegie Political 0.44 0.22 0.25 0.56 0.71 0.47 0.02 0.23 0.14 0.00 0.14
UNITED NATIONS Carnegie Social 0.20 0.07 0.14 0.80 0.80 0.40 0.00 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.20
UNITED NATIONS Carnegie Three Topics 0.37 0.16 0.26 0.63 0.72 0.46 0.03 0.20 0.15 0.00 0.16
UNITED NATIONS Cato 2004 0.90 0.42 0.68 0.10 0.35 0.78 0.00 0.18 0.05 0.00 0.00
UNITED NATIONS Cato 2008 0.49 0.14 0.50 0.51 0.29 0.70 0.00 0.05 0.16 0.00 0.09
UNITED NATIONS Cato 2012 0.33 0.17 0.13 0.67 1.00 0.33 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.17 0.17
UNITED NATIONS Cato Military 1.00 0.50 0.70 0.00 0.50 0.75 0.00 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
UNITED NATIONS Cato Political 0.53 0.19 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.63 0.00 0.14 0.08 0.06 0.10
UNITED NATIONS Cato Social 1.00 0.33 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
UNITED NATIONS Cato Three Topics 0.38 0.17 0.24 0.62 0.61 0.49 0.00 0.20 0.15 0.06 0.10
UNITED NATIONS CFR 2004 0.18 0.06 0.30 0.66 0.49 0.44 0.00 0.15 0.22 0.10 0.10
UNITED NATIONS CFR 2008 0.55 0.20 0.42 0.46 0.51 0.63 0.00 0.15 0.11 0.01 0.11
UNITED NATIONS CFR 2012 0.30 0.06 0.22 0.71 0.85 0.45 0.00 0.20 0.10 0.00 0.26
UNITED NATIONS CFR Military 0.40 0.02 0.38 0.60 0.65 0.63 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.25
UNITED NATIONS CFR Political 0.35 0.18 0.19 0.65 0.66 0.46 0.00 0.22 0.19 0.02 0.11
UNITED NATIONS CFR Social 0.25 0.08 0.46 0.53 0.53 0.45 0.00 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.12
UNITED NATIONS CFR Three Topics 0.35 0.14 0.21 0.65 0.62 0.49 0.00 0.18 0.18 0.02 0.13
UNITED NATIONS Heritage 2004 -0.08 0.03 0.45 0.41 0.36 0.32 0.02 0.12 0.48 0.00 0.06
UNITED NATIONS Heritage 2008 0.04 0.04 0.40 0.46 0.59 0.35 0.01 0.17 0.35 0.00 0.13
UNITED NATIONS Heritage 2012 0.30 0.08 0.20 0.70 0.79 0.45 0.03 0.17 0.13 0.00 0.22
UNITED NATIONS Heritage Military 0.17 -0.06 0.20 0.84 1.00 0.42 0.00 0.17 0.09 0.00 0.33
UNITED NATIONS Heritage Political 0.33 0.13 0.18 0.67 0.68 0.45 0.04 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.17
UNITED NATIONS Heritage Social -0.43 -0.08 0.77 0.10 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.10 0.71 0.00 0.00
UNITED NATIONS Heritage Three Topics 0.36 0.17 0.17 0.64 0.66 0.46 0.03 0.19 0.18 0.00 0.14
UNITED NATIONS RAND 2004 0.49 0.19 0.26 0.51 0.73 0.52 0.03 0.20 0.08 0.00 0.17
UNITED NATIONS RAND 2008 0.41 0.16 0.22 0.59 0.80 0.46 0.00 0.25 0.08 0.02 0.20
UNITED NATIONS RAND 2012 0.42 0.11 0.37 0.58 0.50 0.54 0.05 0.12 0.10 0.00 0.20
UNITED NATIONS RAND Military 0.56 0.24 0.29 0.44 0.50 0.58 0.06 0.15 0.12 0.00 0.10
UNITED NATIONS RAND Political 0.24 0.07 0.13 0.76 0.84 0.34 0.02 0.24 0.10 0.02 0.26
UNITED NATIONS RAND Social 0.64 0.18 0.57 0.36 0.49 0.69 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.18
UNITED NATIONS RAND Three Topics 0.32 0.11 0.14 0.68 0.88 0.41 0.03 0.22 0.12 0.01 0.22
UNITED NATIONS Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.34 0.18 0.36 0.55 0.49 0.43 0.03 0.20 0.20 0.03 0.10
UNITED NATIONS Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.37 0.16 0.42 0.47 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.18 0.19 0.01 0.12
UNITED NATIONS Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.27 0.07 0.22 0.65 0.77 0.41 0.02 0.20 0.11 0.02 0.24
UNITED NATIONS Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.33 0.14 0.33 0.56 0.59 0.45 0.02 0.20 0.16 0.02 0.15
UNITED NATIONS Seven Think Tanks Military 0.35 0.08 0.38 0.54 0.56 0.50 0.04 0.13 0.11 0.02 0.20
UNITED NATIONS Seven Think Tanks Political 0.34 0.14 0.21 0.65 0.68 0.45 0.02 0.20 0.15 0.02 0.16
UNITED NATIONS Seven Think Tanks Social 0.27 0.20 0.65 0.28 0.33 0.38 0.00 0.26 0.25 0.02 0.09
UNITED NATIONS Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.33 0.14 0.19 0.67 0.70 0.45 0.02 0.20 0.16 0.02 0.15
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to the United 
Nations? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing the United 
Nations’ actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks 
view the United Nations’ actions?  
 As Table 5-44 shows, relative to other think tanks, AEI assigned the most 
conflictual actions to the United Nations, while Cato, Brookings, and RAND assigned the 
most cooperative actions. Four think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven 
instances of talking about the United Nations. Across the seven instances, Cato, 
Brookings, and RAND assigned cooperative actions to the United Nations, while AEI 
consistently assigned conflictual actions to it. This level of complete consistency across 
time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to the 
United Nations. As Table 5-44 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks 
(Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of the United Nations was 88% cooperative.  
What was the United Nations’ relative position in the world of American foreign 
policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to the United 
Nations?  
 As Figure 5-21 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks actions of the United Nations were most similar to those of France and least similar 
to those of North Korea and Syria. From the total of forty-four instances, the United 
Nations was placed twenty-one times in the same quadrant as France, which shows 48% 
similarity (52% dissimilarity). The United Nations was placed three times in the same 
quadrant as North Korea and Syria, which shows 93% dissimilarity (7% similarity).  
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 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of the United 
Nations were most similar to actions of Europe and least similar to those of Terrorists, 
Iraq, and the Muslim World. From the total of eleven instances, the United Nations was 
placed nine times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 82% similarity (18% 
dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, the United Nations 
was not placed in the same quadrant as Terrorists, Iraq, and the Muslim World, which 
indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of the United Nations were most similar to 
political actions of Japan and least similar to those of North Korea, Syria, Terrorists, and 
Israel. From the total of eleven instances, the United Nations was placed six times in the 
same quadrant as Japan, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other 
hand, from the eleven possible instances, the United Nations was not placed in the same 
quadrant as North Korea, Syria, Terrorists, and Israel, which indicates 100% 
dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of the United Nations were most similar to social 
actions of the Muslim World and least similar to social actions of North Korea, Syria, 
Iran, India, Taiwan, and South Korea. From the total of eleven instances, the United 
Nations was placed six times in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, which shows 
55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible 
instances, social actions of the United Nations were placed once in the same quadrant as 
social actions of North Korea, Syria, Iran, India, Taiwan, and South Korea, which 
indicates 91% dissimilarity (9% similarity).  
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Military Issues: Military actions of the United Nations were most similar to 
military actions of Japan and least similar to military actions of India and Britain. From 
the total of eleven instances, the United Nations was placed six times in the same 
quadrant as Japan, which shows 55% similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, 
from the eleven possible instances, military actions of the United Nations were not placed 
in the same quadrant as military actions of India and Britain, which indicates 100% 
dissimilarity.  
 
Figure 5-21 Similarity of Actions of the United Nations to other Actors 
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United States 
How did the American foreign policy think tanks perceive the United States’ 
operational code, and did they agree in their assessment of the United States’ 
actions?  
Table 5-47 shows the operational code of the United States on fifty-seven levels 
of time and topic. The values of I-indexes show that in relation to the United States, the 
overall perception of the American foreign policy think tanks was cooperative. Table     
5-46 presents the number of times the United States’ index of direction of strategy was 
above or below the average of direction of strategy on seven levels. The American think 
tanks described the United States’ strategy as conflictual eleven times and cooperative 
forty-six times. The difference between the frequency of conflictual and cooperative 
counts indicates that the American foreign policy think tanks had a high level of certainty 
about the direction of strategy of the United States. As Table 5-4 shows, the seven 
American foreign policy think tanks had 61% agreement in describing the United States’ 
strategy. Among the twenty-two actors, the American foreign policy think tanks ranked 
the United States twentieth based on its conflictual actions and fourth based on its 
cooperative actions.  
 
Table 5-46 Comparing Think Tanks Based on the Strategy Allocated to the United States 
UNITED STATES
CONFLICTUAL COOPERATIVE
Brookings 7
Heritage 7
Seven Think Tanks 8
Carnegie 1 6
RAND 1 6
CFR 2 5
Cato 3 4
AEI 4 3
Grand Total 11 46
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Table 5-47 Operational Code of the United States from the Perspective of American Think Tanks 
Country Think Tank Year/Topic I1 I2 I3 I4a I4b I5ap I5pr I5re I5op I5th I5pu
USA AEI 2004 0.17 0.03 0.12 0.83 0.72 0.39 0.03 0.16 0.18 0.03 0.20
USA AEI 2008 0.21 0.06 0.13 0.80 0.82 0.39 0.02 0.20 0.17 0.01 0.21
USA AEI 2012 0.23 0.05 0.14 0.77 0.73 0.43 0.02 0.16 0.17 0.02 0.20
USA AEI Military 0.06 -0.07 0.12 0.94 0.84 0.37 0.02 0.15 0.18 0.03 0.27
USA AEI Political 0.25 0.09 0.14 0.75 0.74 0.42 0.01 0.19 0.18 0.02 0.18
USA AEI Social 0.29 0.10 0.13 0.71 0.70 0.42 0.04 0.18 0.16 0.02 0.17
USA AEI Three Topics 0.21 0.06 0.13 0.79 0.74 0.41 0.02 0.18 0.18 0.02 0.20
USA Brookings 2004 0.24 0.07 0.14 0.76 0.72 0.42 0.03 0.17 0.18 0.01 0.19
USA Brookings 2008 0.42 0.18 0.19 0.58 0.64 0.49 0.03 0.19 0.14 0.02 0.14
USA Brookings 2012 0.40 0.17 0.19 0.60 0.71 0.48 0.02 0.21 0.14 0.01 0.15
USA Brookings Military 0.14 -0.01 0.12 0.86 0.82 0.38 0.02 0.16 0.17 0.01 0.25
USA Brookings Political 0.41 0.16 0.21 0.59 0.60 0.52 0.02 0.16 0.14 0.01 0.14
USA Brookings Social 0.49 0.27 0.18 0.51 0.69 0.47 0.03 0.25 0.15 0.01 0.10
USA Brookings Three Topics 0.37 0.14 0.18 0.63 0.65 0.48 0.02 0.17 0.15 0.01 0.15
USA Carnegie 2004 0.29 0.10 0.15 0.71 0.73 0.43 0.04 0.19 0.15 0.03 0.18
USA Carnegie 2008 0.35 0.17 0.16 0.65 0.71 0.45 0.02 0.22 0.17 0.01 0.14
USA Carnegie 2012 0.34 0.14 0.16 0.66 0.72 0.45 0.03 0.20 0.15 0.02 0.16
USA Carnegie Military 0.23 0.07 0.13 0.77 0.73 0.42 0.03 0.18 0.16 0.04 0.19
USA Carnegie Political 0.41 0.18 0.18 0.59 0.63 0.48 0.03 0.19 0.16 0.01 0.12
USA Carnegie Social 0.35 0.15 0.17 0.65 0.82 0.43 0.02 0.23 0.14 0.00 0.18
USA Carnegie Three Topics 0.37 0.16 0.16 0.63 0.67 0.46 0.03 0.19 0.16 0.01 0.14
USA Cato 2004 0.26 0.09 0.16 0.74 0.67 0.45 0.02 0.17 0.19 0.01 0.17
USA Cato 2008 0.17 0.10 0.11 0.80 0.81 0.32 0.04 0.23 0.22 0.03 0.18
USA Cato 2012 0.24 0.09 0.12 0.77 0.78 0.39 0.03 0.20 0.18 0.01 0.20
USA Cato Military 0.15 0.02 0.15 0.80 0.76 0.39 0.02 0.16 0.19 0.02 0.22
USA Cato Political 0.22 0.06 0.14 0.78 0.69 0.43 0.02 0.16 0.20 0.02 0.18
USA Cato Social 0.29 0.20 0.11 0.71 0.82 0.32 0.05 0.27 0.20 0.01 0.14
USA Cato Three Topics 0.22 0.08 0.13 0.78 0.74 0.40 0.02 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.18
USA CFR 2004 0.24 0.06 0.15 0.67 0.84 0.40 0.03 0.19 0.14 0.01 0.24
USA CFR 2008 0.21 0.07 0.12 0.79 0.84 0.38 0.02 0.21 0.17 0.02 0.22
USA CFR 2012 0.30 0.13 0.14 0.70 0.76 0.42 0.03 0.21 0.16 0.02 0.17
USA CFR Military 0.00 -0.07 0.11 0.88 0.91 0.31 0.02 0.18 0.20 0.01 0.28
USA CFR Political 0.29 0.11 0.15 0.71 0.71 0.44 0.02 0.19 0.17 0.01 0.17
USA CFR Social 0.46 0.21 0.16 0.54 0.84 0.44 0.04 0.25 0.08 0.02 0.17
USA CFR Three Topics 0.25 0.08 0.13 0.75 0.79 0.41 0.02 0.20 0.16 0.01 0.20
USA Heritage 2004 0.49 0.28 0.17 0.51 0.77 0.44 0.03 0.28 0.13 0.02 0.11
USA Heritage 2008 0.43 0.20 0.18 0.58 0.71 0.47 0.02 0.22 0.14 0.01 0.14
USA Heritage 2012 0.39 0.15 0.20 0.61 0.63 0.51 0.02 0.17 0.15 0.01 0.15
USA Heritage Military 0.31 0.12 0.15 0.69 0.81 0.42 0.02 0.21 0.13 0.02 0.19
USA Heritage Political 0.40 0.19 0.19 0.60 0.62 0.49 0.02 0.19 0.17 0.01 0.12
USA Heritage Social 0.62 0.34 0.23 0.38 0.71 0.51 0.04 0.27 0.10 0.00 0.08
USA Heritage Three Topics 0.41 0.20 0.18 0.59 0.67 0.48 0.02 0.21 0.15 0.01 0.13
USA RAND 2004 0.43 0.21 0.17 0.57 0.81 0.44 0.03 0.25 0.12 0.01 0.16
USA RAND 2008 0.39 0.16 0.17 0.62 0.76 0.46 0.02 0.21 0.13 0.01 0.17
USA RAND 2012 0.16 0.03 0.13 0.84 0.82 0.38 0.01 0.19 0.19 0.01 0.22
USA RAND Military 0.18 0.06 0.10 0.82 0.93 0.33 0.03 0.22 0.17 0.01 0.24
USA RAND Political 0.38 0.15 0.17 0.62 0.70 0.48 0.02 0.19 0.14 0.01 0.16
USA RAND Social 0.41 0.19 0.19 0.59 0.81 0.46 0.01 0.24 0.12 0.01 0.16
USA RAND Three Topics 0.34 0.14 0.15 0.66 0.75 0.45 0.02 0.20 0.15 0.01 0.17
USA Seven Think Tanks 2004 0.30 0.12 0.15 0.68 0.75 0.42 0.03 0.20 0.16 0.02 0.18
USA Seven Think Tanks 2008 0.31 0.13 0.15 0.69 0.76 0.42 0.02 0.21 0.16 0.01 0.17
USA Seven Think Tanks 2012 0.30 0.11 0.16 0.70 0.73 0.44 0.02 0.19 0.16 0.01 0.18
USA Seven Think Tanks 3 Elections 0.30 0.12 0.15 0.69 0.75 0.43 0.02 0.20 0.16 0.01 0.17
USA Seven Think Tanks Military 0.15 0.02 0.12 0.82 0.83 0.38 0.02 0.18 0.17 0.02 0.23
USA Seven Think Tanks Political 0.34 0.14 0.17 0.66 0.67 0.46 0.02 0.18 0.17 0.01 0.15
USA Seven Think Tanks Social 0.41 0.21 0.17 0.59 0.77 0.43 0.03 0.24 0.14 0.01 0.14
USA Seven Think Tanks Three Topics 0.31 0.12 0.15 0.69 0.72 0.44 0.02 0.19 0.17 0.01 0.17
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Which think tanks assigned the most cooperative/conflictual actions to the United 
States? Did any of the think tanks show consistency in describing the United States’ 
actions across time and topic? How did the collectivity of the think tanks view the 
United States’ actions?  
 As Table 5-46 shows, relative to other think tanks, AEI assigned the most 
conflictual actions to the United States, while Brookings and Heritage assigned the most 
cooperative actions. Two think tanks showed complete consistency in the seven instances 
of talking about the United States. Brookings and Heritage assigned cooperative actions 
to the United States across the seven instances. This level of complete consistency across 
time and topic might be a manifestation of an organizational identity in regard to the 
United States. As Table 5-46 shows, and according to the collectivity of the think tanks 
(Seven Think Tanks), the strategy of the United States was 100% cooperative.  
What was the United States’ relative position in the world of American foreign 
policy think tanks? Which actors were most similar/dissimilar to the United States?  
 As Figure 5-22 shows, from the perspective of American foreign policy think 
tanks, actions of the United States were most similar to actions of Europe and least 
similar to actions of the Muslim World. From the total of forty-four instances, the United 
States was placed twenty-seven times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 61% 
similarity (39% dissimilarity). On the other hand, the United States was not placed in the 
same quadrant as the Muslim World, which shows 100% dissimilarity.  
 No Topic Classification: Without any topic classification, actions of the United 
States were most similar to actions of Europe and South Korea and least similar to those 
of the Muslim World, Israel, Britain, Terrorists, Iraq, Japan, and North Korea. From the 
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total of eleven instances, the United States was placed seven times in the same quadrant 
as Europe and South Korea, which shows 64% similarity (36% dissimilarity). On the 
other hand, from the eleven possible instances, the United States was not placed in the 
same quadrant as the Muslim World, Israel, Britain, Terrorists, Iraq, Japan, and North 
Korea, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Political Issues: Political actions of the United States were most similar to 
political actions of Europe and least similar to political actions of the Muslim World, 
Israel, Britain, Syria, Terrorists, Iraq, and Iran. From the total of eleven instances, the 
United States was placed six times in the same quadrant as Europe, which shows 55% 
similarity (45% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible instances, the 
United States was not placed in the same quadrant as the Muslim World, Israel, Britain, 
Syria, Terrorists, Iraq, and Iran, which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Social Issues: Social actions of the United States were most similar to social 
actions of Europe and China and least similar to social actions of the Muslim World, 
Israel, Afghanistan, France, and Pakistan. From the total of eleven instances, the United 
States was placed nine times in the same quadrant as Europe and China, which shows 
82% similarity (18% dissimilarity). On the other hand, from the eleven possible 
instances, social actions of the United States were not placed in the same quadrant as 
social actions of the Muslim World, Israel, Afghanistan, France, and Pakistan, which 
indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 Military Issues: Military actions of the United States were most similar to military 
actions of Iran and least similar to military actions of the Muslim World. From the total 
of eleven instances, the United States was placed ten times in the same quadrant as Iran, 
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which shows 91% similarity (9% dissimilarity). On the other hand, military actions of the 
United States were not placed in the same quadrant as military actions of the Muslim 
World which indicates 100% dissimilarity.  
 
Figure 5-22 Similarity of Actions of the United States to other Actors 
Summary 
In chapter five, the operational code of the United States and its significant Others 
were extracted. This task was done by reducing the unit of verb aggregation to sentence. 
Using the operational codes of the U.S. significant Others and the operational code of the 
United States, I was able to draw cognitive maps of the American elite. These cognitive 
maps showed the similarity of action of the actors from the perspective of American 
foreign policy think tanks. There were separate cognitive maps for each of the twenty-
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two most frequent actors discussed in the texts. The findings of this chapter have revealed 
many nuances about the worldview of the American foreign policy elite, and have opened 
the door for future research. For instance, the transitive verbs and their subsequent VICS 
indexes have shown that from the perceptive of the American foreign policy elite: The 
actions of the United Nations were most similar to the actions of its supporters, France 
and Europe. The actions of Pakistan were most similar to the actions of its neighbor, 
Afghanistan. The actions of Japan were most similar to the actions of its neighbor and 
rival, China. Iran and North Korea, the two members of the Axis of Evil, were most 
similar to each other. And, the military actions of the United States were most similar to 
the military actions of Iran and North Korea, which are the two countries with the highest 
possibility of war with the United States. There were also some anomalies. For instance, 
the actions of Israel, which is one of the closest allies of the United States, were most 
similar to the actions of the enemies of the United States, Terrorists and Syria. 
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CHAPTER 6 : CONCLUSION AND ASSESSMENT 
This research started with one main question: what is the worldview of the 
American foreign policy elite? Unlike other related works about the American foreign 
policy elite, it included the seven American foreign policy think tanks as members of the 
elite. Also, unlike other scholarship, it chose to study the elite/think tanks via their texts 
rather than via surveys and interviews. It answered the main question by adopting the 
strategy of immersion in data and through a multi-level, multi-actor, and multi-topic 
approach. The following sections present some of the main findings and contributions to 
different fields of study.  
Contribution to Topic Classification Methods 
 Validity of the Four-Algorithm Agreement Threshold: The fact that VICS could 
differentiate among subcategories of the political texts can be used as a validity test for 
the supervised topic classification method. Collingwood and Wilkerson have argued that 
if at least four algorithms agree on a topic, then there is a 90% chance that the topic 
classification is correct.1 During the supervised topic classification phase of my research, 
I removed all the verbs from the texts and assigned the topic of the texts based mainly on 
nouns. Therefore, the supervised topic classification of files for military, political, and 
social issues was based on the use of nouns and not verbs.  
 On the other hand, VICS, which is based on the use of verbs, measures the 
exercise of power in each of the topics. One expects that relative to the political and 
social topics, the exercise of power in the world of military issues would be the most 
conflictual. One also expects that relative to political and military topics, the exercise of 
                                                 
1 Collingwood and Wilkerson, “Tradeoffs in Accuracy.”   
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power in the world of social issues would be the most cooperative. VICS showed this to 
be the case in both worlds. In other words, the topic classification based on nouns 
produced the expected VICS indexes based on verbs. The VICS indexes showed that the 
topic classification by nouns was correct, and therefore the four-algorithm agreement 
threshold is a valid threshold.  
 Supervised Topic Classification: As mentioned in Chapter Two, supervised topic 
classification requires much computational power. To solve that problem, I created a 
stop-word list with 12,000 words. However, this is not a practical solution for many 
scholars. Future research should focus on producing lists of verbs or nouns for labeling 
political text and its subcategories. These lists will act as whitelists1 in supervised topic 
classification and will reduce the required computational power for text classification. 
These whitelists will also increase the accuracy of topic classification.  
 Sentence, A Better Level for Topic Classification: I attempted to label the 
documents based on their geographic focus. I created whitelists of the words that could 
identify a country: words like the names of the leaders of that country, cities in that 
country, and nouns related to the name of the country and its ethnic groups. However, the 
between-algorithm consensus rarely met the threshold of the four-algorithm agreement. 
To solve this problem, I reduced the level of verb aggregation from file to sentence. At 
the level of sentence, one can choose the subject or the object of the sentence as the 
keywords for identifying the geographical orientation of the sentence.  
 
 
                                                 
1 In contrast to a stop-word list, a whitelist is a list of words that will be included in text classification. 
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Contribution to Theories of IR 
 This research showed that the collectivity of the seven think tanks had three 
distinct worlds of action: the world of military issues, the world of political issues, and 
the world of social issues. It was shown that the strategy of action in the world of military 
issues was more conflictual than in the other two worlds. Also, the strategy of action in 
the world of social issues was more cooperative than in the other two worlds. This 
finding closely connects the automated operational code based on VICS to constructivism 
from the perspective of Alexander Wendt.  
 Wendt argues that there are three distinct cultures of anarchy in international 
politics: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian.1 In the Hobbesian culture of 
anarchy/interaction, the Self sees itself as an enemy of the Other. In the Lockean culture 
of anarchy, the Self identifies itself as a rival of the Other. And in the Kantian culture of 
anarchy, the Self adopts the role of a friend of the Other. According to Wendt, each of 
these three cultures of anarchy has “different rules of engagement” and “interaction 
logics.”2  
 Based on the findings of this research, I argue that different types of identification 
between the Self and the Other manifest in the types of verbs used by the Self. One 
expects that enemies punish and oppose, while friends support and reward. Based on this 
logic, the difference in the operational code of the three worlds of action can be 
interpreted as the result of three types of identification between the Self and the Other.  
                                                 
1 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1999), 246-313. 
 
2 Ibid., 43. 
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 In the world of social issues, actions are more cooperative. Therefore, from the 
three roles of friend, rival and enemy, the Self is closer to the role of friend. As such, the 
culture of anarchy in the world of social issues is closer to Kantian. In the world of 
military issues, actions are more conflictual. Therefore, from the three roles of friend, 
rival and enemy, the Self is closer to the role of enemy, and the culture of interaction is 
closer to Hobbesian. In the world of political issues, actions are less conflictual than in 
the world of military issues and less cooperative than in the world of social issues. 
Therefore, from the three roles of friend, rival and enemy, the Self is closer to the role of 
rival, and the culture of interaction in the world of political issues is closer to Lockean. 
The above analysis shows that the operational code based on VICS can empirically 
estimate the culture of anarchy from the texts.  
 This research also showed that the rules of conduct of the American collective 
Self were very stable across time and not very different across topics. Following Wendt, 
one can argue that the stability of the operational code of the American collective Self 
over time is empirical evidence of the existence of an American collective being, or what 
he calls the personhood of the United States. According to Wendt, states are like persons 
with stable collective identity.1  
 However, drawing on Onuf’s work on rules, one can argue that the stability of the 
operational code of the American collective Self over time does not necessarily come 
from a stable collective identity. The stability of the operational code of the American 
collective Self is the result of dominance of certain rules and these rules are not always 
                                                 
1 Alexander Wendt, “The State as Person in International Theory,” Review of International Studies 30, no. 
2 (2004): 289-316. 
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the result of the identity of agents.1 They are tools that agents have learned to use to 
achieve their goals. Also according to Onuf, agency does not equate with personhood: 
“agents need not be individual human beings to be able to act on behalf of others (here I 
refer to agents in the third person to emphasize that the terms people and agents are not 
completely interchangeable).”2 
Contribution to the Study of Think Tanks 
 This research showed that in some of the worlds of action the relative ideological 
orientation of think tanks could be estimated based on the verbs they used in their 
publications. Figure 6-1 presents the relative position of the seven think tanks in the four 
worlds of, all the issues, military issues, political issues, and social issues. In the world of 
all the issues, the seven think tanks were positioned as expected. The only exception was 
CFR, which was closer to the Right than the Center. Considering only the American 
collective Self, Heritage moved from the Right to Left, while CFR stayed with the Right. 
In the world of military issues, VICS indexes were not able to predict the political 
orientation of the think tanks all the time. In the world of military issues, Cato moved 
closer to the Center, and Heritage distanced itself from the Right. Considering only the 
American collective Self, the seven think tanks did not differ from one another. In the 
world of political issues, the texts were generally able to predict the political orientation 
of the think tanks. In the world of political issues, CFR stayed in the Center, and Heritage 
moved closer to the Center and distanced itself from the Right. Considering only the 
American collective Self, Heritage moved closer to the Left. In the world of social issues, 
                                                 
1 Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism: A User’s Manual,” in International Relations in a Constructed World, 
ed. Vendulka Kubálková et al. (Monk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 58-79. 
2 Ibid., 60. 
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the VICS indexes were not able to predict the political orientation of the think tanks. In 
the world of social issues, the Left and the Right moved closer to each other, while 
RAND distanced itself from both the Left and the Right. Considering only the American 
collective self, there was no difference among the seven think tanks.  
 Another way of positioning the seven think tanks relative to each other is by 
comparing them based on the number of times they assigned cooperative and conflictual 
strategy to the twenty-two actors. Figure 6-2 shows that this approach could clearly 
separate the conservative think tanks from the Center and Left ones. It also shows that 
CFR was closer to the conservative think tanks than to the Center and the Left.  
 To the best of my knowledge, this is the first time in the fields of American 
foreign policy, operational code analysis, social psychology, and organizational theory 
that relative ideological positions of think tanks/organizations have been computed and 
compared based on their operational codes. These findings open the door for many future 
studies about think tanks and organizational theory. Possible research questions can ask 
why verbs predict the ideological orientations of the think tanks. Is it because 
conservative and liberal organizations write the same way or because they have similar 
understanding of the exercise of power? How generalizable are these findings? Will we 
find the same results, if we analyze the think tanks’ publications about domestic politics? 
Answers to these questions will have major theoretical and policy implications in several 
fields of study.  
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Figure 6-1 Relative Position of the Seven Think Tanks in the Four Worlds 
Figure 6-2 Comparison of the Seven Think Tanks based on the Number of Conflictual and 
Cooperative Strategies Assigned to the Actors 
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Contributions to VICS and Operational Code Method 
 Validity of VICS: This research showed that verbs used in the political and 
nonpolitical texts and the subsequent Instrumental indexes were very different. This 
finding can be used as a successful validity test for VICS, which purports that it has 
created a tool for measuring exercise of power from the text.1 One expects that the 
exercise of power in different domains of life would be different. If the VICS argument is 
valid, then the nonpolitical and political texts should have different operational codes. 
This research has shown that, indeed, the operational codes associated with power in 
political texts differed extensively from the operational codes in nonpolitical texts.  
 One also expects that if the VICS argument is valid, then exercise of power in the 
worlds of military, political and social issues would be different. This research has shown 
that military, political and social texts had different ways of exercising power. Military 
texts were the most conflictual; social texts were the most cooperative, and the political 
texts fell between these two extremes. In other words, this research has shown that VICS 
is sensitive enough not only to differentiate between nonpolitical and political texts but to 
differentiate between subcategories of think tanks’ texts.  
 The Other: As the results of Chapter Five show, the Other should not be treated as 
a unified and homogenous group. Different significant Others of the United States have 
different operational codes. For instance, the operational code indexes of Terrorists and 
China were very different. However, when all of the Others are placed in one category, 
different Others cancel each other’s effects, producing indexes that are always in the 
middle and do not change much. 
                                                 
1 Walker, Schafer, and Young, “Systematic Procedures for Operational Code.”   
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 VICS has two sets of formulas to extract the operational code of a text based on 
its transitive verbs. There are five formulas to extract operational code of the Other and 
eleven formulas to extract the operational code of the Self. I argue that in order to create 
more indexes to study the Other, the eleven Instrumental formulas should also be used for 
the Other.   
 The Self: Chapter Four studied the operational code of the American collective 
Self at different levels of verb aggregation. Although the findings of this chapter are 
reliable, their generalizability requires future tests and investigation. This is due to the 
lack of a standard criterion for selecting words that represent the Self. The operational 
code literature does not have a clear answer to who the Self is and what words would 
represent the Self.  
 I created two datasets (Broad and Narrow) to control for the impact of the 
definition of the Self. In this process, however, I had to make several judgment calls on 
what should be included as the Self. For instance, if a text is mentioning General David 
Petraeus’ action in Iraq, should Petraeus be considered a representative of the Self? If the 
research does not include Petraeus as part of the Self, then does his action belong to the 
Other? If the research considers Petraeus as the Self, what other names should also be 
considered as part of the Self? Should the research include the names of ambassadors and 
special envoys, as well as members of Congress? Due to the lack of a standard definition 
of the Self in the operational code literature, the findings of this chapter require further 
investigation.  
 VICS and Distribution of Power: Chapter Five makes several theoretical and 
policy contributions. It uses the operational codes of the United States and its significant 
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Others to draw the cognitive maps of the American foreign policy elite. To the best of my 
knowledge, no other work in the American foreign policy literature has been able to map 
the similarity of actions of the United States to its significant Others.  
 While, this research has only presented a preliminary assessment, there is a 
suggestive pattern in the twenty-two cognitive maps that requires further investigation. 
The twenty-two cognitive maps reveal that actors with roughly the same amount of 
power are clustered together. For instance, the cognitive maps show that the United 
States is most similar to Europe, China, Russia, and Iran; China is most similar to 
Europe, the United States, Japan, and Russia; India is most similar to the United States, 
Europe, and Russia; and Russia is most similar to the United States, China, Iran, and 
Europe. 
 While these similarities are based on the verbs used by the seven think tanks and 
the subsequent Instrumental indexes, the clustering of actors closely reflects the 
distribution of power in the real world. Stephen Walker suggested to me that the 
similarity of actors in my research could be compared to the similarity of actors in the 
Correlates of War Project. The goal of this comparison is to investigate whether the 
countries that are found to be similar in my research are also similar in the dataset of 
Correlates of War Project. 
  One of the datasets of the Correlates of War Project is the National Material 
Capabilities of the countries.1 This dataset has measured and ranked the material 
                                                 
1 See J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, “Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major 
Power War, 1820-1965,” in Peace, War, and Numbers ed. Bruce M. Russett (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1972), 19-48; J. David Singer, “Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material 
Capabilities of States, 1816-1985,” International Interactions 14, no.2 (1988): 115-32. 
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capabilities of countries using the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC). The 
CINC index is based on six variables: 1) irst: Iron and steel production (thousands of 
tons), 2) milex: Military Expenditures (thousands of current year US Dollars), 3) ilper: 
Military Personnel (thousands), 4) pec: Primary Energy Consumption (thousands of coal-
ton equivalents), 5) tpop: Total Population (thousands), and 6) upop: Urban population 
(population living in cities with population greater than 100,000; in thousands).1 
 To compare the similarity of actors in this research with similarity of actors based 
on their CINC index, the following steps were taken:2 Since the National Material 
Capabilities only measures the capabilities of countries, the actors in my research that 
were not countries were excluded from the comparison. Then the rankings of the eighteen 
countries were extracted from the National Material Capabilities dataset (Table 6-1). As 
this table shows, the most frequent countries in the texts of the seven think tanks are also 
the countries with the highest material capability rankings in the National Material 
Capabilities dataset. 
                                                 
1 “National Material Capabilities (v4.0),” The Correlates of War Project, 2010, 
http://www.correlatesofwar.org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities/nmc-codebook/at_download/file/.  
 
2 The latest version is the National Material Capabilities (v4.0). 
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Table 6-1 Ranking of Countries in the National Material Capabilities Database 
 In the next step, for each country the closest four neighbors were extracted from 
both the material capability dataset (Table 6-1) and the cognitive maps of Chapter Five. 
As Table 6-2 shows, there is a high degree of overlap between the results of two datasets, 
especially for the great powers.   
 My research presents a multi-level, multi-actor, and multi-topic picture of the 
American foreign policy elite’s rules of conduct. It has produced tidy data for the fields 
of American foreign policy, political psychology, international relations, organizational 
theory and text classification. Much future research can be conducted based on the data, 
findings, patterns, anomalies and lessons discerned. It is dynamic and living. In every 
general election, a new batch of texts by think tanks can be analyzed and added to the 
repositories of data. At the 2013 ISA conference, Steven Hook from Kent University 
described this research as an original, multi-level research that opens many possibilities 
Country Ranking irst milex milper pec tpop upop cinc
China 1 494899 46174000 2255 4116892 1324655 748534 0.198578
U.S. 2 98102 5.53E+08 1506 5548023 301621 82969 0.142149
India 3 53080 26513000 1316 1573433 1134023 198077 0.073444
Japan 4 120203 41039000 240 1934963 127772 84414 0.042675
Russia 5 72387 32215000 1027 1558502 142115 68232 0.039274
Germany 7 48550 42108000 246 1158061 82263 25337 0.024082
South Korea 8 51517 26588000 687 943873.3 48456 22826 0.023878
Britain 9 14317 63258000 191 684113.4 60975 55259 0.021158
France 10 19250 60662000 255 712940.6 61707 11861 0.018924
Turkey 12 25754 13643000 515 370437 73875 14180 0.014317
Pakistan 13 1090 4530000 619 133722.8 159570 40864 0.013772
Iran 15 10051 7451000 545 412138 71532 33723 0.01345
North Korea 16 300 -9 1106 29147.73 24056 8752 0.012925
Taiwan 24 20903 9585000 290 26541.71 22958 13513 0.00801
Iraq 36 0 -9 227 37481.42 29682 19879 0.005222
Syria 40 70 1465000 308 32932.75 19172 13314 0.004454
Israel 46 300 11607000 168 44961.18 7180 3160 0.003638
Afghanistan 77 0 153000 50 725.6503 22488 5456 0.00142
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for theory and policy and at the 2015 ISA conference; Stephen Walker described it as a 
research program rather than a research project.  
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 American Foreign Policy Think Tanks 
Most Similar Based on 
 the VICS Indexes 
Correlates of War Project  
 Most Similar Based on 
The National Material Capabilities Dataset 
 
Agreement 
(out of 4) 
China U.S., Japan, Russia, South Korea U.S., India, Japan, Russia 3 
U.S. China, Russia, Iran, India China, India, Japan, Russia 3 
France South Korea, Germany, Turkey, Pakistan Britain, Turkey, South Korea, Pakistan 3 
India U.S., Russia, Iran, North Korea U.S., Japan, China, Russia 2 
North Korea Iran, U.S., Iraq, Afghanistan Iran, Taiwan, Pakistan, Iraq 2 
Israel Syria, Afghanistan, North Korea, Pakistan Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Taiwan 2 
Germany France, Turkey, Japan, South Korea Russia, South Korea, Japan, Britain 2 
Japan China, Turkey, Russia, Taiwan India, Russia, U.S., Germany 1 
Russia U.S., China, Iran, India Japan, Germany, India, South Korea 1 
South Korea U.S., France, Pakistan, China Germany, Britain, Russia, France 1 
Pakistan Afghanistan, South Korea, North Korea, Iraq Turkey, Iran, France, North Korea 1 
Iran North Korea, Russia, U.S., India Pakistan, North Korea, Turkey, Taiwan 1 
Iraq North Korea, Iran, Pakistan, India Taiwan, Syria, North Korea, Israel 1 
Syria Israel, Turkey, Iran, India Iraq, Israel, Taiwan, Afghanistan 1 
Britain China, Japan, North Korea, Afghanistan South Korea, France, Germany, Turkey 0 
Turkey Japan, Syria, Taiwan, South Korea France, Pakistan, Britain, Iran 0 
Taiwan Japan, India, Turkey, China North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria 0 
Afghanistan Pakistan, North Korea, Japan, India Israel, Syria, Iraq, Taiwan 0 
Table 6-2 Similarity of Countries - VICS vs. the National Material Capabilities Database 
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Part-Of-Speech Tags of the Penn Treebank Project1 
Number Tag Description 
1.  CC  Coordinating conjunction  
2.  CD  Cardinal number  
3.  DT  Determiner  
4.  EX  Existential there  
5.  FW  Foreign word  
6.  IN  Preposition or subordinating conjunction 
7.  JJ  Adjective  
8.  JJR  Adjective, comparative  
9.  JJS  Adjective, superlative  
10.  LS  List item marker  
11.  MD  Modal  
12.  NN  Noun, singular or mass  
13.  NNS  Noun, plural  
14.  NNP  Proper noun, singular  
15.  NNPS Proper noun, plural  
16.  PDT  Predetermine 
17.  POS  Possessive ending  
18.  PRP  Personal pronoun  
19.  PRP$  Possessive pronoun  
20.  RB  Adverb  
21.  RBR  Adverb, comparative  
22.  RBS  Adverb, superlative  
23.  RP  Particle  
24.  SYM  Symbol  
25.  TO  to  
26.  UH  Interjection  
27.  VB  Verb, base form  
28.  VBD  Verb, past tense  
29.  VBG  Verb, gerund or present participle  
30.  VBN  Verb, past participle  
31.  VBP  Verb, non-3rd person singular present  
32.  VBZ  Verb, 3rd person singular present  
33.  WDT  Wh-determiner  
34.  WP  Wh-pronoun  
35.  WP$  Possessive wh-pronoun  
36.  WRB  Wh-adverb  
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Source: Table adopted from “Alphabetical list of part-of-speech tags used in the Penn Treebank Project,” 
Penn Treebank Project, accessed February 12, 2014, 
https://www.ling.upenn.edu/courses/Fall_2003/ling001/penn_treebank_pos.html. 
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New York Times Index Data Codebook Major Topic Policy Agendas Project - 20141 
1. Macroeconomics 
2. Civil Rights 
3. Health 
4. Agriculture 
5. Labor, Immigration, and Employment 
6. Education 
7. Environment 
8. Energy 
10. Transportation 
12. Law, Crime, and Family Issues 
13. Social Welfare 
14. Community Development and Housing 
15. Banking, Finance and Domestic Commerce 
16. Defense 
17. Space, Science, Technology, and Communications 
18. Foreign Trade 
19. International Affairs 
20. Federal Government Operations 
21. Public Lands and Water Management 
24. State and Local Government Administration 
26. Weather and Natural Disasters 
27. Fires 
28. Arts and Entertainment 
29. Sports and Recreation 
30. Death Notices 
31. Churches and Religion 
99. Other, Miscellaneous, and Human Interest 
                                                 
1 “New York Times Index Data Codebook,” University of Texas, accessed March 28, 2014, 
http://www.utexas.edu/cola/files/4341573. 
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Foreign Policy Related Tags Imported From Think Tanks’ Websites 
Row Labels 2004 2008 
Grand 
Total 
Military 220 347 567 
Defense 62 101 163 
Intelligence 19 6 25 
Military 34 56 90 
National Security 11 48 59 
Piracy 7 7 
Proliferation 23 25 48 
Terrorism 70 99 169 
War 1 5 6 
Political 402 427 829 
Election 11 19 30 
Foreign Policy 383 385 768 
International Law 2 2 
Nation Building 5 4 9 
Soft power 7 7 
Strategy 3 10 13 
Social 241 508 749 
Climate Change 1 6 7 
International Crime 2 2 
Democracy 27 18 45 
Development 2 20 22 
Drugs 1 8 9 
Economy 133 313 446 
Education 1 6 7 
Energy 3 31 34 
Environment 2 6 8 
Extremism  1 1 
Food 1 1 
Foreign Aid 1 17 18 
Globalization 3 3 
Health 12 12 24 
Human Development 1 1 
Human Rights 15 22 37 
Humanitarian 7 3 10 
Internally displaced People 15 25 40 
Immigration 2 1 3 
Nationalism 1 1 
Olympics 1 4 5 
Poverty 2 2 
Reform 4 5 9 
Religion 6 4 10 
Technology 2 1 3 
Women 1 1 
Grand Total 863 1282 2145 
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General Foreign Policy Tags Imported From Think Tanks’ Websites 
Topics 2004 2008 Total 
Military 220 347 567 
AEI 31 43 74 
Brookings 35 57 92 
Carnegie 2 3 5 
Cato 5 33 38 
CFR 50 80 130 
Heritage 34 46 80 
RAND 63 85 148 
Political 402 427 829 
AEI 94 80 174 
Brookings 85 112 197 
Carnegie 3 11 14 
Cato 37 30 67 
CFR 84 91 175 
Heritage 84 92 176 
RAND 15 11 26 
Social 241 508 749 
AEI 36 32 68 
Brookings 38 158 196 
Carnegie 14 9 23 
Cato 63 102 165 
CFR 52 124 176 
Heritage 18 68 86 
RAND 20 15 35 
Grand Total 863 1282 2145 
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Detailed Results of Supervised Tagging of Sentences 
MILITARY 76483 
Defense 76483 
POLITICAL 337114 
International Affairs 337114 
SOCIAL 73285 
Macroeconomics 8863 
Civil Rights 5086 
Health 6500 
Agriculture 1155 
Labor, Immigration, Employment 4799 
Education 8285 
Environment 3157 
Energy 10295 
Space, Science, Technology 6588 
Foreign Trade 16953 
Sports and Recreation 1054 
Churches and Religion 550 
Grand Total 486882 
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Op-Code Scheme in Profiler Plus –Release 6.11.2 
<xml application="Profiler Plus" 
   rcsID="$Id: $" 
   api="4"> 
 <scheme name="OpCode2"> 
  <config> 
   <results type="mdb"> 
   coding 
   </results> 
  </config> 
  
  <tables> 
   Tagging59,3.0, 
   SALT,4.5, 
   OPCode/OP04Actors 
   OPCode/OP04Actors2 
   OpCode/SALTFixes 
   OPCode/OP04Actors3 
   OPCode/OP05CooperationAndConflict 
   OPCode/OP06SetLemmaToText 
   OPCode/OP06PostActorsPreVerbs 
   OPCode/OP07CasesTensesVoice 
   OPCode/OP08PostVerbs 
   OPCode/OP20CombineVerbPhrases 
   OPCode/OP21IdentifyIntransitives 
   OPCode/OP22OpCodeVerbReduction 
   OPCode/OP31ClarifySubjects 
   OPCode/OP31OpCodeVerbCaseExceptions 
   OPCode/OP32OpCodeFutureTenseExceptions 
   OPCode/OP32OpCodeFutureTenseExceptions 
   OPCode/OP33OpCodeBaseExceptions 
   OPCode/OP34OpCodeObjectExceptions 
   OPCode/OP34Groups 
   OpCode/OP35TargetedOpCode 
  </tables> 
 </scheme> 
</xml> 
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